Lindsay Tanner (Melbourne, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Finance) Share this | Hansard source

In the debate on the bill with respect to stem cell experimentation in 2002, I expressed concerns about the gradual extension of moral boundaries that was being undertaken in that piece of legislation. I have greater concerns with respect to the Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction and the Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amendment Bill 2006 which is before us tonight. I will ultimately vote in favour of this bill and I hope that it passes. But I hold serious reservations about the path that we are heading down and therefore I—along, I suspect, with a number of others—would caution that it will take a lot of persuading to take us any further than this particular position.

Once we opened the door to scientific interference with the process of procreation through the inauguration of IVF, we opened up a range of possibilities. What we are seeing is the gradual extension of those possibilities. We saw that in the 2002 stem cell legislation and more recently in the debate about this legislation that is before the parliament this evening. In the debate in 2002 I pointed out the difficulty that we faced then and that inevitably we will always face when we are dealing with these kinds of matters: once you allow for scientific intervention in the creation of human life—as we did with the inauguration of in vitro fertilisation—that opens up new possibilities, which in turn create scope for controversy and debate as to whether or not those possibilities should be available to be used. That in turn leads to new anomalies, new difficulties and new controversies.

For example, in that speech—and I apologise for the indulgence of quoting my own words from Hansard but I think that it is important—I said:

... if we allow the creation of what are deemed surplus embryos, it seems to me that it is not morally repugnant to seek to use those embryos for a noble purpose—namely, experimentation with a view to improving human life—if the alternative use is that they are simply to be destroyed in any event.

The difficulty is, though, that once we allow that we then create a problem of distinguishing that from embryo farming and creating embryos for the purpose of scientific research rather than for the direct purpose of procreation. In order to distinguish one from the other, we end up in a position where we are making definitions based on intent so that it is acceptable to experiment on an embryo that is created for other purposes but it is not acceptable to experiment on an embryo that is created for the purpose of experimentation ... that is a fine distinction and one that, in the longer term—sadly, I think—will be difficult to maintain. Therein lies the challenge that we face with these issues: ensuring that we make rules and draw lines that are sustainable and logical.

Therefore I find it perhaps not surprising that we are here this evening debating this legislation. In effect, the perspective I adopted in 2002 about the difficulty that this legislation would create has been the driving element in the argument with respect to the legislation before us.

My concern is that although we may move beyond that particular anomalous distinction that that legislation created, we are opening up new and in some respects more difficult moral dilemmas. I must confess that I was troubled by the original legislation that was introduced into the Senate, but I am pleased with the amendments that were made in the Senate and therefore I feel that I can vote for the legislation. Frankly, I am not sure how I would have dealt with the original legislation had it not been amended in the way it has been. I am pleased that those amendments have occurred.

The crucial question here for this parliament is whether we adhere to a basic philosophical position that ultimately boils down to the proposition that the ends justify the means. Morality of whatever kind, of whatever description we choose to give to it, does have a crucial role in the decisions that we make in this parliament—no more so than with respect to matters associated with the creation or destruction of human life. That does not have to be morality as defined by particular religious adherents. Morality simply as an expression of a humanistic point of view—even a very strictly secular point of view—can be just as deeply held and just as philosophically based as a more strictly religious based notion of morality. But, one way or another, the key dynamic underneath the choices that we face with this legislation is ultimately between a more utilitarian perspective, which at its most extreme ends up in a position of the end justifying the means, and one that emphasises the moral or ethical dimension that has its basis in philosophical concepts of human nature and human dignity, with or without a particular religious dimension.

For example, there are certain things that the vast majority of people in this country and other countries find morally repugnant and therefore reject without actually asking the question: could we as a society benefit from those things? We recoil with repugnance from some of the medical experiments and the eugenics experiments under Nazism. There were infamous attempts to create pure Aryans with children that were the product of deliberate breeding of people of supposedly pure Aryan stock and medical experiments by some of the more infamous Nazi doctors. Quite rightly, we do not start our examination of those issues by asking: could we as a species or as a society gain something from this? We recoil morally, because that is repugnant.

I am not suggesting for a moment that the proposals that are before the House are in the same category as those, but I am using that to illustrate how it is an incorrect way of looking at things to start from a utilitarian perspective only and then worry about moral or ethical questions later. In my view, if there is a clear moral or ethical dimension to a matter, as there obviously is in this case, that has to be our starting point.

So in many respects the impassioned and entirely legitimate debate about the prospective benefits of stem cell research is a little bit beside that point, in the sense that if it is morally wrong to undertake particular activities then that is the pivotal question. That is the issue that we have to resolve. As a society, do we draw a line and say that we do not wish to undertake this particular kind of activity, irrespective of what we may materially gain from it? The debates about slavery in the 18th and 19th centuries were ultimately about morality, and the question of economic issues—which did actually figure in some debates about slavery—was always a subsidiary question. The first question that we must ask ourselves in this situation is: is this right or wrong? That is not an easy question to answer, but it is important that we do not simply rush headlong down the path of scientific experimentation on ourselves, no matter what the prospective benefits may be, without asking ourselves the question: is this morally right?

Equally, the argument that comes from sections of the opposition to this legislation and, indeed, to equivalent experimentation—that it is unnecessary and therefore it should be illegal—is clearly illogical. We do not ban things because they are unnecessary; we ban them because they are wrong. The notion that somehow everything that may be required or produced by experimentation on embryonic stem cells can equally be done by adult stem cells is neither here nor there. That is in my view an entirely irrelevant consideration. We do not ban things because there are alternative ways of achieving the same objective; we ban things because they are wrong. So the onus is on those who oppose the legislation to argue the case that this is wrong.

I mentioned that question of morality and the role of the churches. Once again I want to place on the record that even though some of the churches—and possibly most of them; I have not done a tally—have a different point of view from me on this particular legislation, I welcome their contribution to these debates. I think it is extremely important for legislators of whatever party that, when we are confronted with these challenging new issues and when new frontiers are being explored, religious organisations—whose job it is to puzzle over moral dilemmas, to think deeply about the future of humanity and to express a wider view about how we should deal with each other—bring perspectives to the debate. I do not particularly care that those perspectives will sometimes—perhaps often—be different from mine. So I welcome again the contribution that the various churches make to this discussion.

There is a wider issue that is the primary cause for my concern. It is why, although I do intend to vote for this legislation, it is going to take a lot of persuading in the future to get me to go any further down this path. That issue is that we are, as a society, gradually acquiring the ability to change the nature of what it means to be human. Because of scientific and technological advance, we are gradually getting into a position where we can recreate ourselves as a species. The implications of that are absolutely profound. At some point we may cross a moral boundary, where we will in effect re-engineer what human life is, or what it is to become, in ways that are entirely unpredictable and raise a whole lot of very fundamental questions about the nature of humanity. I fear we are getting close to that point. That is, finally, what this question is about for me: how far do we go down this path of scientific or direct technological interference with the creation of human life and manipulation of ourselves in order to achieve wider benefit for humanity, before we get to a point where we cease to be what we have been?

There are already serious moral dilemmas beginning to emerge. Embryos are now being screened for genetic defects. Babies with particular genetic material needed to save the life of an older brother or sister are being engineered—in other words, deliberately created for the purpose of saving human life. Some are even seeking to create babies with disabilities that match their own, such as deafness. Bioethicists such as Julian Savulescu of Oxford University are arguing quite seriously that parents have a moral obligation to create the best child possible. That sends a chill down my spine, but the person putting forward that point of view is a serious philosopher and a serious person in this debate. We should treat those words very seriously.

Philosophers are even debating things that might seem a little wacky, such as the implications of a society where sex is no longer necessary for reproduction. We may soon be able to permanently alter our personalities through drug therapies. We may even start to merge with machines or produce hybrid species that are only part human. That sounds ludicrous, I know, but I had the pleasure of meeting and listening to a world renowned scientist, Susan Greenfield, who is an English scientist from Oxford University recently working as a thinker in residence for the South Australian government. She talks of ‘the merging of carbon and silicon systems’—that is, inert and organic matter, such as us as human beings, capable of being merged.

Directly connecting our brain cells to computers through body implants could soon be a possibility. Advances in medical science already enable us to radically change our physical appearance. There is a very big question for us as to what society would be like if we were able to, at will, change our innate characteristics or those of our children. There are some pretty obvious concerns about this. We may reduce our genetic diversity, increase our vulnerability to diseases or create much greater intolerance or discrimination against people who for one reason or another are not able to access the technologies that can alter who and what they are. People who have been in some ways engineered may even seek to get rid of those who have not, on the basis that they are in some way defective. The underlying logic of eugenicism is never far below the surface when some of these issues are discussed.

It is understandable that we should seek to improve ourselves and, particularly when you listen to some of the impassioned speeches in these debates in this parliament, it is absolutely understandable that people want to support scientific research that may enable us to get rid of or modify some of the appalling diseases and genetic conditions that millions of humans around the world suffer from. But I think we need to be careful in order to ensure that, in doing so, we do not at the same time start to interfere with the unique complexity and diversity of what the human race is.

If you want one or two simple illustrations of this, why is it that we go to great lengths to keep drugs out of sport? We use artificial devices for all kinds of things. Why do we keep drugs out of sport—or try to? It is because we value the contest based on genetic chance and individual character more than a contest between scientifically created or engineered human beings. Why do we value extraordinary physical beauty so much? It is because it is scarce—because it is inaccessible. It is subjective but it is inaccessible. If all of us had the capacity to make ourselves beautiful in conventional terms very easily then beauty would cease to mean anything. Why don’t we allow computers to compete in the world chess championships or in art competitions? The answer is simple: because they would then become competitions between computer programs.

Scientific advance cannot be stopped, but it can be managed and it can be regulated. I have as much desire as anybody else in this parliament to see advances in cures for some of the appalling diseases and illnesses we suffer. I have three close relatives with Alzheimer’s. It would be of enormous benefit to a huge number of people around the world if research of this kind were to find a cure for that illness. There are many other illnesses that are equally or more serious for which a cure, if we could find it, would be of great benefit to the human race.

These are worthy objectives, but we need to be conscious of drawing lines. I, with some reservations, will be voting for this bill, but I do make it very clear that, with regard to anything further in this pattern of legislation that emerges in the future—which I suspect it inevitably will—I will require a great deal of convincing to go further. I am already worried about where this trend is heading and I am already worried about the outer limits of scientific ambit claims as to what should be permissible. Ultimately I believe that there is such a thing as human nature and human dignity and that there are certain things, however irrational it may seem in certain lights, that should be no-go zones for us as the human race. We as a parliament should stand clear in our position that we do not support unfettered scientific interference with the nature of ourselves.

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