House debates

Wednesday, 25 November 2009

Aviation Transport Security Amendment (2009 Measures No. 2) Bill 2009

Second Reading

10:01 am

Photo of Warren TrussWarren Truss (Wide Bay, National Party, Leader of the Nationals) Share this | Hansard source

I am more than happy to tie the abolition of the en route charges subsidy to the fact that cargo is carried on these aircraft, which is the subject of this bill,. I am also happy to refer the remarks about Sydney’s second airport to cargo, because one of the intended purposes of that airport is for cargo flights and therefore this bill is completely relevant, I would suggest, to the subject matter I have been talking about.

There are many other questions about aviation that we could ask. What is the government doing about the passenger movement charge? Is it being spent on its intended purposes or how much of it is simply going into consolidated revenue? I think it is important that the government come clean with the aviation sector. Two years of inaction on aviation policy has clearly left the industry with a feeling of uncertainty about what its future might be.

Hanging over the people of Brisbane are the flights coming into Brisbane Airport after, say, 10 o’clock or 11 o’clock at night. Many of them are cargo flights. These flights are of particular importance to the economic wellbeing of Queensland and yet the Prime Minister is on the record as trying to prevent Brisbane Airport operating after 11 o’clock at night. Even though the nearest house to Brisbane Airport is over six kilometres from the runway—I acknowledge that that house is very close to the Prime Minister’s own house but, nonetheless, it is still over six kilometres away from Brisbane Airport—there is this threat, going back to the days when the Prime Minister was just the member for Griffith, of imposing a curfew on Brisbane Airport. That is of serious concern to the people who are about to invest about $2 billion in the new runway at Brisbane Airport and in the proposed extensions to the domestic terminal. These sorts of investments cannot happen if, in fact, there is a threat to the viability of Brisbane Airport and to the hours during which it can operate.

The government needs to address these issues and give not only the owners of Brisbane Airport but, more importantly, the people and the businesses of South-East Queensland the assurance that constraints will not be put on the operation of Brisbane Airport to suit the whims of the Prime Minister. These are important questions and they need to be answered and answered in the context of the much awaited white paper.

This bill makes some changes to air cargo policy. Can I emphasise, again, just how important the air cargo sector is to the Australian economy. Many people think of exports as coal and iron ore and exports going through our seaports. But many Australian exporters also depend on the air cargo sector to reach their overseas customers. Naturally, there are other options for sending Australian goods to overseas markets, but the aviation sector is particularly important when exports need to get to their destination quickly. In some cases, that can be fresh food products, cargo that needs to be used in industry at short notice and smaller items which we have become used to sending around the world by air. Many Australian businesses are willing to and do pay a premium to get the goods to their destination by air.

In 2007-08 international airfreight traffic totalled over 780,000 tonnes. Both inbound and outbound airfreight traffic have shown increases in recent years. Because such a lot of that freight is actually carried underneath in the bellies of passenger aircraft, security arrangements are especially important. It is appropriate that a strict security regime be in place to guarantee the safety of not just the airfreight but the passengers who are on board those aircraft.

Outbound international airfreight—that is, Australian exports by air—totalled over 300,000 tonnes in the year ended June 2008. Nearly 70,000 tonnes of this airfreight were carried on Qantas jets, and many other airlines were involved in the carriage of airfreight—Singapore Airlines, Emirates, Cathay Pacific, and Air New Zealand each carried over 20,000 tonnes of outbound air cargo. Over 40 per cent of our outbound international air cargo was sent through Sydney airport and the most common destinations for outbound air cargo from Australia were Singapore, Hong Kong and Auckland. In many cases, Australian air cargo would have been forwarded on from these intermediate destinations to reach customers around the globe.

Air cargo is also an important part of the domestic freight industry. In terms of sheer tonnage, air cargo is a relatively small part of Australia’s domestic freight network. Currently air cargo handles about a quarter of a billion tonne kilometres and this is projected to grow at a rate of about three per cent a year. Sending cargo by air tends to be a more popular option when long distances or high value cargo is involved. Customers pay a premium for the speed of air freight, and when they need to get high value goods to distant or isolated destinations the air cargo sector provides a valuable service. It is critical that Australia’s air cargo sector remains a viable part of the freight system. It is also critical that security in the air cargo sector maintains its impressive record.

The Regulated Air Cargo Agent Scheme was created in 1996, and regulated freight forwarders and couriers who certified air freight for international carriers. The RACAs include couriers, cargo agents, express post services and other organisations involved in the transport of cargo by air. They are responsible for certifying air cargo, maintaining the security of cargo until it leaves their possession, and providing their employees with security training to improve their skills. The RACA Scheme meets Australia’s responsibilities under the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

Of course, the security environment surrounding aviation was dramatically changed by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. In response to those attacks, the then coalition government completely restructured aviation security. Improvements to security in the air cargo sector were a part of this revamp. The coalition enacted the Australian Transport Security Act of 2004 to ensure security in Australian skies. The act repealed security provisions contained in the Air Navigation Act 1920 and its accompanying regulations, and the old RACA Scheme was replaced by an updated system. The Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 strengthened the regulatory framework surrounding aviation security and provided the flexibility necessary to respond to a rapidly changing air security environment.

It also took responsibility for the regulations governing the RACA Scheme and the air cargo industry. These regulations have been updated periodically under both coalition and Labor governments to reflect the changing needs of aviation security. The ATSA 2004 and its accompanying regulations required all organisations involved in transporting air cargo to apply appropriate security measures as determined by regulations under the act and to implement a transport security program approved by the Department of Transport, just like airlines and other aviation industry participants.

A TSP details how aviation industry participants will manage security within their operations and protect their operations from acts that may lead to interference with aviation security. It is a legally binding document and it is audited by the department. The requirement to maintain a TSP will continue to remain in place and has provided an enhanced level of security across the industry. Currently there are over 950 RACAs in over 1,700 sites across Australia dealing with international and domestic air cargo. Well over 2,000 employees with security functions have been trained under the RACA security training framework.

Since the introduction of the RACA Scheme, the air cargo sector has operated without a major security breach. In a challenging environment, with billions of dollars of cargo being transported every year, this is testament to the effectiveness of the security regime. But it should not lead to complacency. It is important that security regulations in Australian aviation appropriately reflect the level of risk at any given time. It is also important that security regulations do not unduly hamper the efficient operation of the air cargo sector, especially given its importance to the Australian economy and its dependence on speed to attract its business.

The bill currently before the House amends the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004. It continues the reforming work that occurred under those on this side of the House, and the opposition is happy to support it. The bill will expand the definition of ‘cargo’ to mean an article that is ‘reasonably likely’ to be transported by aircraft. Often, the decision to transport a piece of cargo by air is not made as soon as it is lodged with a cargo agent; sometimes that decision is made much further along the supply chain. As a result, cargo may not be inspected and certified early on in the supply chain. It may have to be inspected and certified just before being loaded onto an aircraft, which may mean having to extract it from a larger shipment. This can be inefficient and impose unnecessary delays and costs on the industry. If such an article could be inspected and certified earlier in the supply chain before the decision to transport it by air was made, it would make for a more efficient supply chain and would allow action to be taken at a more appropriate and convenient time.

The definition of ‘reasonably likely’ will be established by regulations under the act. It is our understanding that it would encompass goods that are identified by the sender as priority freight or goods that are accompanied by a dangerous goods statement. The bill will also expand the definition of ‘industry participants’ who are authorised to certify cargo to include both regulated air cargo agents and accredited air cargo agents.

The AACA Scheme extends the RACA Scheme to cover smaller operators with less complex operations. It is not yet in place, and no AACAs have yet been recognised, but the scheme will come into effect and the government will approve AACAs in 2010. I understand that the government has received many registrations of interest from operators interested in being accredited under the scheme.

Participation in the AACA program will bring smaller operators into the air cargo security regime and will allow these operators to transport cargo from one RACA to another without compromising the security environment. This bill will ensure that a regulatory framework exists in time for the AACA Scheme to come into effect. Participation in either the RACA Scheme or the AACA Scheme will be compulsory for all operators involved in the transport of air cargo.

Other countries, including many of Australia’s major trading partners, are currently introducing similar schemes. Such a scheme will be beneficial in itself but, if it ensures that the Australian air cargo sector is moving in the same direction as our overseas trading partners, it will have additional benefits. A supply chain that allows a package to be inspected and certified upon receipt by one firm, transported to an airport by a second, handled and loaded onto an airplane by a third, and shipped overseas by a fourth, all without leaving a secure and regulated environment will, hopefully, enhance efficiency without compromising the good reputation of Australia’s air cargo sector overseas.

The bill will allow regulations to be made that will stipulate the circumstances under which cargo can be certified by a RACA or an AACA. Like anything that is done through regulations, attention will need to be given to the details. At the moment, cargo tends to be examined just before it is loaded onto an aircraft. This means that there is a very short period between certification and loading where any potential tampering could occur. Under the amendments proposed by this bill, inspection and certification will be allowed to take place further back in the supply chain, before cargo arrives to be loaded onto an aircraft.

There are good reasons to allow such certification earlier, and I referred to them a few moments ago. If security checking is all done at the last minute, a great deal of pressure is put on the individuals doing the inspections and the prospect that something may be missed could exist. Allowing inspection and certification earlier, when cargo is in a less consolidated and more accessible state, is likely to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the air cargo security regime. But if certification is done at a point that is far removed both in time and distance from loading it is understandable that aircraft operators would have concerns about the potential risk of tampering during the waiting or pre-transport period. This is an issue that has been raised by a number of the airlines, and it will be very important in dealing with the regulations that these risks are in fact addressed. It will mean that the regulations governing the RACA and the AACA schemes will need to ensure that once cargo is examined and certified it is kept secure and in tamper-free circumstances.

The United States has recently finished piloting the Certified Cargo Screening Program. Carriers and cargo agents are audited by the appropriate transport authorities under this scheme and are expected to comply with security regulations in the conduct of their business, much like the schemes proposed in this bill. Under the American scheme, inspection and certification can be only one point removed from acceptance by the air carrier. The scheme proposed by this bill will allow certification further back in the supply chain, but the regulations stipulating the circumstances under which this certification can occur have of course not yet been seen. The regulations governing air cargo security under the RACA and the AACA schemes will need to be sufficiently tight to preclude unacceptable risk to air carriers. The opposition, along with air cargo industry players, will certainly watch the regulations closely to ensure that they do not allow a security gap between the certification of cargo and the loading of that cargo onto an aircraft. The bill will also make minor changes enabling the secretary of the department to issue notices specifying the circumstances under which cargo may be certified by approved agents, change the definition of cargo in existing TSPs to the definition contained within the bill and maintain the validity of existing regulations made under the ATSA. These amendments are reasonable and acceptable to the coalition. Overall, the bill will provide a more flexible and appropriate security regime that will enhance air cargo security without imposing undue or excessive restrictions on industry participants.

The air cargo sector plays an important role in Australia’s transport network. In recent years security in this sector has been challenged by developments, and it has to meet these challenges. Given Australia’s record in air cargo security, we may conclude that the security regime established by previous governments has been effective. As the security environment changes, Australia needs to respond. It should be the goal of both governments and the air cargo sector to ensure that the Australian freight network remains secure without imposing excessive regulation and costs on industry and the ordinary Australians who depend upon it to operate efficiently and effectively. The legislation therefore builds on the strong foundations left by the previous government. It will enable us to maintain an air cargo security apparatus that enhances Australia’s reputation for robust security amongst our major trading partners and that is as effective and efficient as possible.

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