Brendan Nelson (Bradfield, Liberal Party, Minister for Defence) Share this | Hansard source

The Royal Australian Air Force, earlier this decade, in considering the replacement of the F111s and ultimately the FA18s, made a decision, having sought expressions of interest from the major aircraft manufacturers throughout the world, that the Joint Strike Fighter was the correct aircraft for Australia. The Royal Australian Air Force also at that time concluded that the contingency option for the transition through to the next decade in new air combat capability would be the Super Hornet Block II. Last year, in examining all of the issues in relation to the new air combat capability, to derisk the transition to ensure that the government would confidently retire the F111, which is now 35 years old—instead of the F111 retiring us, so to speak—in a climate where the F111 is losing situational awareness in the modern airspace and also to derisk the uncertainty which would surround the scheduled delivery of the Joint Striker Fighter, most of the issues for which lie beyond the realm of Lockheed Martin, the government made the decision, on the advice of the Royal Australian Air Force, that the contingent transition capability would be the Super Hornet Block II. One of the reasons for that is that it is a multimission aircraft. It has a very impressive stealth capability. It is also largely interoperable with our existing FA18 A and B fleet. Australia is a Hornet country. It also gives Australia the option at the end of the next decade to on-sell the Super Hornet back to the United States Navy, which will be flying the aircraft until 2030.

In relation to the Super Seasprite, it is well known that on 28 March 2006 an issue arose with the automated flight control system for the aircraft which required the grounding of the aircraft. Following that, I asked the Navy and the Defence Materiel Organisation to systematically examine the options in relation to the future of the Seasprite, keeping in mind that the project is six years late. It is by far and away the poorest performing project of the so-called legacy projects that we are managing. It took the best part of 10 months for all of that advice to be gained in terms of what is actually involved in continuing with the aircraft, what other capability might it be used for at a lesser level, what would be involved in continuing and what would be the prospects for completing the project according to the milestones of capability. The government made the decision after quite detailed examination that we would continue with the project, including the deed, and we will most certainly be working very closely with Kaman, the principal contractor, to see that the key milestones are met. This is an aircraft that Australia will need for antiship warfare in littoral environs.

See this speech in context