House debates
Tuesday, 27 February 2007
Human Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 2007
Second Reading
8:00 pm
Mal Brough (Longman, Liberal Party, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Indigenous Affairs) Share this | Hansard source
In concluding the debate on the Human Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 2007 I would like to first of all thank all members for their contributions. This bill is one of the more important measures to come before the parliament thus far this year, and the level and intensity of the debate certainly indicate that. As the speakers today are aware, the bill provides for the introduction of a new chip based card, a smartcard to provide access to Australian government health benefits and veterans’ and social services. The card will replace the Medicare card and up to 16 other cards and vouchers needed in order to access Australian government benefits. It supports substantially improved proof of identity arrangements to obtain the card and improved proof of identity information on the register, on the card and in the chip. The bill introduces a comprehensive and robust registration process for consumers wishing to obtain a card. The new process will mean that consumers will only need to register once for a service or benefit and only notify relevant agencies once of changes in household circumstances, such as change of address. Clearly, this is going to be a major step forward for many families in their busy lives and will streamline many of our processes.
The bill ensures that the new card will only be required to be produced for the purposes of accessing Australian government benefits and confirming concessional status. I say that again—it is key to this bill—you are not required, under any circumstances, to provide this card on demand. You are not required to carry this card with you at all times, as some people would potentially lead you to believe. This card’s ownership is vested in the cardholder. The new card will replace cards currently held by individuals with one single, high-integrity card. This will make transactions with the government in relation to benefits easier, faster and, most importantly, more secure and less complex. The new system will allow individuals to change or update data in a single operation, and the payment of emergency or disaster relief will be made far easier by the introduction of this card.
As a result of the comprehensive registration system proposed in the bill, the new access card will significantly reduce fraud on the Australian taxpayer. This will enable the government to better provide for those truly in need rather than wasting money on those who deliberately set out to defraud our social welfare system. The new card will be much more resistant to forgery because of the smartcard technology employed within it. It will also be much harder for fraudsters to use the card in order to impersonate others when accessing Commonwealth benefits. All of this will result in a significant saving in Commonwealth revenue; it has been estimated by KPMG to save some $3,000 million over 10 years. That is an enormous sum of taxpayers’ money which can be better put to use than by fraudsters.
The registration process introduced by this bill will ensure a robust and strengthened proof of identity process for card owners. It will provide Centrelink, Medicare Australia and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs with more reliable and up-to-date information, better ensuring that the right payments are made to the right person and at the right time. This is essential to the integrity of the whole benefits system. We need to be sure that the $100 billion paid each year in health benefits and veterans’ and social services goes to those who are eligible, ensuring that taxpayers’ money goes to the right people and that they get the correct payment.
The registration process will require individuals to attend an interview and provide documents verifying their identity. For example, applicants will need to produce birth certificates, passports or other relevant documents. These documents will be checked with the relevant issuing authorities to verify identity. During the interview, applicants will have their photograph taken and will also need to provide a signature. Both of these will be incorporated into the card and will be included on the card’s chip and on the customer register. Clearly, there will be circumstances where it will not be feasible or appropriate for a person to attend an interview, to be photographed or to provide a signature. The bill therefore allows exceptions to be made to these requirements by the secretary, on a case by case basis, or by the minister in relation to identified classes of people—for example, for those in hospices.
The government intends that the registration process will commence in April 2008, when people will be invited to apply for a card. Between 2008 and 2010 people will not need to apply and will be able to continue using their existing cards until 2010. However, in order to ensure a timely transition and to avoid a last-minute rush, people will be encouraged to apply sooner rather than later. As this bill is the first step in the creation of the total card scheme, it does not and is not intended to deal with all aspects of this scheme. The bill has been brought forward to give certainty about the framework of the card and to inform further debate on the issues when the information on the card and the register have been clearly set out in the legislation.
There have been a number of issues raised during this debate, and I would like to take a brief moment of the time of the House to address these issues. It is clear that the member for Hotham has a very selective memory when it comes to the Australia Card. In his speech yesterday he said that he supported the Australia Card because it was only to be used for taxation, social welfare and Medicare purposes and was not to carry a photograph. Obviously he did not know what he was supporting, because the proposed Australia Card most certainly did have a photograph. If he goes back to the original legislation and looks at clause 12, paragraph 3, of the Australia Card Bill he will have that confirmed. The Australia Card scheme would have resulted in a photographic database of all Australians. So he was quite happy to support that proposition in 1986, but his convenient memory to date does not allow him to do so now.
Under the Hawke Labor government’s Australia Card Bill you could not open a bank account without producing your Australia Card; under the access card system you can. You could not withdraw money from an account unless you produced your Australia Card to the bank; nor could a bank pay you interest on your deposits unless you produced your Australia Card. You could not invest money unless you produced your Australia Card. You could not buy land unless you produced your Australia Card. You could not purchase shares in a public company unless you produced the Australia Card. You had to produce your Australia Card when starting a job, and the employer had to record your Australia Card number on your group certificate.
This government’s smartcard is nothing like the Hawke government’s national identity card. Its purposes are limited to the provision of health benefits and veterans’ and social services. The two are as different as chalk and cheese. There are no provisions in this bill that require members of the public to produce their card in order to go about their ordinary business. Unlike the Australia Card Bill, this bill makes it abundantly clear that the smartcard is not a national ID card and is not to become a national ID card. There are very severe penalties for businesses or individuals who demand the access card for identity purposes. Under this bill you can go about your normal daily business without having to carry or produce your access card.
Members opposite have also made a great deal about the KPMG business case. They have suggested that significant portions of the business case have been kept secret and that they cannot make any informed decision about the legislation without access to the full business case. No relevant information is being kept secret. Obviously, part of the business case that may provide tenderers with sensitive commercial information or which could compromise security has been omitted from the public release document. That is only reasonable; there is no surprise in that whatsoever. Similarly, it would be inappropriate to release commercial information which may undermine the government’s negotiation strategy for the development of a smartcard infrastructure.
The member for Sydney also referred to the recommendation of the Fels task force in relation to the digitised signature and the unique identifying number. She said that the government ignored the recommendations of Professor Fels on these issues but had not given any reason for ignoring it. I refer the member for Sydney to the government’s response to the recommendations of the Fels task force, which was released at the same time as the task force report. The government’s response provides reasons for its decision in relation to each of the task force recommendations. I will not take time to detail those reasons here, but the member for Sydney is free to read the government’s decision in the publicly released response. I would be happy to provide her with a copy of that response or she can obtain a copy from the access card website.
Finally, I would like to briefly comment on the issue of function creep that was raised by a number of speakers. Legislative provisions in the bill and parliamentary scrutiny provide a robust protection against function creep. Clauses 6 and 7 of the bill set out the objects and the purposes of the bill respectively. These specific objects and purposes prevent function creep. Any changes in the objects in clause 6 and the purposes in clause 7 will require the government of the day to propose an amendment to the legislation and have it debated in this place and passed through both houses of the parliament. While members opposite may prefer to live in the past, this government is committed to moving with the times and using up-to-date technology to ensure that our health benefits, veterans’ and social services are delivered effectively, efficiently and with the least possible risk to the Australian taxpayers.
I believe that the measures in this bill strike the right balance between providing convenience for people and how they use their access card while at the same time protecting their privacy. Consumer and privacy issues were very important in the development of the smartcard. Without robust proof of identity to verify eligibility, measures that merely cut red tape and improve access for consumers would fail to eliminate weaknesses in the present system, such as identifying fraud problems which are undetected currently, and they will not deliver the benefits to the community that the government is seeking.
In summary, this government believes that the new card system will provide a number of important benefits to consumers: benefits in more efficient and productive interactions with the government’s health benefits, veterans’ and social service agencies; benefits in potential improvements to security for individuals in protecting them against identity fraud and enhanced privacy protection; benefits in preventing fraud against the Australian taxpayer; and benefits for other users chosen by the consumer. I am sure that in years to come people will look back and wonder why this debate took the turn that it did when, clearly, using the latest technology to benefit the Australian consumer, the Australian taxpayer and the Australian welfare system must be a positive step that all will applaud in years to come. I commend the bill to the House.
Question put:
That the words proposed to be omitted (Ms Plibersek’s amendment) stand part of the question.
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