Joel Fitzgibbon (Hunter, Australian Labor Party, Minister for Defence) Share this | Hansard source

I thank the member for Blair for his question. His electorate, of course, is home to one of Australia’s primary Air Force bases and he, better than most in this place, understands how important it is for Australia to maintain its superiority in air combat capability in our region and how important that is to Australia’s national security. He also understands that the government’s next investment in our next generation of air combat aircraft will be the single largest Defence investment ever made in the history of the Commonwealth, with up to $16 billion in outlays.

So this is a decision that we absolutely must get right. Despite the best, and reckless, efforts of those who sit opposite, the government will not be pressured into making a decision on the run. We saw that practice from the former government with respect to air combat capability. We saw the public debate and controversy generated by that approach to these important issues when they ran headlong into a rushed decision on the purchase of the US Super Hornets from the US Navy.

Let us go back to that process for one quick moment. That spirited debate about air combat capability emerged prior to the last election because the former government failed to properly plan for our future air combat capability. Rather than plan for and anticipate the possibility that the F111 may need to be retired early, the former government simply sat on its hands. And then, of course, off the back of a report, when it was clear that the F111 might need to be retired early, the government subsequently ran into a very quick decision to purchase the Super Hornet so as not to be accused, in an election year, of allowing an air combat capability gap to emerge—determined, in an election year, not to be charged with that important charge. And, of course, the way in which the Super Hornet purchase was entered into was not so much about our national security but about saving the political bacon of the then Prime Minister and those who sat behind him. There was no comparative analysis done with other aircraft—no proper analysis done whatsoever. Indeed, in a sense, an analysis would have been useless, because to meet its political needs the former government directed RAAF to deliver an interim aircraft by 2010, and the reality was that there was only one aircraft in the world that could have been delivered into Australian hands by 2010—that, of course, was the Super Hornet. That is what the lack of a planning process leads you to in these important areas of defence capability.

After the election, as promised, the new government reviewed the Super Hornet purchase and in the end, given all the circumstances, came to the conclusion that, as a filler, the Super Hornet was more than capable of meeting Australia’s defence needs. But we did not just leave it at that. We determined to work hard in securing better value for taxpayers’ money, securing aircraft more cheaply and securing aircraft with greater capability. These changes are now being put into effect and, as a consequence, the taxpayer will secure better value for money.

There is only one fifth-generation combat aircraft in service across the globe at the moment, and that is the F22 Raptor flown by the United States of America. The only fifth-generation aircraft that might emerge on the market in coming years is of course the Joint Strike Fighter. The government does not yet have any guarantees about the capability the Joint Strike Fighter offers, nor about when that capability, if possible, may be delivered or what the cost of that aircraft will be. So we are determined not to repeat the mistakes of the former government, not to be rushed into a decision, particularly given that we do not have to sign up to the Joint Strike Fighter until some time around mid next year. There is no rush to enter into this contract. So we will take our time with this decision to ensure that taxpayers get value for money and that the Defence Force, the RAAF in particular, gets the capability it needs to keep the country safe and secure.

Yesterday we took receipt of the Mortimer report on defence procurement in this country. Mortimer appealed for a more rigorous approach to these capability decisions. Yesterday the opposition supported the Mortimer review; today, through their defence spokesman, they want to throw all that rigour out the window. So I have some advice for the opposition leader: this debate coming from the opposition’s ventures about our air combat capability does us no good. It is no good for our national security and it is certainly no good for our commercial interests as we go, as a development partner, into further negotiations about the Joint Strike Fighter. We are entering into a commercial arrangement and the assistance from the opposition does the country no good whatsoever. The Leader of the Opposition needs to understand that this is not like going down to the local Rolls Royce dealer to buy the next model. Even if it were, not even the Leader of the Opposition would stump up the cash for the latest Rolls Royce without first getting some assurance of what capability it delivers, what the price will be and when it will be delivered. Leader of the Opposition, I suggest you pull them into line.

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