Joel Fitzgibbon (Hunter, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Defence) Share this | Hansard source

I know that the Minister for Defence will agree—indeed, I know all members of this place will agree—that the first obligation of any national government is the defence of its country and its people. It is an important and big task, one which requires sound strategic analysis and planning, sound economic management and, of course, competent procurement management. It also requires a competent approach to the recruitment and retention of those who serve in our Navy, our Army and our Air Force. This is an area in which the Howard government has been found wanting in recent years. But it is the first three points that I want to concentrate on this afternoon: one, strategic planning; two, capability policy, planning and implementation; and, three, the economic management of Australia’s defence capability programs. These are, as I said, very big tasks—big tasks that must be undertaken in the right order.

Defence analysts and academics around this country disagree on many aspects of defence strategic policy, but there is one matter on which there is unanimous agreement, and that is that capability planning in this country must be guided by strategy; that is, strategic guidance is the approach to capability planning. To put it another way, you must first decide exactly what it is you want your defence force to do before you decide what shape and size your defence force should take and what kit to give it—that is, first determining the size, weight and mix of each of our services and then, within a tight budget constraint, determining whether we need more people or fewer people, more tanks or fewer tanks, more submarines or fewer submarines, more jet fighters or fewer jet fighters et cetera. You cannot adequately answer these questions if you have not set a clear strategic direction, and you will not meet the obligation to protect the nation and its interests if you do not ensure that defence purchasing is guided by strategy.

This is a government that is working off a Defence White Paper which is now seven years old and has thrown its own capability plan out the window. Of all the charges we might lay against the government either on defence or other issues, this is probably the most serious of all: the fact that the government, in defence spending, is not putting the national interest first but is, indeed, putting the interests of the Liberal Party first. Of course, there could be no better example of this than the recent political fix we saw with the $6 billion outlay for some 24 Super Hornets. Here is a government determined to make sure that it does not go into an election potentially charged with creating an air capability gap in this country. It has decided, without any recourse to the budget, to spend an unfunded $6 billion on an aircraft that the Air Force says that we do not need and most experts say is not up to the job—a fourth generation aircraft to do a fifth generation’s job. As I said, there is no funding for this particular purchasing program. You will not find the $6 billion in the defence capability plan and you certainly will not find it in the 2006-07 budget.

So let us just quickly recap what happened here. The government rushed in to signing up to the Joint Strike Fighter program without taking into account or making contingencies for the inevitable delays and cost blow-outs of that project and it concurrently decided to retire the F111s earlier. So where does that leave us? It potentially leaves us with an air capability gap. The government has been telling us for months that we do not have a looming air capability gap, that we should not be worried about the future of our air superiority—which, I should add, is the key to this nation’s defence—and, as I understand it, it maintains that position. The minister might want to clarify that when he makes his contribution in this debate. The government maintains the position that no looming air capability gap exists, yet it has outlaid $6 billion on an aircraft that, as I said, most experts say is not up to the job. There are plenty of other examples—which I do not have time to go through this afternoon—but, in terms of departure from the defence capability plan, certainly the Abrams tanks stand out.

Each year Australia spends around two per cent of GDP—or about $20 billion—on its defence needs. That sounds like a great deal of money—and it is—but, in these times, when we have the three roles of defending our continent, taking care of our own region and taking care of Australia’s interests further afield, defence is a very expensive thing. The reality is that two per cent may not be enough. Of course, it is not our peak in spending. In 1967-68, during the period of the Vietnam War, we were spending around 3.9 per cent of GDP. But, certainly at two per cent, we cannot afford to waste a cent. Every dollar wasted by this government is a dollar not available to be spent on critical assets needed to defend the country and, indeed, to defend the men and women who wear a uniform in defence of this country.

This government takes the gold medal for waste and mismanagement. The next best example, of course, is the Seasprite helicopter. The Seasprite helicopter was to be the Navy’s attack weapon. It was supposed to be out there protecting our surface ships but, as we speak today, the Seasprite is not protecting our frigates. The Seasprites, nine of them, are sitting in their hangar in Nowra. Why are they sitting in their hangar in Nowra? Because this government pushed the envelope too far on their capability. They tried to do much more than the original concept with that helicopter and consequently mismanaged that program to the extent that we are now facing enormous delays and even doubt about whether the Seasprite helicopter will ever fly at all.

My challenge to the minister on this point today is to answer three questions. First, is he going to scrap the Seasprite helicopter, as has been widely rumoured in the media; second, what will be the cost to the taxpayer; and third, what does it mean for the Navy’s future air capability? I will have a go at answering the second question for him. What we do know is that the government has now spent $1 billion on 11 Seasprite helicopters for the Navy.

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