Joe Hockey (North Sydney, Liberal Party, Shadow Treasurer) Share this | Hansard source

I move amendment (1):

(1) Schedule 1, item 16, page 7 (line 29) to page 8 (line 10), omit subsections 64E(2) and (3), substitute:

(2) For the purposes of performing his or her functions under subsection (1), the Parliamentary Budget Officer may prepare, or have regard to, either or both of the following:

(a) economic forecasts;

(b) budget estimates (whether at the whole of government, agency or program level).

(2) Schedule 1, item 16, page 8 (lines 14 to 29), omit section 64F, substitute:

64F Information gathering powers and secrecy

(1) The Parliamentary Budget Officer has the powers and obligations set out in Schedule 2.

This amendment relates to the Parliamentary Budget Officer. Schedule 1, item 16, section 64E(2) precludes the Parliamentary Budget Officer from preparing economic forecasts or preparing budget estimates. Proposed section 64E(3) states:

... the Parliamentary Budget Officer must use the economic forecasts and parameters and fiscal estimates contained in the most recent relevant reports ...

These proposed subsections essentially constrain the Parliamentary Budget Office to using only the official economic and budget forecasts in its work. So it cannot even use the Reserve Bank's data, which is official data that is often in dispute with the official data out of the Treasury. It cannot refer to any other economic information that might be published by HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Citigroup or anyone else. It cannot refer to any forecast coming out of the IMF or the World Bank. It cannot refer to any forecast coming out of the OECD. No, it would seem that this will clearly constrain its independent assessment or analysis of the economic or fiscal impacts of policy proposals.

The Congressional Budget Office, which is constantly assessing independent data from a range of different sources and providing considered, balanced advice to the congress, would be denied by this bill. This bill alone serves the interests of the Treasury and of the government. It does not serve the interests of the parliament because it is not allowed to use any official data other than that provided by the Treasury. As I know, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet often does its own independent assessments of economic forecasts as well as from time to time forecasts of the budget. The Department of Finance and Deregulation undertakes similar forecasts.

These proposed subsections seem to be at total odds with the purpose of the PBO outlined in proposed section 64B, which states that the purpose of the Parliamentary Budget Office is to provide independent analysis of the budget cycle, fiscal policy and the financial implications of proposals. So I have moved that proposed sections 64E(2) and 64E(3) be omitted. I have moved they be replaced with a new section 64E(2), which gives the Parliamentary Budget Office the power to prepare its own economic forecasts and budget estimates or to have regard to existing economic forecasts or budget estimates as they see fit. This will allow the PBO to fully meet its objectives and provide a truly independent analysis of fiscal policy.

Again, I say to the Independents in this place: here is a classic example of where the government has put into the bill a handcuff on the PBO, attaching it to the Treasury forecasts and the Treasury forecasts alone, which is completely at odds with the intention behind the Parliamentary Budget Office. I am quite surprised that people would agree to that, given they want to have an independent Parliamentary Budget Office.

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