Peter Garrett (Kingsford Smith, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Reconciliation and the Arts) Share this | Hansard source

I value and very much appreciate the opportunity of joining with parliamentary colleagues on both sides of the chamber in considering the Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction and the Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amendment Bill 2006, which the House has been considering over the past day and will continue to consider. It is a bill about legalising the specific act of cloning human cells for research purposes, and one which I have a number of reservations about. But as many speakers have observed, most recently the member for Tangney, there are a number of very serious questions that emerge for members to consider, in particular where they have personal experience in their family or community of people who suffer diseases which the technology identified in the bill, it is argued, has some prospects of treating and curing in the longer term.

In the most general sense, these issues are difficult because profound questions arise concerning our use of technology, the capacity that technology has to modify the basic building blocks of life and the effect that that modification is having on the intellectual, religious and political foundations of our culture. Our individual values are challenged by this technology; and as our individual values are challenged so is our democracy, which is made up by those individual values when we organise together. Given the extraordinary onward march of technology and the issues that continue to be thrown up when the force of technology intersects with these values, I do not think this will be the last occasion when we consider matters of such complexity as these.

Four years ago the parliament specifically rejected the proposals that are before us today. Under the 2002 legislation, embryonic stem cell research was only permissible as a consequence of the availability of surplus eggs produced for the purposes of ART which otherwise would have perished. Had I been a member of this House then, I would have supported that legislation. But we are now being asked to agree to embryonic stem cell research which involves the creation of clones for the purposes of medical research for a period of up to 14 days where the embryos, once the stem cells are harvested, are destroyed. Whilst the proposed legislative framework surrounding these activities can and should be sufficiently rigorous to prevent abuses, as other members have noted, Australian scientists’ ethical rigour and research abilities are both acknowledged and I think confirmed by their current practice—although I must say, by way of parenthesis, that I am alarmed at some suggestions that have come to us that evidence given by scientists to the Senate previously may not have seen them disclose their commercial interests in that matter. That notwithstanding, I think it is the legislators’ task not only to satisfy ourselves that adequate guidelines and proposed regulations are put in place—and this bill does address those matters to some extent—but also to consider much more clearly what the implications and consequences of passing a bill of this kind might be.

I am mindful of those examples of human behaviour where pushing the line or going past the legal threshold over which an activity such as one defined and identified by the parliament should not take place actually does occur. In this case it is clear that the bill proposes such a line, and that is the period of some 14 days, beyond which such research would not be permitted. But, as has been raised by a number of speakers, it is a matter of some concern to those of us who have borne witness to the way in which the lines, the boundaries, the legislative or guideline barriers that have been established in the past in matters similar to this are constantly being pushed at and on some occasions are being deliberately breached.

When we consider the history of technological advances we have to recognise how much has been done to improve the lot of people, their health and their wellbeing over the centuries. It is impossible in this instance not to marvel at scientific progress. But at the same time we have to recognise that there is ample evidence that the original purpose of technologies is often times usurped, sometimes by the military, at other times because of the drive for a profit imperative, and is often times put to use in ways that fall well outside the realms contemplated by the originators of the technology. Whilst there are many examples, the one that comes to mind most clearly for me is the research that originated the splitting of the atom, with the consequent development of nuclear weapons. There is a vast expanse of literature, and I am pretty confident, Mr Deputy Speaker Jenkins, you are aware of some of it, which goes into some detail analysing the moral arguments that were considered by scientists at the time, including the great Albert Einstein. But—notwithstanding that brief excursion—I do think it is inevitable in the instances we are looking at in relation to the bill before the House that pressure to move those lines I identified will eventually be brought to bear if it is considered that, by moving those lines, there will be better scientific results. This alone is not necessarily reason enough to oppose embryonic stem cell research, but it is a factor for the parliament to consider in a debate of this kind where the technology is capable of creating something which previously could only be created by the union of a sperm with an egg—namely, in this instance, life. It is true that that situation has obtained for some time but, nevertheless, the power of this technology is remarkable and profound.

It is worth noting, from the recommendations of the Lockhart committee report, that the committee took as a starting point the identification of a community of diverse interests which makes up the Australian community. I was pleased in some ways to see that recognition of the diversity of the Australian community and, in part, it is reflected by the diversity of opinions that have been expressed in this debate. I do acknowledge the arguments that have been made by those who support the bill and the pleas that have been made by those who wish to see further experimentation and development of therapies to treat loved ones who have debilitating diseases. I do not think anyone is immune to the pleas. No-one is not mindful of the impact that suffering has both on loved ones and on their families. Indeed, suffering of the sort that has been mentioned in the debate will befall some of us, regrettably, in this chamber. But I do not believe the issue before us can be resolved only on those grounds. It is a complex matter we are debating, where reflections of religious belief and of values concerning how we view life inform the debate. I have to report to the House that I have received a number of representations from people, including from those who practise stem cell research, expressing their desire for this bill to pass. But it is the case that the majority of representations to me, including a number from members of the medical profession, have been opposed to the bill and have urged my opposition to the bill.

I also think it is the case that, notwithstanding the moderate amount of media coverage on these issues and the presence of some available information, there still is not widespread public awareness and knowledge of the complexities of the matters contained in the bill. I consider this a great deficiency. With the parliament being called on to make a deliberation about something of great moment of this kind and being given the opportunity to do it by way of a conscience vote, I would have much preferred a more comprehensive public discussion ensuing over a substantial period of time before the parliament addressed the legislation. Just as we do have a conscience vote here, it seems to me that there are very good arguments for a whole-of-community conscience consideration of matters of this kind. It is, I suppose, an inevitable fact of life that in this House we tend to hear from those people who, legitimately, have very strong but immediate interests in the outcome of legislation. We do not often get to hear as much from the broader and general public, who certainly have interests as well.

I also note that the legislation does not come to us from the government, which chose not to bring legislation forward, but comes by way of a private member’s bill, following the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002, the Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 and the Lockhart committee review. As this bill involves essentially regulating the activity of research where human embryos are created by methods other than by fertilisation of a human egg by human sperm—that is, a clone created by somatic cell nuclear transfer, which can be used for research but will be destroyed in the course of the research—it takes us to a different place in our deliberations from where the parliament has been before.

The basis that I referred to on which the Lockhart committee put forward its recommendations—that being a recognition of the plural nature of Australia—was expressed in terms of the questions that the parliament had to satisfy and identify: that the social and moral values that some communities attach to the human embryo need to be balanced against the social and moral value that other communities attach to the treatment of disease. The Lockhart committee identified that as being the junction point upon which we would be called on to make a decision.

In the case of the treatment that it refers to and the research that leads to that treatment—research, it has to be said, which is aimed at discovering therapies for diseases like diabetes—the debate here has not extended out to a discussion of what other factors and imperatives are driving the push to extend embryonic stem cell research: whether there are other economic imperatives at play. Nor has the question of research directions generally been substantially debated at this point in time.

The arguments in favour of the bill are that there is a greater potential benefit in research using embryonic stem cell research that overrides the moral status that attaches to the embryo. It is said that the potential benefit will not be realised until the process is permitted—that science would be prevented from bringing cures to diseases to people who so desperately need them—and that the guidelines and regulatory framework of the proposed legislation are sufficient to guard against unethical behaviour. Of course, finally, it is said that the 14-day limit for experimentation provided for in the bill provides a clear time line and a boundary beyond which no experimentation should occur.

There are additional claims, although I have to say some are speculative, made as to the limitless potential of embryonic stem cell therapy in the here and now. Notwithstanding that, it is little wonder that scientists, those who suffer terrible diseases, their families and many others in the community hopefully anticipate what potential cures such therapies might offer. But ‘might’ is the operative word as we consider this, and it leads to some of the arguments from those who have opposed the bill—in particular, the lack of success or research which validates the claims made by those who are supporting the bill. While this has been a contested point in the debate, it is the case that very few concrete advances have been made through embryonic stem cell research up to this point, whilst at the same time adult stem cell research is showing positive results—for example, in relation to type 2 diabetes—and it is not burdened with the ethical consequences and issues of embryonic stem cell research.

I want to make brief mention of the issue of the supply of eggs, the longer term consequences of the likely desire of researchers to seek to access a larger supply of eggs for their research and the impact on the health of women in those circumstances, which has been raised not only in the debate in the parliament but also in the community. It is here that I find the arguments of those who served on the Lockhart committee least convincing. Why is that? Because the research and economic imperative to access a large number of eggs for cloning will in my view inevitably lead to calls to amend legislation and guidelines to facilitate and encourage a greater supply. If in its initial phase there is a requirement for a number of eggs, numbering many hundreds towards thousands, necessary to create a single living clone then there is a calculation here which for me lacks proportion.

Up to now the act of intentionally creating a life which does involve the production of a variable number of eggs had at its core the intention of the creation of a life. But here in this bill, where clones are created, a large but variable number of eggs are required merely for the purposes of research and the entity is destroyed. In the case of the existing laws, whereby surplus eggs from IVF or ART which would otherwise perish are used, the purpose of creation and its potential after-effects are consistent at least with the existing reason for having eggs in the first place. But cloning introduces an entirely new basis which, whilst understandable, does not in my view justify the matters that are identified in the proposed legislation by way of research.

I also have in mind that the passage of the laws would bring subsequent pressure for further changes, both to extend the development of the human embryo clone past 14 days and later still to consider the implantation of a human embryo clone into a woman. Of course, arguments then would be made that the success rate of the existing program was proving to be poor and a period of review had been identified but that possible advantage could be gained if there were to be an extension and there were sufficient, in the Lockhart committee’s words, ‘communities of interests’ to call for such a change.

But, even if those objections and issues that I have identified can be allowed for, it seems to me that there is another sticking point in the bill before us that some members, including the member for Rankin, have identified. That is where the Lockhart committee identified what it described as a different social or relational significance that an embryo formed by fertilisation of an egg with a sperm has compared to an embryo formed by nuclear transfer.

But of course this raises the question: why is it determined that it is on the 14th day that a cloned embryo attains such significance and not before? Apparently the answer is that this is when there is a likelihood that the organism might be hurt, but this is really an arbitrary line that has been identified for the present on available scientific information and opinion. If this relational significance is a critical factor in determining the moral status of the organism then what place is there to have a dividing line where it suddenly kicks in and for what purpose? If the answer is that of course the cloned embryo does not have such significance, notwithstanding some line drawn in the sand to protect it, then the line will simply be redrawn again and again. I find the argument a harder one to sustain.

If the loss of life of the embryo is counted as having a moral status because of its potential to be human—which most seem to agree is the reason, although we give different weights to this potentiality—then surely it is the loss, not the fact of a border or a line and on which side the loss does or does not happen, that is the important matter to be considered. And, in this case, if there is something substantially worthy in the creation of a human life—and I believe there is—then to allow its destruction seems to me to deny its worth. Once that step is taken, it is impossible to retreat.

Whilst it is the case that it can be argued that stem cell embryos do not warrant as much respect and protection as more fully formed embryos—and I note and respect the views of those who have argued in this way—I take it that, as the beginning point of the embryo is the beginning of a possible human life, it should not be treated as merely a means to an end, no matter how beneficial, as it is the very purpose of creation that intends life, and, in this case—with a technology that has uncertain consequences and whose result is the destruction of that life—there needs to be a compelling and moral good that allows for that destruction to take place.

As a consequence, an embryo created by therapeutic cloning has a legal barrier to it becoming a life, but the fact remains that it can become a life. And the fact that it will be destroyed in the present, in the course of its creation, and that it has fewer rights as a consequence of that destruction seems to me to be a very deep philosophical and rational hole that we have dug ourselves into. As a consequence, I oppose the bill.

Debate (on motion by Mr Cadman) adjourned.

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