Paul Neville (Hinkler, National Party) Share this | Hansard source

I too welcome the opportunity to speak in this debate on Afghanistan. It seems that every Australian has an opinion on whether our troops should remain in Afghanistan or whether they should be withdrawn, and I think that debate is quite good and proper. We are all asking ourselves ceaseless questions like: should we stay in Afghanistan or should we walk away; are we making headway or is it a lost cause; and have we matched our military might with social and economic reconstruction? I might say by way of an aside that the lessons of previous conflicts should have told us that we need to put a lot more into social and economic reconstruction.

Of course, if we abandon our course prematurely, we are simply surrendering Afghanistan to authoritarian governments or to warlords or, even worse, to terrorist organisations that would possibly run the country, as they have in the past—organisations which will invariably carry out attacks on foreign soil or allow the training of people who will carry out attacks on foreign soil. The fact that so many terrorists and would-be terrorists have admitted to training in Afghanistan demonstrates the depth of the problem. Those of us who have seen Australians killed in Bali or in the London underground bombings should be in no doubt of the capacity of these terrorists—and that is saying nothing, of course, about other occasions and near misses at Australian and American embassies and the dreadful events on the Spanish railways. They are other examples of training that occurred in that country.

It is important that all views are aired and it is important to support the men and women who are carrying out their duties in what must be the most hellish of circumstances. It is absolutely pivotal to this debate that we understand the broader implications of Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan. We must take into account Afghanistan’s history, its current situation and its likely future. We must consider international alliances and security matters, Australia’s role in Afghanistan up to this point, the welfare of our troops, the wishes of Australians and the deeply held sentiment of people that we must finish the job in Afghanistan as a fitting tribute to the 21 Australian soldiers who have been killed to date.

Bearing in mind the parliament’s bipartisan commitment to remain militarily engaged in Afghanistan, it is timely to re-examine our role in reshaping that country—and, of course, that goes beyond the military. For hundreds of years Afghanistan has experienced conflict and strife—strife that we as a nation have never known but strife that has gone on there for literally hundreds of years. History tells us that whenever a foreign power has tried to exert influence over Afghanistan, that particular country has come off second best. You can trace that back to colonial Britain or, more recently, to Russia. They are just two of many examples of countries that have tried to use their influence in Afghanistan. So we must be cautious in our endeavours.

I believe we must stay the course in Afghanistan but we must also have a roadmap and benchmarks for our eventual withdrawal from that country. For the sake of our troops, their families, their friends and all Australians, we need to know when that job is done and not just stay on in some endless continuum.

As developed nations forge closer ties and become more and more engaged with the internet and so on—in other words, as we become a more global community—it is ironic that the gap between Afghanistan and the rest of the world widens. It is a nation which faces enormous challenges, and not just in the political sense. Geographically, Afghanistan has some of the most hostile terrain on earth and its people struggle for basic subsistence.

Almost 44 per cent of the population in Afghanistan is aged under 14. Corruption is rife and public infrastructure, as we all know, is diabolical. Unemployment runs at 35 per cent and roughly the same percentage of Afghans live below the poverty line. And per capita, Afghanistan’s GDP is only $1,000. It is also the world’s largest producer of opium—an illegal crop. Throw into that mix constant armed conflict and terrorism and you have about as grim a situation as you can imagine. Clearly, there is a hell of long way to go before peace and prosperity will be created in Afghanistan. So the goals must be military, political and social if we are to achieve genuine results in Afghanistan.

Our troops are there to make a difference, and I believe they are doing just that. Our nine-year presence in Afghanistan is only second in Australian memory to our engagement in the war in Vietnam. On that point, I want to come to another aspect of our engagement in Afghanistan, and that is support for our troops. I hope that I am not being unduly critical but I am not convinced that it is all that it should be. I want to take you back to Vietnam and, in particular, to the Battle of Long Tan to make a point about the importance of support capability for our troops in the field. While I accept that Australia’s role in Afghanistan is quite different from its role in Vietnam, and also the environment in Afghanistan—the desert and hostile terrain that I was talking about before—is quite different from that of Vietnam, the need for support for our troops in Afghanistan is as paramount as it was in Vietnam.

In the Battle of Long Tan, 105 Australian troops, with some support from RAAF helicopters and a contingent of APCs, took on an estimated contingent of 2,500 North Vietnamese regulars and Viet Cong. The odds of 105 to 2,500 are just enormous. Even though those odds were overwhelming, the Australians prevailed. But what was seminal to that battle—and I have heard it from people who actually served there, even the commanding officer in the field, the commander of D Company of 6RAR, Major Harry Smith, now Lieutenant Colonel Harry Smith, who was decorated for his exceptional leadership and bravery on that day—was the strategic nature of New Zealand, Australian and American artillery units who provided a carpet of fire into the rubber plantation where the battle was occurring. Harry Smith makes no secret of the crucial nature of the artillery fire and of the helicopters which brought in ammunition at the height of the battle. Imagine his situation: he was right at the front of the firefight, with his New Zealand artillery officer beside him. They were both lying face down in a puddle of muddy, swampy water, trying to raise their heads just enough to keep them out of the line of fire to call down a withering barrage of artillery from the three units that were literally metres in front of them. He says that that was the turning point for them. The only way that they could have won that battle was with the support of the RAAF helicopters and that barrage of fire. It was scary, it was frightening but it was crucial and decisive. In fact—and I just say this by way of an aside—it is said that, if they had not won the battle on that day, the Australian base at Nui Dat would probably have been attacked by those 2,000-plus North Vietnamese troops. Contrast that with the situation in Afghanistan where the Dutch helicopters stayed at 5,000 metres above our troops at Deh Rawood, out of the firefight but broadly in support of the troops. This is not a criticism of the Dutch helicopters—they had to make the call on that day—but, rather, a call for an integrated Australian capacity where the Australian commanders in the field can make those decisions and call on Australian backup.

I was disappointed by the criticisms made of the shadow defence minister, Senator Johnston, when he called for better Australian support. Honourable members would know that there have been too many delays in military procurement in this country. I am not criticising the current government or the previous government; I am just talking in broad terms. There have been too many delays, too many changes and too many cost blow-outs of all sorts in defence procurement. When I hear of troops wanting to buy different shoes or not being happy with their flak jackets and the like, it gives me a sense of unease. Our people have to have the best support, whether it is in their personal equipment or in having other forms of backup. General Jim Molan said we should have tanks in Afghanistan. We need to take notice of people who have been in these sorts of situations and can make a judgement. If a soldier says something to me about his equipment or his backup, I am more likely to listen to him than to a Defence spokesman.

In the remaining few minutes I would like to back up my colleague the member for Kingston and say how important it is to have support for the families. Just last week we had a friend around for dinner—and you do not realise the impact of this until someone close to you is in this situation. Her daughter’s husband, her son-in-law, was killed in Afghanistan just a few months back. Of course, once the funeral is held and the tributes are paid and the troops return to the field, there is a lonely widow and two children. The lonely widow is so wracked with grief that she suffers from clinical depression and has to go to hospital. When you see that at close quarters you call for another form of support, as the previous speaker did—support for the families—and no support is too much.

My colleague also made a very good point about support for returning troops. Again, I spend a lot of time in my electorate with Vietnam veterans, for whom I have a great affection. We ran a health program for them—I cannot remember its name—through the YMCA. I remember that, when I went to the graduation of these ex-servicemen who had been through this health course and this physical exercise, two of them told me that they were on the verge of suicide at the time they took that course. So, in closing, in talking about support and in examining what we do on the ground in Afghanistan, we should also remember the families that have been left behind and the troops who suffer psychological damage from these conflicts.

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