Luke Hartsuyker (Cowper, National Party, Deputy Manager of Opposition Business in the House) Share this | Hansard source

The fact that we are holding this debate reflects a huge change in our world view. With the possible exception of the Russian invasion of 1979, for most Australians Afghanistan fell into the category of those faraway lands about which we knew little and cared perhaps even less. When the Russians departed, effectively defeated nine years later, the country sank back into obscurity—an obscurity broken only by occasional cries of outrage at the activities of the fundamentalist Taliban regime. Even then there were those both within and outside Afghanistan who argued that, whatever their faults, the Taliban were providing some measure of stability in what had become a ruined and lawless country. However, any tolerance of the Taliban and any measure of obscurity vanished with the tragic and barbaric events of 9-11. Afghanistan was revealed as the source of an evil—plotted and enacted on a scale that we had not seen before—that changed our perception of national security and national interest. It questioned our commitment to defending fundamental values and challenged us to act on our beliefs and help turn an impoverished and divided country into a stable, democratic nation.

Before I turn to those issues, I will say that it is above all the sacrifice made by our fellow Australians that has brought Afghanistan to the forefront of our national consciousness. Twenty-one Australians have been killed in action and 155 have been wounded. I wish to pay tribute to them all, but in particular I mention Sergeant Matthew Locke from my electorate of Cowper. Sergeant Locke from Bellingen joined the Army in 1991 and was posted to the 5th/7th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment, after he completed his training. In November 1997, he completed the Special Air Service selection course and eventually joined the 3rd SAS Squadron. He had a distinguished career, including service in East Timor and Iraq, and was awarded the Medal for Gallantry while serving in Afghanistan in 2006 for his actions when his patrol came under sustained attack from anti-coalition forces. I quote from the citation:

The courageous and gallant actions of Sergeant Locke were instrumental in regaining the initiative from the Anti-Coalition Militia and allowing the successful exfiltration of the patrol on foot prior to first light the next day.

Sergeant Locke’s actions of gallantry whilst under enemy fire in extremely hazardous circumstances, displayed courage of the highest order and is in keeping with the finest traditions of Special Operations Command-Australia, the Australian Army and the Australian Defence Force.

He was fatally wounded in October 2007 by small-arms fire while on patrol in Oruzgan province in an operation to clear Taliban from an area around Tarin Kowt, where many Australian troops are based. I was privileged to be able to attend his memorial service in Bellingen. Throughout this debate we should remember that, when we talk about national security, national reconstruction, defending democracy, denying terrorists a safe haven, and many other abstract concepts, this is what it comes down to: a brave and committed soldier putting his life at risk in a foreign land, a memorial service in a small country town and a grieving family. Matthew Locke was just one of the 21 servicemen who have died.

There is much in the history of Afghanistan of which we should take note in an attempt to avoid previous mistakes, but we should also look into our own history and ensure that it is not just the dead we honour but the 155 wounded as well. We require a longer and more difficult commitment, but that is the very least we can do. Everything we say during this debate should be seen in the light of what we are asking our service men and women to do and in the light of the sacrifice that they may have to make. This is no academic exercise divorced from reality and dignified by the use of words like strategy, geopolitics and democratisation; for our service men and women on the ground in Afghanistan it is a reality, and it can be nasty, brutish and fatal.

I mentioned the history of Afghanistan in the context of our avoiding previous mistakes—but, to be more precise, its recent history is instructive. It has been invaded three times not for the resources it has but for where it is. In the 19th century, the British saw the country as a back door to British India through which the Russians would march if allowed. In 1839 the British dispatched a force of 21,000 men which succeeded in controlling enough of the country to install their own man on the throne in Kabul. The British withdrew the bulk of their force, leaving an occupying army of some 8,000 soldiers who were soon after allowed to bring their families to join them.

Resentment grew against the propped-up puppet government and the presence of foreign troops and their families, and a revolt broke out in 1841, leading to what the British thought was a negotiated retreat and safe conduct for the soldiers and their dependents. The retreat started in 1842, and in the depths of the Afghan winter the British were systematically slaughtered as they struggled through the snow. Only one man, Dr William Brydon, made it back to British territory.

In 1878 the British tried to send a diplomatic mission to Kabul in response to a similar move by the Russians. They were turned back at the Khyber Pass—through which many of the coalition forces’ supplies travel today—and their response was to summon an invasion force of some 40,000 soldiers, nearly twice the size of the previous expedition. Once again the British succeeded in gaining control of most of the country, and they established a British presence in Kabul.

All was well until September 1879, when all of the members of the British mission were killed in a rebellion. The rebellion was put down, but this time the British, learning from their mistakes, withdrew while they still had control and retained only two passes and oversight of Afghanistan’s foreign policy for their pains.

In a twist of history, it was again geopolitical concerns that led to the Russian invasion in 1979, ostensibly at the request of the then communist government in Kabul. The Russian forces rapidly became bogged down in a vicious guerrilla war in which they controlled only the main towns and connecting roads, and they eventually completed a withdrawal in February 1989. Around 15,000 Soviet soldiers and KGB operatives lost their lives; estimates of the Afghan dead range from 100,000 to two million people.

Five million people fled to neighbouring countries and two million were displaced within the country. In the 1980s, half the refugees in the world were from Afghanistan. In the midst of all this misery Afghanistan became one of the most heavily land-mined nations on earth. Thousands of its citizens were crippled or killed, and any attempt to restore subsistence farming to previous levels was seriously limited.

So what did we learn? That the Afghans have no love of foreign forces on their soil, whatever their reasons for being there; that the country is extremely difficult to control and supply; that the three major invasions could be regarded ultimately as failures; that inevitably the country’s professional classes would have been among the first people to leave; that we are dealing with a country in which tribal and family loyalties are far more relevant than dealings with any form of regional or national administration; and that we are dealing with a country that was shattered and brutalised even before the military actions of 2001.

A report on ABC Radio National noted recently that in Oruzgan province, where most of our forces are based in their training in rebuilding roles, the illiteracy rate is 95 per cent. How do you rebuild a police force, a health service and an education system when only one person in 20 can read and write? How can you rebuild on this scale while fighting a guerrilla war? The scale of the task is tremendous, and it is good at this juncture to remind ourselves why we are there. To my mind, arguing the case for our presence in Afghanistan is the easiest part of the whole debate. We are there because 111 Australians lost their lives in terrorist attacks linked in some way to the freedom that terrorists enjoyed in Afghanistan.

It is not that we are seeking revenge, but we want those responsible brought to justice and to deny another opportunity to those who would harm us. We are there because we have a treaty obligation to other countries, notably the United States, and because we as a country meet our obligations. We are there because it is simply the right thing to try to rescue and restore a failed, broken state and provide the Afghans with the things that we take for granted: adequate food, water, shelter, health services, education and freedom from fear.

I refer to the government’s national security statement, which aims to establish freedom from attack or threat of attack. The premise behind the action in Afghanistan supported by the United Nations resolution was that the Taliban regime allowed al-Qaeda to operate in the country and to use it as a training base. Most security analysts believe that al-Qaeda has been seriously weakened by the denial of its base and the fact that its leaders have been forced into hiding, probably in tribal areas of Pakistan. On the other hand, it is obvious that the support for the ideology of al-Qaeda remains strong and widespread, and if a weak or fundamentalist regime were in charge in Kabul there would be little doubt that the movement would quickly re-establish itself. Would it be a threat to Australia? Of course. Australians were killed in New York. Australians were killed in Bali and an Australian was killed in Mumbai. Slaughter aside, a resurgent al-Qaeda or its successor would have a measurable effect on international travel, commerce, communications, merely by its presence, let alone by any attacks it was to mount. There is no way that Australian citizens or Australia’s interests would remain untouched.

As I said, we also have treaty obligations. In the case of ANZUS, one which we must honour, failure to do so would be morally reprehensible, would damage Australia’s standing and, crucially, would send a signal to our enemies that we are not united. One of the principles of our national security is to support the UN in its efforts to promote rules based international order. This is an important reason for staying the course in Afghanistan.

This continuing conflict is not just about preventing loss of life; it is about values. It is about Australians standing up and saying that mass murder is evil and must be prevented. It is about standing up for tolerance, free speech and basic human rights, not least in Afghanistan itself. Put simply: to be part of an international presence in Afghanistan is the morally right thing to do; putting aside all strategic and political considerations, it is the right thing to do.

Of course doing the right thing is not always easy. We are trying to build a nation that had little to start with and has lost what it had. Many Afghans have fled. Many of those who remain have been brutalised by violence, poverty and insecurity. There is no civic structure as we know it. Our efforts in nation building will be undermined until the Taliban and other forces are finally defeated or, more likely, persuaded to become part of the process. That may seem far-fetched, but one only has to look at Northern Ireland to see where such a process can lead and the benefits that it can bring.

I note the Prime Minister’s statement that we will be in Afghanistan for at least a decade. I believe that this is a realistic assessment and that we should stiffen our resolve, support our troops in any way we can and get the job done. Only when the Afghan people as a whole feel they have something to lose, only when they feel they have an investment in their own country, will we have solved the problems of Afghanistan.

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