Kelly O'Dwyer (Higgins, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Parliamentary Budget Office Bill 2011, a bill that has been brought forward by the shadow Treasurer, whose objects are very clear. The objects of this bill are to establish an independent statutory office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer to provide objective and impartial advice and analysis on the Commonwealth budget and budget cycle, medium- and long-term budget projections, the costs of policy proposals and other matters as requested by members and senators.

This is something that we on this side of the chamber understand is very critical to an open and transparent analysis of the budget. The coalition felt it so important that, before the last election, we brought forward this proposal as an election commitment. In government, it is something that we would implement directly. The government agree—belatedly—that there is a need for a parliamentary budget office, and they agree that it is world's best practice to have a parliamentary budget office, an independent body that can provide impartial advice on and analysis of the Commonwealth budget and major policy announcements and costings. However, we disagree as to the best way to implement the Parliamentary Budget Office.

I was a member of the Joint Select Committee on the Parliamentary Budget Office, which delivered 28 unanimous recommendations for the parliamentary budget office. We all agreed on the importance of and need for a parliamentary budget office. Indeed, this was something that the Independent members also agreed was critical to the functioning of the government, with the member for Lyne, the member for New England and the member for Denison, as well as the Greens, all making it a condition of their agreement to form government with the government just after the last federal election. The shadow Treasurer brought forward this bill on 22 August. He brought forward this bill because the government, which proclaimed that this was an important reform, had done absolutely nothing about it. Today, though, the government has brought forward its own bill for debate on the second reading. Its bill in comparison to the shadow Treasurer's bill is deficient in a number of ways. I would like to use the time available to me to outline to the chamber the key differences between the shadow Treasurer's bill and the government's bill.

First and foremost, we believe it is important for the Parliamentary Budget Office to be effective, and to achieve that it needs to be independent. There is only one way we can ensure its independence and that is to make sure it has the full powers granted to it to obtain information as and when it requires. By contrast, the government has taken a different position. The government's position under its bill is not only to establish the PBO with limitations but also to ensure that, if the PBO requires information, it needs to request that information by arrangement in writing from the Department of the Treasury, and Finance. It is also prevented under the government's bill from preparing economic forecasts and budget estimates. This goes to the very heart of the functioning of the Parliamentary Budget Office. To not allow the Parliamentary Budget Office to do its job, to gain the information that it requires and to prepare economic forecasts, means that it would be a very anaemic parliamentary budget office indeed. It would be a parliamentary budget office in name only.

The contrast between the government's bill and our bill is stark under the powers granted to obtain information. This is the second fundamental difference between the two bills. The government's bill requires the PBO to make arrangements, in writing, as I have said, with Commonwealth bodies to obtain information and documents relevant to the Parliamentary Budget Office's functions. It needs to agree to various memorandums of understanding, which, we know, would put limitations upon the information that could be obtained by the Parliamentary Budget Office. We will not constrain the Parliamentary Budget Office under our bill as brought forward by the shadow Treasurer. We understand that to do so would mean that they could not properly go about their business, role and function. So we will give them considerable information-gathering powers, and an additional element, the element of secrecy, so that any discussions that take place between it and a senator or a member take place in confidence so, again, the Parliamentary Budget Office can provide full and frank and fearless advice.

The third element that I wish to highlight tonight is that of the government's bill restricting the functions which can be performed by the PBO. This is of course at odds with what was provided for in the explanatory memorandum bought forward by the minister, who said in the explanatory memorandum when they were establishing the mandate for the PBO that the mandate of the PBO is to inform the parliament by providing:

… independent and non-partisan analysis of the budget cycle, fiscal policy and the financial implications of proposals …

However, to restrict the Parliamentary Budget Office from providing and preparing economic forecasts and budget estimates, whether as a whole-of-government agency or at program level, means that they are restricted in the functions that they can perform. This of course goes to the ability of the PBO to, as I said, do its job: provide frank and fearless advice, and perform all those roles and functions that we would expect of a parliamentary budget office—particularly one that this government lauds as being modelled on the Congressional Budget Office in the United States. This, with the restrictions brought forward by the government's bill, as opposed to our bill, would mean that it could not do those things.

Finally, I wish to also point out the difference between the government's bill and the bill that is brought forward by the shadow Treasurer, and that is the confidentiality of policy costings performed during and after an election period. It is important that, if we are to develop policy and develop policy well, the costings be done in a way that is confidential so that, when an announcement might be made, at the appropriate time, those policy costings can be released. This sometimes will take a variety of iterations. The Parliamentary Budget Office should be fully able to engage with the senator or member who has brought forward the request for policy costings. To pre-emptively make public those policy costings before a final decision is made by the senator or member or their party would mean that policy would not necessarily be brought forward or into the public domain at a time where it is final and complete, which would have adverse consequences for proper policy making in this place.

These are the fundamental differences between our bill and the government's bill. It is important to get the detail right, which is why we have brought forward amendments and why we say that the government should scrap its bill and instead implement the coalition's bill. We have seen before, when the government has got the detail wrong, just how dramatic those consequences can be. You only need to look at the pink batts saga to see how wrong and how devastating the impact can be not only from an economic perspective, with billions of dollars blown out in the budget, but also from a personal perspective, where we have seen people lose businesses and, most tragically, lives.

It is critical that the government get the detail right on this bill, which is why we encourage and commend them to resolve to implement the bill that has been brought forward today by the shadow Treasurer, the Parliamentary Budget Office Bill 2011. We commend that bill to the chamber and we ask the Independent members and the government members to join with us in implementing that bill.

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