Simon Crean (Hotham, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Trade and Regional Development) Share this | Hansard source

I rise in this debate to raise a number of concerns with the Human Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 2007 and to support the second reading amendment that the member for Sydney has moved. Essentially this is a bill to introduce a compulsory access card, a card to replace the Medicare card, a card linked to new electronic databases containing essential and personal details about individuals. Labor are not opposed to an access card but are opposed to the way in which this card is being introduced. We are very concerned about aspects of the card which have not been fully considered and fully explained by government. On one front, we are not being given information commissioned by the government in justification of its move and, on another front, the government are not picking up key recommendations of Professor Fels into privacy issues—again, information advice commissioned by the government but which they are ignoring.

The second reading amendment moved by the member for Sydney spells out those concerns and in essence we believe that there are inadequate safeguards in the bill as it stands going to protect the accuracy and privacy of information. We believe that the government continuing to keep secret information about the costs of the card and what it is designed to do is not appropriate. We also are concerned that there is no guarantee that the document verification service will be fully operational and contain appropriate safeguards. Having said that, if the government supports those issues and amends the legislation accordingly, we will support the bill; if not, we will oppose the bill.

It is important in our view to have a robust and secure system to prevent welfare fraud but it is equally important to protect personal privacy and to prevent identity theft. Labor have consistently opposed welfare fraud and theft and we have supported measures to prevent it. Centrelink, Medicare and veterans payments should only go to those who need them, and we must be vigilant against the rorts that undeniably exist. The question is: will this access card prevent or significantly reduce fraud? That is the assertion that the government makes. On the information available to us, it is not possible to answer that question. The government has not released the work commissioned through KPMG which it says supports its case. It argues the need to access information to prevent fraud but it will not give us the justification of the solution.

KPMG was asked to identify the costs and benefits of introducing the access card, but the government will not release that information. We again call on the government to release in full the detail that they are withholding. KPMG points out that its proposal represents a significant change from present practices to combat fraud through detection and investigation. The new approach that they propose, and to which this legislation is intended, is aimed more at prevention and deterrence. But how effective will the new methods be? What are the costs in inconvenience to users of essential health and welfare services? What about the possible erosion of individual rights and privacy? KPMG’s analysis has been reported to the government, but it has not been released. We call on the government to release that information. In the absence of the information, it is very hard to accept the government’s bald assertions.

KPMG asserts that a robust and uniform registration process, underpinned by strengthened proof of identity requirements and the provision of a card which will properly authenticate the user, will make fraud much more difficult. KPMG says that it will not only help prevent fraud at the outset but also give Medicare and Centrelink better information with which to detect fraud. All of that may be true, but we have no way of judging the merits of those claims—it is just the government’s assertion. It is not backed by information that the government has released but by information it says it has seen—and which it will not share with the rest of the community. Significant sections of KPMG’s report have been deleted for ‘cabinet-in-confidence’ reasons.

And then we have to deal with the financial costs of implementation. Detailed costings have been removed for commercial reasons. The government has released KPMG’s broad indication of possible fraud savings, ranging from $1.6 billion to $3 billion over a 10-year period. The minister has quoted the higher figure—$3 billion—but omitted the time scale, giving the impression of large and immediate savings. Whatever the savings, they could be completely swamped by the costs of implementation of the scheme—costs that could well blow out to more than $1 billion. No-one really knows how much welfare fraud there is—and, if the government knows it, it certainly is not telling us.

It is a fact that people claiming welfare benefits under false identities are only one aspect of waste and fraud. Centrelink does make mistakes, and applicants make honest and inadvertent errors in applications. No identity card will stop applicants claiming in their own name payments to which they are not entitled.

The integrity of registration and information gathering for the access card will clearly be an important factor in achieving its goal of fraud prevention. The government envisages personal interviews for registration. There will need to be, therefore, more than 16 million interviews and photographs, with verification of identification documents. The government has based its costings on the assumptions that each interview will take no longer than five minutes. In our view, this is likely to be a gross underestimate, particularly where there are language difficulties or where documents are not verifiable, have been forgotten or cannot be produced.

There will also be significant costs to families in obtaining birth and marriage certificates, up to $45 each. Certificates from foreign countries may not be acceptable because their authenticity cannot be verified. People from war zones and areas of civil disturbance may not be able to obtain the necessary certificates; indeed, they may not even exist. Proof of residence over the past 10 years may be required. That will be very difficult for itinerant people and anyone who moves frequently. The government still has not explained how people such as the mentally ill, the homeless or otherwise severely disadvantaged people will be able to qualify for their cards. What is the status of their carers? The aforementioned people’s very survival will depend on the card, because they will have to produce it to access the benefits upon which they so desperately rely.

We also raised concern about people living in regional and remote areas. This is a field of one of my portfolio responsibilities. They may have to travel long distances to present for an interview, with the possibility of a return trip if there is a problem with their documentation. The government has said that mobile teams will register people in regional areas. This is to be commended, but obviously problems will arise if people are away from their homes when the mobile teams visit.

Much greater thought and public consultation needs to be put into the development of this proposal. It is not something that can be rushed through the parliament when significant aspects remain unresolved. We are being asked in essence to buy a pig in a poke, and I must say that this pig needs much closer examination. I have said before that the opposition want this information from KPMG released. We believe it is in the public interest in order to test whether the government’s claims stack up.

The new card will have a name, a personal identification number, a signature and a biometric photograph. It will also have a digital chip that can carry medical information, an address, emergency contacts, concession status and stored value—or money. The biometric photo is an interesting concept in itself. A biometric photo is a digitised image of a mathematical formula of the measurements of facial features, making it easy to compare the image on the card and the database with images from video footage, newspapers or other sources. Clearly, this has implications for surveillance beyond access to welfare services. It is expected that state and federal police will have access to the database, which will hold photographs of the entire Australian adult population. There are concerns about the accuracy of matches between images. There is a failure rate, and there are obvious problems with significant changes in appearance, such as weight changes or other physical changes. This may cause people to be misidentified and possibly denied benefits to which they would otherwise be entitled.

The minister says that the new card will protect privacy in that it will show less information than current drivers licences; for example, it will not show date of birth and home address. It is true that much information will not be visible on the card itself, but it will be able to be read by authorised electronic readers. Professor Allan Fels, as head of the Consumer and Privacy Taskforce which was established as part of the consideration of this legislation to advise the government, proposed two significant amendments to the government’s plan, which the government has not accepted: that the personal identification number and the digitised signature not be displayed on the card. Professor Fels says that a digitised signature is not necessary, in that signatures on similar cards are very rarely checked, and the inclusion of the signature provides an opportunity for identity theft.

Professor Fels has similar concerns about the unique number being visible on the card. He accepts that it will have to be on the chip, but a visible number can be easily copied and used to assist in identity fraud. Professor Fels has further concerns that the card may become a national identity card which has to be produced on demand. The government says that the card is voluntary. This is an entirely disingenuous statement, I would suggest, because anyone who requires access to any government benefits or services—which is just about everyone at some time—will need to have the card. Given that that is the obvious consequence of entitlement to benefit, it would be very easy for a future government to change the law to require everyone to carry the card at all times and to produce it on demand.

Professor Fels has also said that there must be strict security surrounding the databases on which the card is based. I am concerned that collection, storage and maintenance of information on the databases may be outsourced—perhaps even offshore, beyond the reach of Australian security and privacy mechanisms and legislation. Further, Professor Fels said that the public must have confidence in the card, and this can only be ensured by strong legislation. He has called for the government to put its commitments regarding privacy and data security in the legislation, but this bill does not do that. We all know about the record of this government in terms of broken promises and the redefinition of promises, with ‘core promises’ being the only ones that have to be honoured.

In summary, we are being asked to agree to a card before the full facts are known, before all the rules have been made public, before the full need for it has been disclosed to the public, before projected costs and benefits have been thoroughly examined and disclosed, and before full consultation and discussion have taken place. This is another example of this arrogant and out-of-touch government not trusting the people and not seeing the need to take the people into its confidence. It applies double standards. It wants the card to build trust in the system, but it will not trust the people who make up the system.

I want to briefly allude to the fact that the Hawke government proposed the Australia Card back in 1986-87. It was proposed to carry a unique number, the cardholder’s name, address and signature, and it was to be used only for taxation, social welfare and Medicare purposes. It was not to carry a photograph, and the technology at the time precluded any thought of including a chip with digitised information. As president of the ACTU back then, I supported the proposal. I believed then, as I believe now, that abuse of the welfare system cannot be condoned. It constitutes theft from the public. Abuse of the system and misdirection of limited resources mean that deserving recipients are the ones who miss out. Then, I was satisfied that the privacy issues had been sufficiently addressed and protected in the proposed legislation and in the limited scope of the proposed card. There had also been extensive community consultation. As is well known, the Australia Card was abandoned following legal advice that, although the legislation could have been passed by a joint sitting of parliament, the Senate could have disallowed regulations crucial to the implementation and operation of the card. Of course, at the time, public opposition to the scheme was also undoubtedly a factor in the government’s decision to abandon the bill in 1987.

It is our view that, since then, this government has learnt very little from the circumstances at that time. There are many unanswered questions—and I detailed those earlier—but the real concerns about the proposed access card go to the fact that, despite the government’s denials, the access card will inevitably become an identity card, even if the legislation seeks to prohibit its use as such. The very strength of the card will lead to it being requested and used as proof of identity. We are also concerned that there may well be function creep—further functions added—and that, whilst the parliament may legislate for data protection, it cannot ensure compliance. There is a real possibility of data misuse and consequent loss of privacy.

It is against that background that we moved a second reading amendment, and the member for Sydney will also be moving amendments in the consideration in detail stage. We believe that the Senate inquiry should be given more time to consult and report on the issues that we have raised and will continue to raise. I support the second reading amendment and I indicate on behalf of the opposition that, if the amendments that we have proposed are not adopted by the government, we will oppose this bill.

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