Melissa Parke (Fremantle, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

On behalf of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, I present the committee’s report, Report into state law enforcement integrity models, together with evidence received by the committee.

Ordered that the report be made a parliamentary paper.

I am very pleased to speak to the tabling of the report of the inquiry into state law enforcement integrity models conducted by the Joint Committee on the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity. As the committee chair, I will begin by thanking the deputy chair, Senator Johnston, and my fellow committee members for their work. On behalf of the committee, I thank all those who appeared before the committee or who made submissions to the inquiry—and especially those who took the time to do both. On behalf of the committee I also thank the secretariat and support staff for their diligence, professionalism and good humour.

The Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, or ACLEI, commenced operation on 30 December 2006 under the stewardship of John McMillan, who was the first Integrity Commissioner, and it has continued to develop through the committed leadership of the current commissioner, Phillip Moss. I take this opportunity to thank both Mr McMillan and Mr Moss for their work in that role and for their contributions to the inquiry.

ACLEI was created to provide oversight of the Commonwealth law enforcement agencies—namely, the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Crime Commission. ACLEI was not created in response to evidence of misconduct or corruption in those agencies, but rather as a sensible addition to the national integrity and anticorruption architecture, which is an important feature of our democracy. It was always contemplated that ACLEI would develop and expand from its initial form. For this reason, the parliamentary committee’s first inquiry sought to consider state anticorruption agencies that stand as models of this kind of organisation.

As the report makes clear, the various state based organisations present a range of anticorruption models. The agencies in question came into existence out of varying circumstances and they were designed to fit within differing law enforcement and public service oversight environments. It was through the evident contrasts and commonalities that emerged in the inquiry that the committee was able to consider ACLEI from a number of important perspectives, which include the committee’s consideration of ACLEI’s current scope, jurisdiction and function. The considerations in this area went to the merit of agencies that have a specific law enforcement brief—as ACLEI does—in contrast to agencies with a broader public service integrity jurisdiction and role. Consideration was, first, given to ACLEI’s potential to provide oversight of other Commonwealth agencies which have some law enforcement functions and to the issue of ACLEI’s prevention and education role. Second, consideration was given to the question of the funding and resources, both in terms of ACLEI’s existing operational needs and in terms of the resources necessary to allow ACLEI to expand and evolve. Third, the committee considered various issues related to the technical and practical necessities of ACLEI’s current and future operation. Fourth, the committee considered the role of a parliamentary or integrity inspector in relation to anticorruption agencies.

• In summary, the committee made the following recommendations:
• that the government review ACLEI’s level of funding as a matter of urgency;
• that the government fund the establishment of an anticorruption education and prevention unit within ACLEI as a matter of priority, and that this object of ACLEI’s function be strengthened by appropriately detailed amendments to section 15 of the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006;
• that the government fund as a priority the provision to ACLEI of a secure hearing room and associated technical and personnel requirements;
• that the government establish a national forum through which matters of common interest to state and federal law enforcement agencies can be addressed;
• that the government consider in the longer term establishing an integrity inspector to assist in the oversight of ACLEI;
• that the government review and consider strengthening the existing obligations under which employees of Commonwealth law enforcement agencies report misconduct; and
• that the government review the existing arrangements for the suspension and dismissal of Commonwealth law enforcement agency personnel who are believed on reasonable grounds to have engaged in serious misconduct or corruption.

As a relatively new parliamentarian, can I say that the committee process and its outcomes are, in my experience, one of the most substantial and rewarding aspects of parliamentary work. It is understandable that the executive and legislative functions of the parliament, along with the adversarial nature of party politics, receive most of the public and media attention, yet the committee system, with its capacity to incorporate cross-party views and to draw on the collaborative work of parliamentarians who represent different views and different constituencies, is a part of our system of government that deserves more credit. I am not the first person to observe that there is a review and maintenance function exercised by the committee system that is too often overlooked and almost certainly underregarded.

The committee’s first report is an important first step in the committee’s review and advisory role with respect to ACLEI. I look forward to the further work that lies within the scope of the next inquiry. I commend the report to the House.

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