Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Aviation and Transport Security) Share this | Hansard source

On 4 December 2003 the Howard government announced its intention to create the position of the Inspector of Transport Security. It is a sign of the Howard government’s mismanagement and incompetence that it took more than two years after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 for it to even accept the need for a senior inspector of our transport systems. Having an independent expert running a ruler over our aviation, land and maritime security operations is an invaluable audit of our preparedness to prevent or disrupt potential terrorist attacks targeting Australia or Australians. Since 9-11 it has become clear that terrorist organisations continue to see mass transport systems as attractive targets. In spite of the repeated statements from various Howard government ministers seeking to score political points out of the current security situation, they did precious little about fulfilling this important role.

It was not until 23 November 2004 that former AFP Commissioner Mick Palmer was appointed as the Inspector of Transport Security. That was nearly a full year after the announcement that the position would be created. It took a full three years after 9-11 for the Liberals to get someone to work on this important task. As with so many other areas of policy, the Liberal government has been more interested in the political spin than in taking the sensible, practical measures necessary to make travel as safe as possible in a new climate of threat. But even here, with this appointment, the Howard government is playing a game of smoke and mirrors. The government has engaged the inspector on average for only one day a week. We have had a part-time Inspector of Transport Security at the same time as terrorist attacks on mass transport systems have increased.

On 7 July 2005 terrorist attacks on rail and bus systems in London killed 56 people, including one Australian, and hundreds more were injured in that appalling attack. Two weeks later, on 21 July 2005, four terrorists attempted bomb attacks that disrupted part of London’s public transport system. Stations were closed and evacuated. The intention of the terrorists was to cause large-scale loss of life, but luckily only the detonators of the bombs exploded. On that occasion, innocent travellers were lucky. In March 2004 we saw terrorists successfully attacking a commuter train in Madrid. More recently, in July this year, we have seen terrorist bomb attacks kill innocent people on a train in Mumbai in India. On 11 August—almost three months ago now—the United Kingdom went to its highest threat level after authorities arrested 24 suspects in a plot to blow up as many as 10 passenger jets leaving Britain for the United States.

Meanwhile, here at home, we have seen repeated breaches of security in the Australian transport industry. All the while, the Howard government has been asleep at the wheel. In Western Australia there was the incident in March last year when three drunken men decided for a bit of a lark that they would jump the fence at Perth International Airport. They walked across the tarmac and, in fact, boarded an empty Qantas passenger plane. Thankfully, they were there for a drunken lark; they could easily have been there for far more sinister purposes. You might think that if security were to be top-class in one place in Australia it would be at Australia’s busiest airport in Sydney; yet, sadly, we know that is not the case. Earlier this year I raised in this parliament a number of breaches of security at Sydney airport. There was the incident in July this year where vehicles tailgated through a security gate. The gate was allowed up to enable one vehicle with a security pass to pass through. Two other vehicles quickly followed through without authority. On that occasion, it was again a case of good luck rather than good management. The two vehicles involved in breaching security were in the midst of an act of road rage. Again, contemplate what might have been the case had that been a planned attack, if it had been terrorists who wanted to get into Australia’s largest airport.

One of the great pities of that incident, as with a number of others, is that the exact problem was drawn to the attention of the government by the UK expert Sir John Wheeler, who delivered a report to the government in the second half of last year identifying a range of problems. He specifically mentioned the problem of vehicles tailgating through security checkpoints at airports. Twelve months after he pointed out that specific problem, we saw examples of it at our largest airport. Then there was that rather famous timber chock that was loosely securing a door on the public side of the airport. The only thing stopping the public walking into the secure area of the airport was a piece of timber in the track of a sliding door. You could lift up the piece of timber and the sliding door would open, allowing you entry into the secure side of the airport. When presented with this in the chamber, the minister sought to deny it, in spite of the photographs we were able to produce of the door and the bit of timber.

And who can forget the camel suit at Sydney airport? In April 2005 a baggage handler managed to get a camel suit out of one of the checked bags. That is the sort of thing we could all have a laugh about in certain circumstances but, of course, this was a secure item in a secure area of one the most important transport hubs in the nation. If a person could easily get to that baggage and take items out, they could just as easily put something in. We know that a number of people who were working at Sydney airport were subsequently removed. Not all of them were removed for reasons associated with the camel suit, but some were removed for security reasons.

But it is not just at our airports that Australia has had these problems; we have seen disasters waiting to happen at our waterfronts and in our ocean lanes. This government has handed out voyage permits for foreign crewed ships, foreign flag of convenience vessels, as if—and I have described them in the past—they were tickets in a chook raffle at a Friday night pub draw. No review has been conducted by this government of the background of the ships or of the crew. The truth is that these ships are flagged in places like Panama, where there is no way of properly identifying the ownership and background of the vessels, and the government makes no real effort to get a security clearance on the individuals who crew the ships, yet those ships carry dangerous chemicals around our ports. On many occasions in this parliament I have raised the example in September of last year of one of those vessels, the Pancaldo, travelling around the Australian coastline on a voyage permit, carrying 3,500 tonnes of ammonium nitrate. Ammonium nitrate is the explosive of choice that terrorists have used around the world for some years. Its use has been regulated by agreement with COAG, but the Commonwealth allows its widespread use by flag of convenience vessels with crews who have never undergone security clearances here in Australia, unlike Australian crewed vessels, where maritime security identity cards provide thorough background checks on all Australian seafarers.

Then, of course, there is land transport, with rail stock and commuter transport. We do not have to travel far around Australia to find rail stock with graffiti on it. That graffiti is often viewed by some—those who created it—as a work of art. They spend some time graffitiing the train to have what they regard as their work of art on display. They are in what should be secure areas for 30 minutes, one hour or two hours doing their graffiti, their so-called artwork. The truth is that terrorists need only a few seconds to deposit a bomb.

Then there is the problem we have in our regional airports, from which, as we speak today, there are flights into major centres like Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane, where passengers hop on the flights without ever having any check done on what they are carrying onto the flight. There is no inspection of either them or their carry-on baggage. They could take weapons on; they could take bombs on; they could take a hand grenade on. Frankly, no-one would know because no checks are performed on them. Again, it is a serious flaw in our transport security network, which was identified by Sir John Wheeler more than a year ago and is still being neglected by the Howard government.

Just two weeks ago Sydney airport had to be partly evacuated precisely because of that problem. A flight arrived from Wagga Wagga and people who had hopped on the flight had never been scanned and had never had their luggage checked; they could have been carrying weapons or explosives. They wandered off into the wrong area of the airport and, all of a sudden, they were in a secure part of the airport without ever having been checked. When the authorities realised there was a problem, they had to evacuate part of Sydney airport and put everybody back through the security points.

These are the problems that have been occurring on a regular basis, but I have mentioned only a couple of them because of time constraints. In the five years since 11 September 2001, when the world was put on notice that public transport systems were a target for terrorists, this government has been asleep at the wheel. It has taken years—in fact, until tonight, it has taken five years—to put in place an Inspector of Transport Security and provide that person with the legislative basis for their work. Even after his appointment, the inspector had no legal powers to do anything. Labor has been calling for legislation to underpin this important job for years. Finally, last year, on 23 May, the government announced its intention to underpin the inspector’s role with legislation. We applaud that. Labor has consistently argued that the Inspector of Transport Security have legislation authorising the important tasks that need to be performed by the person fulfilling that role. Some 17 months later we finally have a bill in this parliament—that is, five years after 9-11 the Howard government has managed to complete, or nearly complete, the process of establishing the Inspector of Transport Security. I have recently described that progress as akin to a snail on sleeping pills.

Who would seriously contemplate this as a response to the threat of terrorism, a response to the 9-11 disaster, a response to the Madrid train bombing, a response to the London bombings? Who would credibly accept that in the face of those threats a reasonable response of a diligent government is to wait five years before actually getting a senior Inspector of Transport Security on the job with a piece of legislation to say what he can and cannot do? Finally, on 18 October this year—just a couple of weeks ago—the government tabled this bill in the House of Representatives after what can only be described as a disgraceful and unacceptable delay in the face of a dangerous list of terror attacks overseas and flaws in our own system.

Labor supports the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006. However, there are flaws in it that need to be rectified, as well as improvements that need to be made to enhance the inspector’s role and the independence of the inspector. I want to quickly refer to just a couple of provisions in the bill and then address those areas where further improvements are required. Clause 80 requires the inspector to minimise disruption to transport. That is a sensible provision—Labor wants commuters to be safe and on time.

Clause 81 correctly obliges the inspector to act consistently with Australia’s international obligations, and that is a sensible provision, of course, that we support. From time to time it may be appropriate for states and territories to confer powers and functions on the inspector, and clause 83 of the bill allows that temporary passing of powers from the states to the inspector to occur.

The bill also ensures the interests of the states and territories are protected. The consent of the relevant state or territory minister is required before the Inspector of Transport Security can conduct an investigation into a matter that falls within their jurisdiction. I have no reason whatsoever to doubt that all of the states and territories would work cooperatively with the Commonwealth and the Inspector of Transport Security, especially in the event of an incident or a terrorist attack.

But there are five particular areas of this bill that we think require improvement and amendment, and during the consideration in detail I will be moving amendments to give effect to these matters. This bill claims to provide a framework for independent inquiry and recommendations in relation to transport security and offshore security matters. Under the bill, though, the inspector has no power whatsoever to independently initiate an inquiry of his or her own volition.

The Minister for Transport and Regional Services, Mark Vaile, has made some statements about this bill but, like so much of what the government tell you, the devil is in the detail. The minister for transport has said:

The strengths of the legislative framework to support the role of the Inspector of Transport Security include: the independence of the inspector ...

I am not quite sure what definition of ‘independence’ the minister had in mind but it is certainly not the simple English view of independence. The truth is that the inspector has no power whatsoever for an own-motion investigation into a federal matter. He can only investigate what the minister wants investigated, not what needs to be investigated. Indeed, the bill determines that the inspector is not allowed to look at anything until the minister authorises it. Subsequently, the minister can withdraw that authorisation before a report is produced. That is hardly a common-sense definition of an independent inspector. This is somebody well and truly under the yoke of the minister of the day. You might as well make the person a ministerial staffer and put them in the minister’s office. They can only do what the minister wants when the minister wants. That is not what we need if we are going to properly protect the Australian travelling public.

The government have tried, also, to slip in a clause to remain lazy on security. Clause 25(3) of the bill says that the inspector may be appointed on a part-time basis. It does not require him to be appointed part time but we know that that is the government’s form. On average, the inspector has only been asked to work one day a week. Protecting Australians on our transport system is a full-time task. We will move an amendment to stop the government providing Australians with part-time security.

A properly operating Inspector of Transport Security will play a key role in security and counterterrorism matters. By its very nature that will involve access to classified and sensitive material, some of which cannot be made public. However, that does not mean that you cannot have transparency or accountability. As with other senior positions, like the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security—and also positions such as the director of ASIO—appropriate involvement of the Leader of the Opposition of the day provides public confidence that necessary secrecy is not a cloak for hiding poor performance or improper activities.

We should bring this bill into line with the principles enunciated in the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986. Before a recommendation is made to the Governor-General for the appointment of a person as the Inspector of Transport Security, the relevant minister should consult with the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives. That is a provision similar to section 6 of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986. Similarly, the relevant minister should give a copy of a report furnished under subclause (1) to the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives but, in accordance with the similar provisions that apply to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, there would also in the act be a duty on the Leader of the Opposition to treat as secret any part of the report that is not tabled in a house of the parliament.

That brings me to questions associated with public access to reports. Clause 64(1) of the bill states:

The Minister may table a copy of a final report, or part of a final report, in the Parliament, if the Minister thinks that it is, on balance, in the public interest to do so.

In other words, the bill proposes an Inspector of Transport Security who is not allowed to look at anything unless the minister says he can. And the bill then says that, having investigated a matter and reported to the minister, the minister can decide at his absolute discretion whether or not he tells anybody what the Inspector of Transport Security found. So if it is a bit embarrassing for the minister or the government day it will not be a hard task to put it in the top drawer and never have it seen again.

That is not how the nation is going to secure our transport networks against the threat that it now confronts. The word ‘may’ should be changed to ‘shall’ to make it a compulsory requirement to table some report for public consumption. As is customary in matters of this kind, the report tabled may, in fact, be an edited version of a classified document. Sir John Wheeler’s report on aviation security is a clear example. Indeed, I know a few people who wondered why our own Inspector of Transport Security could not have undertaken that review. In any event, it illustrates the process which Labor believes should be followed in this case. I will be moving amendments to give effect to those changes when the bill is considered in detail.

We are also debating the Inspector of Transport Security (Consequential Provisions) Bill 2006 associated with the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006. That consequential provisions bill is important in that it encourages the voluntary disclosure of information under the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006. The object of the bill is to provide an exemption from a request under the Freedom of Information Act for information gathered by the Inspector of Transport Security in the course of the inquiry. It is important to encourage people to provide the inspector with intelligence on security and safety matters. A lot of that inside information is often personal. It can save lives by identifying vulnerabilities quickly and accurately. However, it is important that information be kept confidential. In reading through the international standards and recommended practices to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, a rationale for controlling freedom of information disclosure in aviation matters is articulated. These views are relevant to controlling access to data on black box recorders and I believe they are appropriate and relevant in dealing with the other matters that the Inspector of Transport Security would be obliged to investigate.

This fact was recognised by the 35th assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organisation which noted that existing national laws and regulations in many states may not adequately address the manner in which safety information is protected from inappropriate use. The sole purpose of protecting this information from inappropriate use is to ensure its continued availability so that proper and timely preventative action can be taken and aviation safety improved. The bill protects the information generated or gathered by the inspector in the course of an inquiry from being released under an FOI claim and supports the other confidentiality provisions in the main bill. The inspector’s inquiries will be conducted on a no-blame basis and that is clearly an appropriate thing. Information generated or gathered in the course of inquiries cannot be used as evidence in civil or criminal proceedings except in very limited circumstances set out in the main bill.

Clause 67(3) of the bill permits the minister to issue a certificate indicating that disclosure of the information in a civil proceeding or coronial inquiry is not likely to interfere with an inquiry under this bill. For the information to be disclosed to a court or coroner, clause 67(5) must also be satisfied. These are all sensible provisions to enable the release of information where it is not in any way going to impede either the inquiry or subsequent inquiries and access to information that is going to, in other events, save lives. Clause 67(4) permits disclosure of information in a criminal proceeding where the minister has issued a certificate stating that the disclosure is not likely to interfere with an inquiry. The minister may only issue a certificate if the criminal proceeding is for a serious offence and the disclosure is necessary to establish a chain of evidence.

Clause 67(5), to which I referred earlier, permits a court or coroner to order disclosure when the court or coroner considers the adverse impact of disclosing the information is outweighed by the public interest in the administration of justice. Labor has no objections to these provisions. Clause 67(6) permits a court or coroner to place conditions on the publication or communication of protected information that is to be disclosed or ordered under the subclause, including any information that may be obtained from such information. These are important protections.

We all know the important use of black box data—the information of what is said in cockpits—and its vital role in enabling post-incident investigations. Ultimately, the purpose of that is to prevent accidents from happening again. It is important to ensure that access to the full information is maintained and these provisions, I think, go a long way to applying that standard to the role of the Inspector of Transport Security; we think they are appropriate. The procedure reinforces the policy intention that, except in extraordinary circumstances, information collected for the purposes of an inquiry conducted by the inspector should only be used for that purpose. Labor endorses this provision. It is consistent with Australia’s international obligations with respect to the collection and use of information arising from safety incidents involving transport.

That takes me back to the general purpose of the bill and the Howard government’s performance on this matter. There has been a very unsatisfactory five-year delay in putting in place what is potentially a very important role in improving the security of Australians, whether they are travelling by air, on land or at sea. These are difficult times for many countries in the world to grapple with. There is a new threat that affects people in their normal daily lives in a way that we are not used to. When we turn on our televisions and see what happened on September 11 in America, or when we see what happened in July of last year in London, it affects all of us profoundly and sits in the back of our minds when we travel as well. It is important that when people travel they have the full confidence that all reasonable measures that can be taken have been.

I have cited in my speech a raft of examples where security within Australian airports and on maritime matters has been well below what any competent performance would deliver. The government have not been diligent in addressing these matters. They have been quick to get the political spin out there; they simply have not been quick to do the sensible, practical things that are needed. I hope that the Inspector of Transport Security is given the independence the minister spoke about—and that will only happen if our amendments are adopted. And I hope he fulfils that role of ensuring not just that there is an investigation post incident but that his vast experience and the powers that this bill confers are used to take preventative measures so that all of us in Australia, when we travel, do so knowing that all the things that can be done to make that travel safe have indeed been done. I move:

That all words after ‘That’ be omitted with a view to substituting the following words: “whilst not declining to give the bill a second reading, the House:

(1)

notes the failure of the Howard Government to appoint a person as Inspector of Transport Security until one year after the announcement of the position;

(2)

notes that the Howard Government finally committed to underpin this important job with appropriate laws in May of 2005 but has only now introduced legislation into the House for that purpose;

(3)

condemns the slowness with which the Howard government dealt with the important role of Inspector of Transport Security;

(4)

condemns the Howard government’s dismissive use of the Inspector of Transport Security who has been engaged on an average of just one day a week in spite of repeated failures in security in the Australian transport sector at the same time as terrorists have targeted aviation and rail transport over years; and

(5)

condemns the Howard Government for its failure to engage the Inspector of Transport Security in a full time capacity”.

See this speech in context