Wilson Tuckey (O'Connor, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment Bill 2007 is important legislation. It is representative of the demands that government must meet in protecting the Australian people in the war on terror and in protecting the younger side of our community from the activities of those who distribute child pornography via telecommunications, which leads to attacks on children and other most despicable things.

The legislation is also the result of the government seeking expert advice on these matters from a leading international expert, Mr Blunn, who recommended the processes that this bill will put in place. The advice was that it has now become apparent that what was once a small part of the Telecommunications Act, in which there was a provision for interception, now requires an entire act. This will enable our various law enforcement agencies wider access to telecommunications, accepting that telecommunication has come a long way from a hardwire telephone and accepting that what was once required by law enforcement agencies to track down some criminal doing theft or fraud is now required for other things. Suddenly, we are looking at people who are prepared to use terrorism against the community, and they have to communicate from time to time.

It is interesting that the advent of mobile telephones has been good news and bad news for law enforcement authorities and agencies. Once one knows, through interception, whom one wants to know the whereabouts of, mobile phone can give that information. On the other side, through the use of prepaid SIM cards and this matter attracted public attention just recently—criminals and people planning terror can give themselves not so much a false identity as almost a vacuum of identity. That is the phrase that comes to mind.

It was quite amazing to me that the media approach was focused upon where a certain SIM card was left in the United Kingdom by a person who was here in Australia. It was suggested that maybe it was in a car that burnt to pieces. One might wonder where you were going to find it in that vehicle. But I did not think that was the problem. The problem was that the card was still in existence after 12 months. It certainly was not kept for 12 months to expend the accumulated cash value that was in the card, because if that was the case it would not have lasted very long. Clearly, it was being retained by someone who wanted to make phone calls that would be difficult to trace by interception. It is worth putting that matter on the record.

This bill will complete the circumstances of transferring certain provisions from the Telecommunications Act to special legislation—that is, the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act, otherwise referred to as the T(IA) Act. I am advised by the explanatory memorandum that this bill will transfer those relevant provisions at the conclusion of this matter. I welcome the support of the opposition in this matter. People obliged to use these powers will have a single act to which they can refer. They will be able to see in the fairly clear provisions the impositions or controls that are placed upon them to ensure that privacy is protected to the extent that people are entitled to protection.

I see from the explanatory memorandum that the bill will:

• provide a mechanism for access to prospective telecommunications data, including establishing secondary use and disclosure offences and accountability mechanisms,
• impose obligations on carriers and carriage service providers in relation to interception capability and delivery capability, and
• preserve existing cost allocation principles between the telecommunications industry and interception agencies associated with interception and delivery capability.

The EM continues:

This Bill will also improve the effectiveness of the Australian telecommunications access regime by:

• Implementing in part recommendation 24 of the Blunn report, which recommended allowing access to the content of communications for the protection of data systems and the development or testing of new technologies ...

One can see how important that particular provision is when one considers the speed, the rapidity, with which the technology of the telecommunications industry advances. The EM continues:

• widening the definition of exempt proceedings to allow disclosures for the purposes of proceedings in relation to the Spam Act 2003, and enabling the use of this evidence in court proceedings ...

That, of course, has significant reference to child pornography, which I have mentioned already. Might I say, the more that we are able to control spam when we are trying to do our daily business, the more pleasant I will find it. I am not one of the leaders in computer adequacy. However, with two offices 1,000 kilometres apart, I rely on both of them feeding information into my computer, from which I am able to print letters and all those things. The first thing I have to do is clear the spam, although I have been helped with regard to no longer receiving pornographic spam because, apparently, I now have a blocker on the computer which takes away a lot of those things. More particularly, as the second reading speech advises us, the main area of focus of the legislation is child pornography—and so it should be. That is just the lowest of the low. Unfortunately, as I have said, that in itself leads to direct attacks on young children, and that is just unbelievable.

The explanatory memorandum tells us that the bill will also improve the effectiveness of the telecommunications access regime by:

• ensuring that interception warrants are available in relation to the investigation of any offence relating to child pornography, regardless of the maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed by State and Territory criminal law, and
• other minor amendments that will improve operational efficiency.

It is interesting to note that the financial impact statement says that there will be no cost to the taxpayer with regard to these matters, but no doubt the telecommunications companies will find costs involved in assisting law agencies in this regard.

As I said, this is not the sort of legislation that should be controversial. We all regret this increasing invasion of public privacy, but it is always the case of the lesser of two evils. The world has changed so much in recent times that there is no doubt that we must give our law enforcement agencies the legislative power necessary to engage with criminal and terrorist elements, as they have been doing. It is worthy of note that there are cases before the courts at present that are based almost entirely on interception. Fortunately, the agencies were able to identify the people whose phones they had intercepted and, it appears from media reporting, accumulate a large body of evidence to present to the courts. It is also a matter of some of the provisions existing in the act prior to these amendments relating to the rules by which an interception can be approved. It is not laissez faire; it is a situation where approvals must be granted. This amendment adds to the reporting requirements—that is another matter of importance. It is a case of making sure that the agencies have speedy access to an interception regime, but that there is a process that ensures that it is not abused.

I strongly support this legislation. I have already said that I welcome the contribution of the opposition on this matter. I trust that the provisions in this special legislation are such that they will assist our agencies in protecting the Australian community.

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