Melissa Parke (Fremantle, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

I welcome this debate on Afghanistan. It is certainly not before time that we are discussing in the national parliament our part in a war that has been running for nine years; that has cost Australia $6 billion; that has involved the loss of 21 Australian defence personnel and injury to more than 150, some very serious injuries; and that we discuss the paths that lead from our current mission into the future—the future of Australia’s involvement, the future of the international effort as a whole and the future of Afghanistan. Before proceeding further, I want to pay tribute to the Australian troops who are and who have been in Afghanistan, and to express my condolences to the families of those who have died as well as to those who have suffered injury as a result of their service to this nation.

The gravity of our involvement requires that the purpose and costs of Australia’s commitment are well understood and scrutinised and, yet, as General John Cantwell, the Australian officer in charge of our mission in Afghanistan, said recently:

I do fear that Australians in general don’t understand what we’re doing here …

This government and this parliament are responding to that view and I commend the Prime Minister for her clear, detailed and heartfelt statement that commenced this debate, and also for the new commitment to instigate a parliamentary consideration of our role in Afghanistan at least once a year for every year that our role continues. It is a meaningful improvement to Australia’s national parliamentary conduct and governance.

In my first speech I called for the introduction of a War Powers Act that would require parliamentary consent before Australian troops are sent overseas to war. I note that a number of contributors to this debate have also endorsed this approach. I believe it is very odd that a decision by an Australian government to change policy, even minutely in some cases, requires the passage of legislation through the parliament, yet the decision to commit the nation to war—to send our armed forces to put their lives on the line and to be prepared to take lives—remains within the sole discretion of the Prime Minister and the cabinet, without any requisite involvement of the parliament. This is done through the exercise of prerogative powers—by convention rather than pursuant to the Australian Constitution, which is silent on the matter.

Blackshield and Williams have quoted the view of noted English legal scholar Sir Frederick Pollock where he said:

Prerogative is nothing more mysterious than the residue of the King’s undefined powers after striking out those which have been taken away by legislation or fallen into desuetude—

that is, disuse. I note further the UK House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution’s report entitled Waging war: parliament’s role and responsibility of 27 July 2006 which concluded:

… the exercise of the Royal prerogative by the Government to deploy armed force overseas is outdated and should not be allowed to continue as the basis for legitimate war-making in our 21st century democracy. Parliament’s ability to challenge the executive must be protected and strengthened. There is a need to set out more precisely the extent of the Government’s deployment powers, and the role Parliament can—and should—play in their exercise.

In my view that statement applies equally to Australia and there is every good reason to properly consider the introduction of a War Powers Act to ensure that the decision to commit troops overseas to war, and indeed to continue in war, are decisions given the full weight and scrutiny of the Australian parliament.

I would like at this point to acknowledge the tireless advocacy on this issue of Ian Maguire, a semiretired solicitor from Blackheath in New South Wales, who writes regularly to me and to other parliamentary colleagues on this subject. As almost every contributor to this important debate has pointed out, Australia is in Afghanistan as a consequence of the September 11 terrorist attack on the United States and our involvement was properly effectuated through bilateral and multilateral processes. Australia joined the United States in Afghanistan according to our obligations under the ANZUS treaty, which was invoked for the first time as the formal means of securing our participation in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force.

I commend the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in this debate and the minister’s longstanding commitment to the probity and integrity that is delivered through Australia’s re-engagement with and observance of multilateral processes. As the minister noted, Australia’s alliance with the United States is without question our most important relationship and our role as an instigator, shaper and member of the United Nations is in my view the most important contribution we have made to international relations.

For me, as a former United Nations staff member, the fact that the International Security Assistance Force was properly sanctioned through an appropriate United Nations process is of great importance. It is what distinguishes our presence and our purpose in Afghanistan from the poorly justified, planned and executed excursion to Iraq. The UN Security Council renewed the ISAF mandate as recently as 13 October. It is clear that the illegal and harmful war in Iraq distracted from the effort in Afghanistan—indeed, it set it back substantially. I do not believe this is a reason to leave Afghanistan, but I do think we need to be honest about the environment in which we are now operating.

The new Taliban is resurgent and well-funded by drug crops, and supported from Pakistan. The security situation both inside and especially outside of Kabul is highly unstable and dangerous, and the government led by Hamid Karzai is generally acknowledged to be corrupt and dysfunctional, operating a system of patronage networks. I am grateful to Professor Amin Saikal, Director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Australian National University, for his insights into Afghan society, which he describes as a mosaic of different ethnic, tribal, cultural and linguistic groups with close ties to neighbouring countries. Despite these differences, Afghans are strong and proud people who have suffered over many years from foreign interference and from weakness of the state.

Professor Saikal notes that the establishment of a presidential style system of government now entrenched in the Afghan constitution has only exacerbated these factors. It has resulted in a system of patronage and personalisation rather than institutionalisation of politics. In some ways, it has also helped the elevation of one tribal group within Afghan society (the Durrani Pashtun) to the detriment of other groups, including the Ghilzai Pashtuns—from where most of the Taliban originate—and the non-Pashtun ethnic groups inhabiting northern, central and western Afghanistan such as the Tajiks, the Uzbeks and Hazaras.

I note further the comments in this regard of Professor William Maley, Director of the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy at ANU, that ‘while corruption is a very serious problem, it should more be seen as a product of a dysfunctional set of incentives created by aid flows in an environment of weak institutions than the moral weakness of individual Afghans’. It is recognition of this institutional fragility and fragmentation that leads to the acknowledgement that military means alone will not resolve this conflict. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan as described by Professor Paul Dibb, former deputy secretary of Defence, is testament to the futility of pursuing such a course.

It is clear, however, that the ISAF military intervention is a significant component in establishing the leverage needed to achieve a political solution, which must include an emphasis by donor countries and international entities on helping to rebuild the institutions that are part of better governance and greater political stability. Fulfilment of these core, or survival, functions of the state would improve the authority and legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its population.

Negotiations are now underway for a political settlement. Such a settlement will not only need to be inclusive of the wide spectrum of Afghan society but also require a regional consensus including Iran, Pakistan, India and Saudi Arabia. In particular, as has been noted by Professor William Maley, Pakistan, as the incubator of the Islamic extremist Taliban forces, will need to discharge its duty as a sovereign state to prevent its territory from being used for mounting attacks on a neighbouring country.

I would also argue that much more attention must be devoted internationally to combating the root causes of terrorism. As I noted in my first speech:

… you cannot fight a war on terror without also fighting a war on disadvantage, discrimination and despair. Security, development and human rights are inextricably linked. Tackling poverty in our region through the Millennium Development Goals is part of a wider strategy to deal with terrorism, climate change, pandemics and refugees.

A key rationale of the international mission in Afghanistan is the need to repel the attack upon our democratic values and beliefs that is represented by terrorism. We must therefore be careful to ensure that our own actions and words are consistent with these democratic values. One of the most powerful organising tenets for al-Qaeda and other outlets for Muslim extremism is the belief—widely held in the Muslim world—that we do not consistently apply our values and beliefs, particularly in relation to the rights of the Palestinians. Settlement of the long-running Israel-Palestine conflict would go a long way towards removing a central recruiting tool of Muslim extremism.

While much of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is unquestionably motivated by the extremist cause, I note the view put forward in an interview on Lateline by former Marine Captain Matthew Hoh, who resigned from his post in Afghanistan with the US state department, that for as long as we are involved in combat operations the insurgency will have life. It is true that to a certain extent the relationship between an occupying force and an insurgency is mutually reinforcing. Meanwhile, the civilian population remains caught in between, often cruelly exploited by the insurgents and sometimes shown insufficient care by the occupying forces.

In a recent article the Guardian described a survey carried out in Afghanistan which found that although few Afghans spoke warmly about the Taliban they felt the international forces were equally brutal towards civilians, and often indiscriminate. As the Guardian article notes, these issues have been recognised by Western policy makers and reforms have been made to address them, such as tactical restrictions on air strikes that risk civilian deaths. On the other hand, for example, night-time house searches, which result in fewer deaths but cause offence and terror, have increased; international forces often hire or subcontract unaccountable Afghan guards for security support; and many incidents involving civilian harm are dealt with in a non-transparent way, especially where special forces are involved.

The article concludes that for any resolution of the conflict to be sustainable it needs to be built on trust. The good news is that, despite the negative views expressed, most Afghans surveyed still wanted foreign troops and international engagement in the country. This is a key factor for the ISAF mission in going forward, and I am heartened by the efforts being made to avoid harm to civilians and moreover to work with local communities on the provision of vital infrastructure like roads, hospitals, schools and irrigation systems.

I believe that any Australian who looks closely at our operations in Afghanistan will take pride and pleasure in the reconstruction efforts, whatever else they may feel about our role in the war. According to the Lowy Institute, the percentage of the population with access to basic health care has increased from nine per cent in 2002 to 85 per cent in 2008. Of the six million Afghan children enrolled in primary education, two million are girls, when there were none in 2001. The Prime Minister is absolutely right to say that nothing represents progress more than those two million Afghan girls learning to read.

I also take heart from the perspective of an Australian friend and former UN colleague with whom I worked in the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, Tony Preston-Stanley, who has recently worked on the ground in Afghanistan. He too highlighted the importance of education:

I can tell you from personal observation that there are people there who see this as the way out of feudalism, and the only real hope of some future for their grandchildren. There are many examples out in the middle of nowhere of families desperately trying to educate their children against all sorts of odds. I have seen them under trees, in ratty tents and on the floor of a two-room village mosque. On my bad days it is those little faces and the efforts of their communities and teachers that give me reason for saying we need to help this country for a while yet.

I am in agreement with the Prime Minister that whatever the nature of the Australian military involvement in Afghanistan in the future, Australian civilian aid for humanitarian and development assistance will be needed for at least a decade and its nature and composition may change. The institutional and governance areas noted earlier would be a natural fit for expanded Australian contributions.

I note the research that has been carried out by the Afghanistan Working Group of the Australian Council for International Development, ACFID, into the obstacles and opportunities that exist in the area of development assistance in Afghanistan. ACFID has called for increased public transparency of Australia’s development assistance to Afghanistan as well as for Australia to play a key role in ensuring that strong Afghan participation, including by women, is a condition of funding in order to ensure Afghanistan develops its own capacities.

I note further the comment of Oxfam’s Executive Director, Andrew Hewett, in a recent article in the Age that ‘military-led projects quickly become a target for anti-government elements’ as well as concerns expressed by the outgoing head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA, Sir John Holmes, earlier this year about a blurring of the distinction between the work of soldiers and aid workers when the military engages in humanitarian aid delivery, which may be putting the humanitarian workers in danger. In 2008 alone, 260 humanitarian aid workers in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan were killed, kidnapped or seriously injured in violent attacks. In order to address these concerns, every effort should be made to separate the roles of military and aid work, and local and civilian constructed development should be preferred wherever possible.

There are no easy answers in Afghanistan, but it is essential that the international community, in collaboration with the Afghan government and its people, continue to work together for a solution. I have already spoken about the ways in which the delivery of aid might be approached differently, as well as the need for a political settlement that is inclusive of the many sections of Afghan society and involves regional consensus and cooperation.

However, I am concerned that whatever political conclusion is ultimately reached does not worsen the already unacceptable position of many groups within Afghan society. There is one very large group—namely women—who have a great deal to fear in a political solution that trades away the observance of fundamental human rights as the price of Taliban participation in an outcome. If the Taliban return to power not only will women suffer enormously but also the non-Pashtun national minorities, including the Hazaras, will be subjected to brutal discrimination, as they were when the Taliban were in power from 1996-2001.

I would like to end with a quote from William Maley’s book The Afghanistan Wars:

Here, the peoples of the wider world, who have witnessed agonizing waves of war sweep over the people of Afghanistan, bear a special responsibility. An old Kabul proverb—Kuh har qadar boland bashad, baz ham sar-e khud rah daradstates that there is a path to the top of even the highest mountain. With characteristic determination, the Afghans are now striving to reach that summit. They should not be left to climb alone.

In the end, I too believe that we should not leave the Afghans to climb alone.

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