House debates
Wednesday, 6 December 2006
Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction and the Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amendment Bill 2006
Second Reading
9:22 am
Peter Costello (Higgins, Liberal Party, Treasurer) Share this | Hansard source
The Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 and the Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 were passed some four years ago. They prohibit human cloning, prohibit the creation of human embryos by any means other than to help a woman become pregnant, and allow the use for research—under strict regulation and licence—of human embryos created through assisted reproductive technology. These are embryos that would otherwise be left to die. I supported each of the related bills.
The bills required an independent review of their operation by December 2005. The review was conducted by John Lockhart, a man for whom I have enormous respect who served his country as a distinguished judge and whom I had the honour of appointing as a governor to the Asian Development Bank. His report recommended lifting the ban on creating human embryo clones for research, including the production of embryonic stem cells, provided the embryos are not implanted into the body of a woman or allowed to develop for more than 14 days. A cloned embryo so implanted could, if medical science develops sufficiently, become a fully-fledged human being. The 14-day limit arises from the fact that at day 15 the appearance of the primitive streak is the first developmental point at which a multicellular structure is formed.
I have received many calls and letters from constituents regarding the Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction and the Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amendment Bill 2006, and I thank them all for their input. I have considered all of them carefully. I want to mention in particular a visit I had from Cathy Manners, who is suffering from a degenerative disease and has become a powerful advocate for embryonic stem cell research. I also had a visit from Dr Stephen Livesey, from the Australian Stem Cell Centre, which is a pioneer centre of excellence for research in this area.
It is argued that embryonic stem cells are pluripotent, that they have much greater capacity than adult stem cells to yield cures to degenerative diseases, although no-one can rule out that adult stem cells have the potential to yield such results. Nobody argued that, if we went with embryonic stem cell research, we should not continue with adult stem cell research. Most of the proponents of embryonic stem cell research argue we should do both.
If it were not for the hope of medical breakthroughs and the ending of suffering and disability, this bill would not be here. The bill is put forward for the best of motives. It is because of the good that people believe this research can do that they are prepared to support the cloning of human embryos. The cloning of human embryos is not something we would support of and for itself. It is a matter that certainly gives me disquiet. The disquiet arises from the fact that, by cloning an embryo, we are producing a genetic replica of an existing person.
Proponents of the bill say that, because this embryo will only be allowed to exist for 14 days, we can be assuaged that the disquiet that we would otherwise have about cloning will not come about. But I find no great comfort in the fact that the embryo itself will be terminated after 14 days. The committee’s conclusion on an embryo created by somatic cell nuclear transfer states:
... if such an embryo were implanted in the uterus of a woman to achieve a pregnancy, the individual so formed would certainly have the same status and rights as any other human being. However, a human embryo clone created to extract stem cells is not intended to be implanted, but is created as a cellular extension of the original subject. The Committee therefore agreed with the many respondents who thought that the moral significance of such a cloned embryo is linked more closely to its potential for research to develop treatments for serious medical conditions, than to its potential as a human life.
According to this argument, the fact that an embryo is marked for death at the outset deprives it of moral significance. This appears to me to be a rather self-serving argument. The argument is that, because we have marked it for no significance, it has no such significance, and it dodges the underlying question: was it right to create the cloned embryo for this purpose in the first place? I find this a very troubling proposition.
The committee also saw inconsistency in experimenting on excess embryos created through assisted reproduction while not allowing the creation, through SCNT, of embryos for experimentation. It said that this attaches greater importance to the treatment of infertility than to the treatment of other diseases that might be cured by stem cell research. I do not see such an inconsistency. SCNT embryos would not exist but for experimentation and destruction; fertilized embryos are created for the purpose of living. One set of embryos is created for the purpose of human life, even if we know only a minority will fulfil that potential; the other would be created for the purpose of experimentation and certain—indeed, legally mandated—destruction. I see that as a big differentiation.
Some contributors to this debate question the importance of the purpose in assessing this question. Yet our entire criminal law is based upon the need to prove purpose—actus rea and mens rea: the criminal act and the criminal state of mind in the criminal law, intent and purpose feature strongly in moral reasoning. Indeed, the strongest argument for this research is its purpose—the hope of finding medical cures. The reason that we are here discussing this proposal now, four years after our last debate, is that medical science is developing all the time, and developing for good. We are being asked now to approve something all of us voted to ban four years ago. We are told that we can draw a line on what is ethically permissible and what is not, and that the line lies at 14 days. But let us suppose that in four years time we were told that scientists were on the brink of a medical breakthrough and that it could only be done if embryos were allowed to develop another 14 days. Can anyone imagine the parliament, having approved cloned embryos for research for 14 days, letting go the possibility of medical breakthrough rather than extending the time limit for another 14 days, or indeed another 28 days? I do not find this time limit of 14 days a convincing one. In fact, I suspect it will prove to be shifting, and a shifting line is not one that I would anchor legislation upon.
I respect the motives of those who have brought on this legislation. I believe that they have done it according to their own good conscience and for the best of reasons. This was not something I supported in 2002 and I have not been persuaded to change my mind in the interim. I do not find these issues simple, nor believe it is an occasion to label those of a different opinion as morally inferior or lacking moral clarity. This is a difficult debate, but it is one that has been conducted with a civility that reflects well on the parliament. I believe this is what a parliament exists for—to represent the nation, to speak on the great questions where there is division of opinion, and to resolve them according to policy and good conscience. For the reasons that I have set out, I will not be supporting this legislation.
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