Alan Griffin (Bruce, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Veterans' Affairs) Share this | Hansard source

He certainly did not answer any questions. But I have some statistics for him too. They are statistics that really spell out what has been happening in defence procurement in this country and statistics which he, once again, was not able to deal with on this occasion.

According to figures released by the Department of Defence on 13 March this year, 58 defence projects are behind schedule. Thirty of them are over one year behind and 11 are six to 12 months late—that is, 28 per cent of defence projects are in arrears, and we are talking about very big money. The poor management of these projects has implications not only for our capability but also for proper expenditure in this very important aspect of government endeavour.

I will give the parliament an idea of a number of the major projects that we are talking about. The airborne early warning control aircraft, Project Wedgetail, were due in 2006. They are now expected in approximately 2009, a delay of in excess of two years. The original cost was expected to be over $1,000 million. Now the cost is estimated at $3.5 billion. The Tiger helicopter project was due in 2006. It is now expected in 2008, a delay of two years. The original cost was over $1,000 million. It is now estimated at $2 billion. The ADF air refuelling capability was due in 2002. Now it is due in December 2009, a delay of seven years. Its original cost was between $500 million and $1,000 million. Its expected cost is now $1,761 million.

The FA18 Hornet upgrade was due in 2003. It is now expected in December 2007, a delay of four years. Its original cost was between $500 million and $1,000 million. It is now estimated at $1.5 billion. The FG frigate upgrade was due in 2003. It is now expected in 2009, a delay of six years. Its original cost was between $500 million to $1,000 million for six ships. It is now estimated at $1.5 billion for four ships. The high frequency radio communications modernisation project was due in 2002. It is now expected in 2007, a delay of five years. That one, we accept, is within cost, but with five years of missing capability.

The anti-ship missile defence project was due in 2005. It is now expected in 2009, a delay of four years. That, too, is within cost. The new heavyweight torpedo was due in 2004. The expected due date is now 2010, a delay of six years. Its original cost was $250 million. It is now estimated at $430 million. The Seasprites, which the member for Hunter spoke about earlier, were due in 2003. They are now expected, we hope, in 2008, a delay of five years. Their original cost was between $200 million and $500 million. It is now estimated at $1 billion and, as we know, they are in some doubt.

The M113 armoured personnel carrier minimum upgrade was due in 2003. It is now expected in 2007-08, a delay of four years. Its original cost was between $200 million and $500 million. It is now expected to be $0.6 billion. The new air defence command and control system were due in 2007. They are now expected in 2009, a delay of two years. So what we see is a litany of projects—serious projects—that are mostly over cost, sometimes by factors that are quite mind-boggling. We certainly have a situation which has real implications for the defence of our country and where there are issues that have not been addressed by the minister in his job in this government and in respect of what they are doing in defence.

Much has been said about the Super Hornets. I will say a couple of brief things about them. The minister talked about how, when you are looking at the issue of procurement, you are in a complex situation. And there is no doubt that defence procurement is a very complex area. But, if it is so complex—and I agree that it is—you would think that you would go through proper processes. You would think that you would have to ensure that you did.

But what do we see here? We see the minister, almost overnight, spending $6 billion in order to go through with this purchase. Where was the process here? The member for Hunter asked that question specifically of the Minister for Defence, and the Minister for Defence ignored it. He did not answer it. In the short time he will have available, the next speaker might like to address that issue. These are complex purchases, they are important purchases, and we know the minister did not go through a proper process to ensure that this purchase was done correctly and that the correct decision was made. We also know that, based on the amount of criticism. The minister can say that we are not experts on defence but we can also say, frankly, neither is he. In the circumstances, we see in this field a number of independent commentators publicly criticising decisions that have been taken by this government in recent times. Hugh White, writing in today’s Sydney Morning Herald, said:

We do not know why the F-18F was chosen as the best aircraft for the job or why buying it without a competitive tender was the best way to acquire it. It is pretty clear that the idea was first raised at a National Security Committee meeting in November last year, when Defence Minister Brendan Nelson threw it on the table out of the blue. One wonders who provided the material for the briefing that Nelson then gave his NSC colleagues. Three months later, with time out for Christmas, the deal was done—a triumph of salesmanship over strategy.

Mr Tom Burbage, Executive Vice-President of Lockheed Martin’s JSF program, was quoted in the Canberra Times about his view on the Super Hornet. He said:

It’s not the airplane you want to hang your future on if you want to have an effective coalition airplane and you want to be effective nationally in a threat environment 10 to 15 years down the road.

Retired Air Vice-Marshal Peter Criss, writing in the Sydney Morning Herald, said:

Certainly, with the Super Hornet carrying half of some of the weapons, half the distance, at half the speed of the aircraft it is replacing, one has to hope and pray that the minister has not been misled. Worse still, we must wonder whether he has gone off prematurely without ensuring the rigorous engineering and operational evaluation process that is so essential to justifying spending $6 billion has been scrupulously followed and all options carefully and fairly evaluated.

He also said:

… the Super Hornet is inferior to the 1970s-designed and 1980s-built original F/A-18 aircraft. Admittedly the Block II Super Hornet has a new radar and some electronic components not in the version Coyle gave evidence on, but the fundamental airframe and performance remain unaltered: it is heavier, slower, larger and uglier (its radar signature did not measure up to expectations) than the normal Hornet.

There is certainly one thing that is a lot faster than a Super Hornet—that is, the process followed by the minister to seek approval by cabinet for a $6 billion purchase. In terms of the future, that raises real questions. The issue of the Seasprite has been covered by previous speakers, but I will briefly mention a couple of points. Let’s not forget that the New Zealanders themselves took up the Seasprite option, but they adjusted it. They did not go over the top in terms of capability requirements. Their Seasprites have been in operation for quite some time, and I understand that is also the case with the Egyptians. There are issues there around how this government has handled those capability matters.

I wish to make one final point with respect to public scrutiny of what this government has done on defence. Parliament is about to break for some six weeks or so. We know that the government is considering a further deployment to Afghanistan, a deployment which Labor support, yet we have had no statement at all from this minister or the Prime Minister about the nature of that deployment. I think that shows, once again, how little they care about this parliament and about consulting with the Australian people through the forums that are supposed to be utilised in this parliament. (Time expired)

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