Nola Marino (Forrest, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on Appropriation Bill (No. 5) 2008-2009 and Appropriation Bill (No. 6) 2008-2009. The March 2009 quarterly figures are expected to confirm that Australia will indeed be in negative growth for two consecutive quarters and is in recession. In fact, many believe we are already in recession. Job losses today in my electorate of Forrest will be included within the March 2009 figures. They were announced on ABC Radio this morning while it was reporting that the Harvey Beef abattoir will cut its workforce by more than a quarter by sacking 160 workers in the very short term. They will include 120 full-time and 40 contract workers. The company will also cut production from seven days to five days a week. The majority of these workers live in my electorate, and I personally know many of them and their families. They now do not have a job at all or will not have one by the end of this week.

So the first package that was supposed to create 75,000 jobs has not even saved the existing jobs in my electorate, let alone created new jobs. Harvey Beef is WA’s largest beef producer and exporter. It commenced production in 1919. This is a business with the capacity to process over 4,500 head of cattle per week. So what initiatives and assistance have there been for exporters like Harvey Beef in either the government’s first $10.4 billion cash splash or the $42 billion cash splash that we are about to see?

On behalf of those 160 workers, who will lose and have lost their jobs, I ask: what did the government’s first $10.4 billion handout do to keep them in a job at Harvey Beef? Where can they apply for one of the 75,000 jobs the Prime Minister said were created by that first package? In recent months the only sector that has kept Australia out of a technical recession has been the exporting, agricultural sector—something that is known but not necessarily respected or valued appropriately as the backbone of our economy. What is worse, I understand that the government has actually cut export market development grants for small to medium companies.

The ANZ’s latest monthly survey showed there was a 30 per cent fall in newspaper job ads in WA in February. In fact, only the Northern Territory recorded a bigger decline. In last year’s budget, one of the major saving measures from the Minister for Finance and Deregulation was to cut funding to employment services by $279.8 million. Clearly, the government, at that time, was more concerned about the imaginary inflation genie than real global financial issues. Many small businesses in my electorate have not seen any benefit from the government’s first cash package. I visited one such business last week and this business has seen no benefit at all from the package. Their existing and forward orders have dropped from 50 to 10, and the size of the orders has declined significantly also. Only one of their regular clients has maintained their orders and their order size. Their loyal staff know by the amount of work they are doing—or, rather, not doing—that their jobs are at risk. I asked the owner what use the 30 per cent tax deduction for eligible new assets over $1,000 gift is to his small business. His response was, ‘I can’t afford to buy any new equipment.’ He actually wanted to know what the federal government was doing to assist his business in real terms.

Federal government handouts will not save these jobs. Funding to manage unemployment is no substitute for having a job in the first place. Small businesses have also been saying for many months now that they are not seeing a reduction in their overdraft and finance interest rates. We all know that small business is in fact big business because it employs nearly half the workforce in Australia. The Prime Minister said that the first $10.4 billion cash splash would create 75,000 jobs, and all we have seen since is an increase in unemployment—just like the 160 workers this week at Harvey Beef. The Prime Minister, who told people to go out and ‘spend, spend, spend’ the first package, in question time could not answer the question of whether his advice on the latest over $12 billion taxpayer-debt-funded cash giveaway is to spend or to save. He also said the $42 billion package would support 90,000 jobs, yet the government could not, when asked twice in parliament yesterday, categorically state the government’s industrial relations bill would not cost Australian jobs.

We saw the national accounts for the December quarter released this week. Gross domestic product fell by 0.5 per cent. Business profits fell by 3.3 per cent. In other indicators, building approvals fell by 3.7 per cent in January and car sales in February fell by 21.9 per cent compared to the same month in 2008. WA was the hardest hit, with the economy falling significantly, according to the ABS. Commercial car sales declined significantly, a further indication that businesses are cutting spending. I noted the editorial in the Australian on 18 February which stated:

In no way can increased government borrowing kick-start the economy into recovery or revive the stagnant credit market. That can be achieved only by private enterprise—individual businesses and their employees—responding to incentives that allow them to benefit from the wealth they create.

I now want to specifically speak on matters relating to the Appropriation Bill (No. 6) 2008-2009 and the $250 million from the Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts to bring forward water purchases for the Murray-Darling Basin—something I know is of interest to you, Mr Deputy Speaker Secker. This was part of the deal the government made with Senator Xenophon to pass the government’s second $42 billion spending package and, of course, the associated $200 billion, put-it-on-the-credit-card, borrowings bill.

I am very concerned about the effects of the accelerated buybacks, and I believe that there are far more questions than answers. For instance, what will this mean for food security in Australia and the loss of production in the areas the water is purchased from? What will be the effect and cost of stranded irrigation assets? What will be the additional fixed and service costs to the farmers and growers who retain their water allocations along the same system where water purchases have occurred or are occurring?

Which agency is responsible for the social and economic analysis—those social impacts so important and so critical to regional communities? When will this analysis be available to the parliament and the individual communities affected by the accelerated buybacks? Why is it that this analysis will only be available after the water has been purchased, not on the date of the release of the analysis itself? What additional resources will the government apply to communities and regions that are found to have been negatively impacted by the government’s current accelerated buyback process? Or are we to assume that there will be no genuine analysis and that a preconceived, deliberately superficial and benign analysis is a foregone conclusion? Will it be a superficial analysis that ignores the Owens Valley experience in California and deliberately and clinically short-changes rural and regional communities and puts at risk our national food security? Where is the extensive planning necessary for the buyback process that will have permanent negative impacts on food security as well as on those same rural and regional communities?

How much of the water that will be sourced in this accelerated buyback process will actually come from New South Wales? How much of the water in the accelerated buyback process will come from South Australia? Given Victoria’s four per cent water trading cap, the majority of the water will have to be bought from New South Wales. The Goulburn-Murray water is unavailable because the cap is applied over several separate zones. The cap is often reached within a season, so there is no water available from this source before 1 July. There are very real expectations that the four per cent cap will be exhausted immediately after 1 July, so water purchases will still not be possible. I understand that the imposition of the four per cent cap in Victoria is discretionary, not compulsory. This could be done if the government agreed to do so. I understand that the terminology in the regulation in Victoria actually states ‘may refuse’, not ‘shall refuse’.

The federal government, I understand, has been buying general security water—water that is available only when the actual water is there—and not high-security water. I understand that the government has not processed or transferred the water it has purchased so far—or certainly not all of the water. I would like to know what the turnaround time for purchases and transfers is, including those outside the four per cent cap. How much has actually been transferred in a physical sense? What process is being used with willing sellers and how long is it taking? What impacts is the uncertainty around settlement and transfer having on those selling the water? How much actual water allocation and physical water has the government achieved for the amount of water purchased? How much allocated water is actually committed? There is no doubt that the federal government’s presence is distorting the water market. The accelerated buyback process will distort this even further, and the irrigators, growers and their communities are bearing, and will continue to bear, the costs. The federal government is doing far greater damage to these communities than it actually needs to do in the process.

As I said, Australia’s food security is also at serious risk with this strategy. We have already seen the debacle of the federal government’s controversial purchase of Toorale Station—that same station that produced 8,000 tonnes of wheat, 2½ thousand tonnes of sorghum and 1,250 tonnes of maize. I am told the local council estimated that this would cost the economy $4 million and up to 100 jobs. Has the local council sighted the government’s cost-benefit or socioeconomic analysis of this purchase? I would really like to see that myself.

One key question in this accelerated environmental water purchase issue that is not being addressed is: what is the environmental impact and cost of removing the water from the land itself? What was the environmental damage to the land caused by water stripping in the Owens Valley, in the United States? What are the broader implications of the buybacks and where are they occurring? Can the economic, social and environmental impacts be managed? Where, as a result of this analysis, should water actually be purchased from? Because that is what it would tell you.

The Australian people know that this government is indeed building debt for current and future generations, and the Australian public is becoming increasingly nervous about this ‘Eva Peron’ style government. The IMF has said that fiscal stimulus packages should be temporary, targeted and timely. How long will it take to repay the Rudd government’s ‘temporary’ deficit and how long will it take to repay the $200 billion-plus borrowings? This government’s $200 billion-plus borrowings bill means debt and deficit for our children—and all this from a self-confessed economic conservative Prime Minister.

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