Luke Simpkins (Cowan, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

Today I will take this opportunity to speak on the Crimes Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 but I will confine my comments to the matters concerning changes to the way the Australian Crime Commission can operate as foreshadowed in these amendments. I certainly have an interest in such matters, being a former member of the Australian Federal Police and a current member of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity.

As we know, the Australian Crime Commission took over from the National Crime Authority, and its primary purpose is the investigation of organised crime. Its current determinations, or work priorities, include the criminal intelligence examination of matters such as amphetamine-type stimulants and new synthetic drugs; child sex; cocaine; complex organised technology-enabled crime, including identity crime; established criminal networks in Victoria; high-risk crime groups and high-risk crime groups in South Australia; illicit firearm markets in New South Wales; Indigenous violence or child abuse; money laundering; people smuggling; serious organised crime penetration of the border; superannuation and investment fraud; terrorism and various other matters. In the last financial year, there were 433 examinations of such matters. When we look through this list of offences and situations, it is clear that there can be a large amount of money generated in committing these sorts of crimes. And with money comes organised crime: syndicates, collaborators, conspirators—all with the common purpose of generating money illegally, and always at the cost of the innocent and the weak.

In preparing for today, I suddenly remembered last night one of those definitions that were drummed into us at the Federal Police College back in 1986, that being the definition of an investigation. It was that ‘an investigation is a search for the truth in the interests of justice and in accordance with the specifications of the law’. That definition brings in a number of concepts, which include ethics, and that is what my fairly limited, short contribution today is about—the ethical behaviour of those charged with undertaking these investigations and these criminal intelligence examinations. It is certainly the case that, where there is big money and organised crime, there is also the potential for corruption.

We can look back at the 2004 detection and then subsequent convictions of ex-Victorian police officer James McCabe and New South Wales police officer Samuel Foster on matters relating to corruption and other serious misconduct. As encouraging as those sorts of past detections have been, the question that needs to be asked is: what more can still be done or needs to be done? It has always been my view that the likelihood of corruption is greater in the state police forces because of the frustrations with the legal and justice systems. The frequency of contact with criminals and the value to criminals of corrupting police do seem to be higher at the state level when these matters are combined. That of course does not preclude corruption taking place or not taking place among permanent Federal Police officers; but, for the reasons I have outlined, I believe that it is less likely.

Nevertheless, to deal with the very few that turn from the path of justice and truth, further options for appropriate action by the CEO of the ACC are required. I note that the provisions of the bill in this capacity were influenced by the 42nd Parliament’s Joint Committee on the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity. The committee’s 23 February 2009 report on its inquiry into law enforcement integrity models included the following:

The committee recommends that the Australian Government review existing arrangements for the suspension and dismissal of Commonwealth law enforcement agency employees believed on reasonable grounds to have engaged in serious misconduct or corruption, and that the Government take action as appropriate, bearing in mind the need to respect the rights of employees.

On 13 March 2009, the ACC Chief Executive Officer, John Lawler, responded to the recommendation when he said of the ACC:

Indeed, it has access to and the storage of, as I have spoken about, very significant intelligence holdings so the thresholds around accountability and integrity and responsibility are naturally higher with the ACC than they might be in other walks of life. My view is that, if we are entrusted with those powers, with those authorities or with that information, we need to have in place robust mechanisms whereby those people who would abuse those trusts can be dealt with in a way that protects the integrity of the organisation and what parliament designed for it. I have to say that some of the current arrangements do not provide the mechanisms to do that in the way that they should.

That brings me to the enhanced dismissal powers that the amendments in the bill provide to the CEO of the ACC. It allows termination in cases where there has been serious misconduct that is having or is likely to have a damaging—

See this speech in context