Ms Julie Bishop (Curtin, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition) Share this | Hansard source

The coalition welcomes the government’s commitment to a region that is critical for Australia and for the world. The coalition supports strongly the work of Australian military and civilian personnel serving in Afghanistan. It is important that bipartisan support endures for this work because it will require a long-term commitment if the NATO-led mission to Afghanistan is to be successful, which also has major implications for stability within Pakistan—a country with nuclear capability.

In terms of modern warfare, there is a tension between long-term military commitments of democratic nations and the electoral cycle, and the inevitable pressure that builds with ongoing casualties and the often slow rate of progress in terms of necessary nation building during and after the conflict. The task that confronts us in Afghanistan is daunting. After decades of conflict, the nation is desperately poor, with unemployment estimated at approximately 40 per cent. It is estimated that some 50 per cent of Afghanis live at or below the poverty line. While there have been improvements, recent figures still show that fewer than 30 per cent of the total population is literate, while only about 13 per cent of women are regarded as literate. National infrastructure has been severely degraded and large numbers of people live without adequate access to housing, clean water, medical care, food and electricity. There are serious and ongoing concerns about the ability of national institutions to provide adequate governance to the country in terms of economic, social and security considerations. Afghanistan is reported to now account for the vast majority of opium production world wide, and this presents a serious challenge in terms of finding viable alternative crops for many farmers in their communities.

During a recent visit I made to Afghanistan with the Leader of the Opposition and the shadow minister for defence, I was told that the single, largest source of income to the government of Afghanistan was the flyover fees paid by international airlines. There are very significant structural problems in Afghanistan that simply cannot be redressed by a short- or medium-term commitment from the international community. The scale of the challenges means that we are talking about international involvement of some character over a generation or more.

Education is a critical issue for the region, because the foundations of the current crises in Afghanistan and in Pakistan are to be found in events of the late 1970s and the 1980s and earlier. It is worth recounting a little of this history to gain an insight into the nature of the task ahead. It was during this time that the number of religious schools known as madrasahs greatly increased in number in Pakistan. There were estimated to be fewer than 200 madrasahs in Pakistan in 1950, growing to more than 10,000 by 2001, and it is currently estimated that there are more than 40,000 madrasahs in Pakistan. The Pakistan military are reported to have encouraged the growth in the number of these schools, because many students from Pakistan went on to fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s.

There was a policy of encouraging extremism, which it was believed would act as a bulwark against the Communist ideology of the Soviets, then occupying Afghanistan. This was a successful strategy in that the Soviets were eventually forced to leave Afghanistan in 1989. However, the madrasahs continued to increase in number and continued to influence millions of Pakistanis and Afghanis and to radicalise a significant number of them. These religious schools played a key role in the emergence of the Taliban—which in Pashto means ‘students’. By 1992 the mujaheddin had swept away the last vestiges of Soviet rule and took control of the capital, Kabul. The mujaheddin were not able to agree on power-sharing arrangements and the country was beset by conflict, often verging on civil war.

It was in this unstable environment in Afghanistan that the Taliban became established in Kandahar, in the south of the country. The Taliban were initially supported by many Afghanis, who had tired of the corrupt mujaheddin warlords. However, conflict soon erupted, civil war broke out and the Taliban eventually captured Kabul in 1996. The ascendency of the Taliban raised a number of issues of particular consternation to the Western world, including reliance on increased opium poppy production in Afghanistan, the imposition of harsh sharia law and its impact on women particularly, and the sheltering of Osama bin Laden and his growing al-Qaeda network of terrorists, who trained and planned global terrorist attacks from their base in the mountains along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

After the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, the United States led a coalition into Afghanistan to disrupt the Taliban and destroy the al-Qaeda terrorist network. There were early military successes and the Taliban were soon swept from most of the country. A form of government was established and elections were held. However, the situation became increasingly unstable with the re-emergent Taliban fighting back for control of large swathes of the country. While Afghanistan has been a priority for the Western world since 2001, the gestation period for its troubles has been more than 30 years with a long history of conflict, so we must think in the long term.

Whenever nations have directly intervened in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, the challenge has been for them to maintain the level of commitment required to achieve an outcome that is sustainable and stable in the long term. It is unrealistic to expect relatively quick and easy resolutions to a situation that has been brewing for many years. While military and strategic planners of the international community would undoubtedly be well aware of the lengthy time frames, it is incumbent upon them to keep their citizens informed of the likely length and depth of the necessary commitment.

We in Australia know how the electoral cycle can put enormous strain on the nation’s commitment to sending and maintaining our troops in conflict zones for deployments that must necessarily span multiple elections. Former Leader of the Opposition Mark Latham’s infamous and populist commitment to bringing the troops home from Iraq by Christmas of 2004 and the current Prime Minister’s insistence prior to the last election that the Howard government have a timetable for an exit strategy from Iraq are cases in point. There was little debate or consideration of whether it was in our long-term strategic interest or the interest of the country, the region or the world for troops to be withdrawn. The issue became caught up in the political contest. Similarly, in last year’s United States presidential election the presence of US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan became embroiled in the political debate.

Domestic public opinion has long proven to be a strong factor in the commitment of Western nations in particular to international conflicts. Notwithstanding President Obama’s commitment to the war in Afghanistan, according to a recent poll the United States public is rapidly losing enthusiasm for the Afghanistan conflict. In the wake of September 11, public support in the United States was high, with almost 90 per cent of people approving of the war on terror in Afghanistan. Eight years on, that support has plummeted, with 53 per cent of people surveyed saying the United States made a mistake in sending military forces to Afghanistan. This was up from 30 per cent in February this year, yet in January 2002 only six per cent of people surveyed called the war a mistake.

After the success of President Bush’s surge of troops into Iraq, President Obama has replicated the tactic of a surge in Afghanistan and has committed an additional 21,000 troops. Overall, there are more than 100,000 international soldiers in Afghanistan; about two-thirds are American. There is speculation that the new United States commander, General Stanley McChrystal, will request of the Obama administration an even greater commitment of troops after finalising a review of operations in mid-August; however, his review has been postponed to September. Reports from the United States suggest that any such request is likely to have a chilly reception in the congress. This would be based partly on public opinion and the growing number of casualties, which is approaching 800 in the United States alone, but also on the reaction from NATO allies to President Obama’s request for additional troops to support the US surge.

At a NATO summit in April, President Obama gave an impassioned speech in which he asked other NATO countries to send more troops as he outlined the United States’s strategic policy that now includes Pakistan with Afghanistan. His request was largely ignored. The United Kingdom, however, pledged to send several hundred soldiers, in addition to its current commitment of 9,000 troops, to help improve security during the election to be held this week. The additional British troops are to be withdrawn after the election. Only two other countries made any commitment. Belgium committed an additional 35 military trainers, while Spain said it would send 12. During his speech President Obama warned European leaders that any failure to show long-term commitment in Afghanistan would increase the danger of terrorist attacks on their home soil. The then Secretary General of NATO confirmed that public opinion was a key consideration behind the decision of many nations not to send additional troops. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is currently grappling with the NATO request for additional troops, in a week when British casualties have passed the 200 mark.

This poses a serious challenge for the international community because, while the initial intervention enjoyed strong domestic support which encouraged action by leaders, public support can ebb, as can the support of national leaders. There is obvious potential for failure or for poor outcomes from such a cycle. A key challenge for national leaders who have intervened in places such as Afghanistan is convincing their public of the need for long-term commitment to such an intervention. For the countries of the NATO-led forces to realistically achieve the goal of a stable and peaceful society in Afghanistan, the commitment needs to be greater and longer than a temporary military and civilian surge. Ensuring that the Afghan people succeed politically and economically will be essential to the battle against extremism. There needs to be a fundamental reform of the education system to ensure it no longer radicalises young men in particular. There needs to be fundamental reform of the economy so that people can improve their standard of living without resorting to activities such as opium production. These changes are exceedingly difficult to implement at any time and are much more difficult in a country where the Taliban still exert considerable overt and covert influence. It follows logically that nations with troops in Afghanistan must be prepared for the long haul—and it could be a very long haul.

There is a story doing the rounds in Washington that an American soldier wearing a gold watch captured a Taliban fighter, who pointed at the watch and said to the American, ‘You may have the watch, but we have the time.’ This Taliban combatant was, of course, referring to the fact that soldiers from intervening nations, even if equipped with state-of-the-art equipment and resources, are perceived to rarely stay the course in such countries for the many years that it takes to achieve enduring reconstruction and sustainable social stability. During my time in Afghanistan, I was told on a number of occasions that the local people expect the international soldiers to leave. They have no other expectations.

The international community must not lose sight of the ultimate goal of never again allowing Afghanistan to become a base for global terrorism. Nations must not forget about the thousands of men who passed through al-Qaeda’s training camps, many of whom then playing roles in terror attacks around the world. While the situation in Afghanistan, and now Pakistan, is difficult, there are some positives. Our troops are making progress in disrupting the Taliban. A necessary element of establishing Afghanistan as a state capable of defending its people and its institutions and of policing its territory is to build an effective national security force. Through a combined international effort, the Afghan national army and the Afghan national police are being trained, equipped and mentored to establish the Afghan national security forces, capable of taking responsibility for the country’s security.

I met with members of Australia’s Operational Mentor and Liaison Team that has been providing vital mentoring and advice to a battalion of the 4th Afghan National Army Brigade. The team partners the battalion as it undertakes security operations. Australia’s Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force is supporting local capacity building through major infrastructure projects, including security, health, education, water and other essential infrastructure. I observed the trade training school run by our Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force in Tarin Kowt, in Oruzgan province, which is an outstanding example of Australia’s supporting local Afghani communities. The four-week courses are recognised by the Afghan government and provide opportunities for skill development and employment amongst local people, particularly among young men who are considered of fighting age. While the current Afghan government has had a number of successes in building its national security force and instituting programs in health and rural development, the Taliban’s chances of success improve if the Afghan government is weak. The new national government must ensure there are honest and effective officials at provincial and local levels and ensure the delivery of basic services. To build and maintain a new and democratic order the presidential elections to be held this week must be secure and free and fair.

Australia’s contribution of an election support force of 120 personnel and additional resources will be necessary to assist the International Security Assistance Force and the Afghan government during the elections. The militants have been more active in recent weeks as they seek to disrupt these elections, showing contempt for the fact that significant sections of the Afghani population have embraced the democratic process with enthusiasm. The majority of the people of Afghanistan are no different to the vast majority of the people of the world: they want to live in peace and safety and to create communities where they can provide adequately for their families in terms of food, education and security. After decades of conflict and suffering these people deserve our support.

I was informed during my visit that an increasing number of Taliban militants are not Afghanis, yet with the support of the international community Afghanis will eventually be able to defend their nation, defend their institutions and defend their communities. However, they will require financial, logistical and military support for many years to come. Australia has made a significant commitment to Afghanistan. In terms of the human cost, we have lost 11 brave Australian soldiers and a number have been wounded. There is also the significant cost to the Australian taxpayer—in 2009-10 alone the budget is more than $1.2 billion. Given the scale and length of this likely commitment, the Rudd government must ensure that it continues to keep the coalition, the parliament and the Australian community fully informed about Australia’s commitment in Afghanistan and developments in Pakistan. As time passes, it will become increasingly important that both sides of politics continue to take the Australian people into their confidence as we continue our commitment to defeating terrorism and supporting democracy.

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