Craig Emerson (Rankin, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

What has changed since 2002? The then health minister, in summing up her position on cloning, said:

I believe strongly that it is wrong to create human embryos solely for research. It is not morally permissible to develop an embryo with the intent of truncating it at an early stage for the benefit of another human being.

Well, what has changed? We are now being asked, in considering the Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction and the Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amendment Bill 2006, to examine and then approve the creation of a human embryo for the very purposes which Senator Patterson argued so persuasively in 2002 should not be allowed. So there must be some scientific breakthrough or some new moral perspective to warrant not only the consideration of this legislation but also a vote in favour of it. And that is what we need to examine: what has changed?

On the question of scientific breakthroughs and promise, Professor Loane Skene, who was a member of the Lockhart committee, gave a presentation to those members of the parliament who wished to hear from her and she described therapeutic cloning as pure science. I commend Professor Skene for her candour and the frank manner in which she answered questions that were asked of her. Professor Skene is clearly an advocate of therapeutic cloning but she did not seek to mislead those who asked the question, ‘What is the promise that is available under this form of experimentation?’ She did not seek to mislead; she said that it was pure science—in other words, it held out no particular promise. So, on the scientific field, nothing has changed since 2002 when the parliament unanimously voted against cloning.

The member for Blair has just advised us of the suffering that he experiences as a sufferer of diabetes type 1. I am very sorry for that. I am very sorry for the suffering of any and all human beings. But the member for Blair then went on to say that a cure for diabetes type 1 is ‘so close you can almost taste it’ and that this proposal for therapeutic cloning is contributing to the scientific knowledge that will lead to a cure for diabetes type 1 which is ‘so close’ that ‘you can almost taste it’. That is, unfortunately, incorrect. There has been no development in relation to therapeutic cloning that would give the member for Blair, and other sufferers of diabetes type 1, any hope or promise that such a cure will be found through therapeutic cloning. Indeed, there is no particular promise at all associated with this line of research.

We need then to examine what has changed in relation to the ethical consideration of this issue. The proposal before us creates a new ethical boundary. There is no dispute from the Lockhart committee that the bill would allow the creation of a human embryo, yet in his contribution the member for Blair said that this would not be an embryo and that an embryo would not be created despite what ‘ideologues’ say. I do not believe for a moment that asserting that this process creates a human embryo is an ideological position. The Lockhart review committee’s report said that this is the creation of a human embryo. Is the member for Blair accusing them of ideology when they conceded—volunteered—that this was the creation of an embryo, when they are, in fact, advocates of therapeutic cloning? It is incorrect for the member for Blair to assert that only people who are ideologues could claim that therapeutic cloning creates a human embryo. The Lockhart review asserted with full confidence that there is no doubt that this process does create a human embryo.

Furthermore, there is no dispute that such embryos are destined for destruction. The Lockhart committee does not assert otherwise. It is very open and honest that the purpose of the creation of these human embryos is for experimentation and destruction. That is beyond debate and beyond dispute. The boundary that we are being asked to cross in this parliament is to create a human life for the purposes of experimentation and then destruction. That is a huge ethical boundary that we must all consider very carefully.

What significance are we to attach to the embryo so created? Those who argue in favour of this legislation effectively answer ‘not much’; it is not really very important. Those who argue against this legislation say that this embryo is important. Again we should look at what the Lockhart committee report says about this, because it needs to grapple with this new ethical issue. It says:

... the Committee found that, while it was difficult to logically define a moral difference between embryos formed by fertilisation and those formed by nuclear transfer or related methods, it appeared that embryos formed by fertilisation of eggs by sperm may have a different social or relational significance from embryos formed by nuclear transfer.

Those are the key words: ‘a different social or relational significance’. This becomes the new ethical definition: if an embryo has a social or relational significance, we should respect it and protect it; if an embryo does not have a social or relational significance, we should not worry about its destruction. What a subjective judgement that is. Who is going to go around Australia and the world deciding whether a particular embryo has a social or relational significance? That is very worrying. It is very dangerous territory to have such subjective judgements made outside of this parliament by people who just determine on the basis of their own view of the world whether a particular embryo that has been created has a social or relational significance. As Father Frank Brennan argues, this is very dangerous territory.

When does a cloned embryo attain such a social or relational significance that it then demands, according to those who wrote the Lockhart report, proper consideration, respect and protection? Apparently the answer to that is on the 14th day. How about that! On the 13th day, this embryo does not have a social or relational significance. On the 15th day, it does have a social or relational significance. So, on the 14th day, we will destroy it to prevent it getting a social or relational significance on the 15th day. That there is something magical about the 14th day is an absurd proposition. I asked Professor Skene and others, ‘What is this great moral event that occurs on the 14th day of the existence of this embryo so created?’ The only answer they could give was, ‘We think that is roughly when nerve cells begin to form. Since nerve cells could begin to form around then, it might hurt this organism when it is killed.’

This is quite absurd. They needed a number, they chose the number 14 and then they tried to give some meaning to that number. I then asked, ‘How could we be assured that we as a parliament are not asked to then approve the creation of these embryos for, say, 28 days or 56 days or 112 days?’ The answer was, ‘No such request has been made overseas.’ Great! We are now reassured that, because no request has been made overseas to date, no such request ever will be made. By this time, we have crossed the ethical boundary. As other speakers, such as the member for Werriwa, have said, is there a new boundary to be crossed which is called ‘the early stages of foetal development’? Are we then going to be asked to approve the creation of and experimentation on an embryo right up to and including the early stages of foetal development, and then approve its destruction? Surely the parliament would be getting pretty squeamish about that, but I do not know where the boundary is once you create the 14 days. I do not know where it stops, and that is why I believe it is so dangerous.

We all—everyone in this parliament—want cures to debilitating diseases that prematurely end lives and that so badly affect the quality of life. But all the advice that has come to me and to other colleagues who are arguing against this legislation is that adult stem cell research holds more promise than the pure science, as described by Professor Skene, associated with therapeutic cloning. The fact of the matter is that all of the representations that I have received on this from local residents of the electorate of Rankin have asked me to vote against it. Not one has asked me to vote in favour of it. Other people may have had different experiences, but I am reporting at least one indicator of the feeling in my community, and I always take account of the feelings that are expressed in the community that I represent. Ultimately, we are being asked to agree to the creation of human life for the purposes of its destruction. I cannot agree with that, and I oppose the bill.

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