Luke Simpkins (Cowan, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I would like to take the opportunity today to speak on the Aviation Legislation Amendment (2008 Measures No. 2) Bill 2008 because this is an area in which I have long held an interest. Shortly after I graduated from the Australian Federal Police College at Weston Creek, as it was in those days, I undertook my probationary training in Sydney. Amongst a range of very interesting rotations, I spent some time at Sydney Airport, working primarily at the international airport and in the ports watch section. That was in plain clothes and armed. From that time in 1986 and 1987, I developed a very good knowledge of the workings of the airport. I knew where all the entry points and the security points were. I drove on the tarmac and walked out underneath aircraft at various times. I boarded international flights in response to passenger immigration alerts where Family Court rulings prohibited children being taken overseas. I therefore had a very good knowledge of the shortcomings and the problems of the time.

Appropriately, airport security has moved on, and the Australian Federal Police has substantially moved on. In the AFP, we were limited in so many ways.

In budget, premises, equipment and training, and certainly by reputation, the AFP is a completely different organisation now than it was then. In my opinion, the previous government turned the AFP around. The Howard government believed in the need for the Australian Federal Police and the capabilities that were required and are now possessed. I believe that the federal government before the Howard government did not have the imagination to do what needed to be done, yet we now have the effective and highly professional crime-fighting and security organisation that exists today. I hope that its work is never again undermined by lack of government will, as it was when I served.

Of course, any discussion on aviation security cannot be advanced without putting the AFP in the debate. However, this bill is about aviation security information, the relationship with aviation industry participants and the ability to delegate powers and functions. This bill will amend the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004, the Civil Aviation Act 1988 and the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.

I will begin with comments regarding the amendment of the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004, and I would like to look back to 2005 to clearly put the issue of aviation security in the right perspective. That perspective is that the hard work was done years ago and that this bill is finetuning in comparison. Members would be aware of the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 that came about to address the risks and threats in aviation security following September 11. Beyond the good work of that act, there was also the Wheeler review and the Aviation Transport Security Amendment Bill 2006. That bill primarily targets security and clearance processes for domestic and international cargo before it is taken on board an aircraft and gives the Secretary of the Department of Transport and Regional Services approval authority for alterations to an existing transport security program.

Members would also recall that it was in June 2005 that the then government asked Sir John Wheeler, the former security minister for Northern Ireland, to conduct a review of Australia’s airport security. Wheeler had already conducted a similar review in the UK. The Howard government directed Wheeler and a small team to examine the threat from serious and organised crime at airports, the integration of ground based security and law enforcement arrangements and the overall capacity of the existing security systems. The review commenced in June and was presented in September 2005. As directed, the report focused on responses to the threat of terrorism and clearly related serious crime threats at airports. It identified coordination deficiencies across all levels of governments and agencies and a related lack of security awareness amongst airport workers. Policing at major airports in Australia was found to be often inadequate. Demarcation and dysfunction, in general, marred the security systems. It was little wonder that the review found problems of bureaucratic turf protection and unresolved Commonwealth-state conflicts over resources. Changes were needed, with an emphasis on intelligence sharing, addressing the potential overlap between terrorism and crime and, therefore, the clear need for staff at airports to be vetted.

Key among the recommendations was that there should be a permanent police presence at the major airports, under a single airport police commander and, not surprisingly, there were other recommendations related to an increase in CCTV coverage, coordination of CCTV coverage of all international airports and a tightening up of the aviation security identification card system. It was from the Wheeler review that the deficiency in cargo screening was highlighted, where 20 per cent of cargo could be loaded without being screened. The Wheeler review described the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 as providing a ‘solid basis for security regulation at airports and associated activities’. However, it was clear that a substantial review of the existing legislation and regulations was necessary. The review recommended that collaboration between the states and territories would enable a more effective system that would help in the flow of intelligence and deal with the threats of both organised crime and terrorism and the potential overlaps between them.

Therefore, it would seem that, while the post 9-11 changes served Australia well, more was needed. The Howard government accepted, in principle, the recommendations made by the Wheeler view and immediately announced additional expenditure of almost $200 million to further tighten security at Australia’s 11 major airports. It was shortly after that announcement that Minister Truss introduced the Aviation Transport Security Amendment Bill 2006. The bill addressed regulatory arrangements that would apply when a security controlled airport conducted special events or, as they are described in schedule 1, ‘out of the ordinary’ events, such as major governmental conferences like APEC or a visit from the Pope. In addition, the bill addressed the better handling of domestic and international cargo prior to loading. Schedule 2 of that legislation was designed to increase the number of cargo operators controlled by the regulations and increase the screening of cargo to 100 per cent.

It is not, and it has not been, my intention to cast doubt on the validity of the amendments in the bill before the House. I do believe that it is valuable for the secretary to be able to collect information that currently falls outside the scope of security compliance information. As the explanatory memorandum refers to, such additional information will enable assessments to be made as to what new security measures are required or what existing security measures need to be modified to address threats to the security of aviation. An assessment of the incidence and statistics in general of security operations such as screening would provide a very useful tool from a process and intelligence perspective.

I am also particularly happy about proposed new section 112, which would require a person to give aviation security information. The reason of self-incrimination could not excuse them from providing that information. That is a good power to be applied when approaching the need to continuously improve aviation security, but it should not be applied when the need to proceed with a criminal prosecution is evident. I am confident that the professional and dedicated agencies involved will balance these priorities carefully. I also agree that the secretary must be able to delegate powers under the ATSA to a head of another agency that is responsible for national security matters. I would also be interested in hearing which agencies would receive such a delegation of powers and when that would occur.

Although the secretary currently has the power of delegation to an SES level officer within the department, proposed subsection 127(1) will allow delegation to other agencies with national security responsibilities, and I support this change. The explanatory memorandum mentions the secretary’s powers in the ATSA under section 74D, which allows the secretary to issue an incident control directive to require an aircraft to undertake a particular action. This enables the secretary to determine whether the aircraft is under the control of its authorised crew or has been seized. The delegation of this power beyond the department would speed up the flow of information and enable critical decisions to be made more quickly. Beyond amendments of the Aviation Transport Security Act, the Civil Aviation Act 1988 would also be amended by this legislation. I support the changes that would insert provisions into the act allowing aircraft cockpit voice recorders to be copied and disclosed.

Finally, this bill will amend the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 to strengthen the powers of the ATSB, increase penalties and enable the ATSB to prosecute the failure to report an aviation incident up to six years after the commission of the offence, extending the current 12-month limit, due to the time it can sometimes take for some offences to be brought to light. As I have previously stated, I have a long-term interest in aviation security. I also have a very keen appreciation of what needed to be done and what was done in the past. I therefore pay tribute in this forum to the efforts of the Howard government in pushing aviation security in this country forward.

I also acknowledge the benefits that this bill will bring, but the threat to the Australian Federal Police posed by the upcoming audit worries me. The Howard government greatly advanced the interest of national security by properly resourcing the AFP and other agencies. The Rudd government should not, with a funding cut, turn the clock back on front-line policing and the range of critical tasks that the AFP now can accomplish. Clearly an example of this is today’s revelation in the Australian that, from a high point of 170 air security officers under the Howard government in 2006, under the Rudd government there are now fewer than 100. The question is: is the threat any less clear now? Not at all. But the Rudd government’s record with AFP cutbacks is becoming clearer, and I worry for the future.

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