Stuart Robert (Fadden, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Defence Science, Technology and Personnel) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to lend my comments on the Prime Minister's motion. In doing so I acknowledge the Minister for Defence Materiel, who is in the chamber. This is now the fifth statement that I have given on Afghanistan this year. The Minister for Defence indicated he would provide regular updates and, true to his word, he did so four times during the year. I now follow the Leader of the Opposition in response to the Prime Minister's statement. I do so noting the horrendous loss of life Australian soldiers have faced on the battlefield with 11 soldiers killed in action and numerous wounded in action this year alone—with 32 killed in action since the resumption of combat operations in 2001 and over 210 wounded in action. They have paid the price of freedom on behalf of our nation, a price that is borne by so few yet so appreciated by and for the benefit of so many. Let us never forget that we entered combat operations in Afghanistan as a result of the 11 September 2001 attacks against the continental United States of America when 19 al-Qaeda trained Islamic terrorists hijacked four commercial passenger jets and subsequently crashed them, into major state buildings, being the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, and into a field near Shanksville in rural Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 victims, including the 19 terrorists, died in the attacks. On 20 September 2001 the United States stated that Osama bin Laden was responsible for those September 11 attacks and the US made a five-point ultimatum: deliver to the US the leaders of al-Qaeda, release all imprisoned foreign nationals, close immediately every terrorist training camp, hand over every terrorist and their supporters and give the United States full access to terrorist training camps. On 21 September the Taliban rejected unilaterally the ultimatum.

In response President Bush launched Operation Enduring Freedom, the US's global fight against terrorism. The initial military objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom, as outlined by President Bush in his 20 September address to a joint session of Congress, was the destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, the capture of al-Qaeda leaders and the cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan. We make it very clear that terrorist activities have not ceased in Afghanistan. Not every terrorist training camp or the ability to train, indoctrinate and lead has been destroyed. Many in the media profess that Osama bin Laden has been caught and died during that capture operation; therefore, the initial objectives have been achieved. Never forget the threefold initial objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom—the cessation of all terrorist activities in Afghanistan, the destruction of all terrorist training camps and the capture of all al-Qaeda leaders.

Let us also not forget that under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom the US assembled an international coalition of the willing, a coalition against terrorism. By 2002, 136 countries had offered a range of assistance: 55 countries had provided military force, 89 countries had granted overflight status for US military aircraft, 76 countries had granted landing rights and 23 countries had agreed to host US and coalition forces. Today over 40 countries continue to fight side by side to achieve the cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan. The mission, led by ISAF—the International Security Assistance Force—was put together on 20 December 2001 by United Nations resolution 1386 and has been operating under subsequent US mandates since. Coalition troops in Afghanistan now number over 130,000: there are over 120,000 ISAF troops from over 40 nations and a number of troops, up to 20,000, under Operation Enduring Freedom. ISAF has grown in membership and troop contributions over the last year in line with the revised ISAF strategy. Between November 2009 and August 2010 the US increased their commitment to ISAF through the much documented surge to over 100,000, with President Obama of course recently announcing that 10,000 of those will withdraw by Christmas this year and that a further 20,000 will withdraw by Christmas next year, bringing the US troop component down to 68,000. Australia still maintains 1,550 combat soldiers, sailors and airmen fighting within Afghanistan, with a wider number within the Middle East Area of Operations.

Let us also not forget that for 10 years Australia has been involved in the conflict. Australia's support commenced in October 2001, and the level and types of activities and equipment have varied during that time. From 2001 to 2002 was the initial, post 9-11 force deployment to support the US's Operation Enduring Freedom as well as the initial ISAF operation. Yet, from January 2003 to July 2005, Australia's focus shifted to the wider Middle East, leaving only two uniformed officers—and in many cases one officer—in Afghanistan. From August 2005 to June 2006 Australia once again ramped up its deployment to Afghanistan with special forces to support the US operation. From 2006 to 2007 a reconstruction task force was deployed to Afghanistan and commenced reconstruction and population protection tasks. Special forces remain to engage with and destroy terrorist operations.

Following the election of the Rudd government, Australia's strategy and operational disposition changed again. From February 2008 to July 2010 a mentoring and reconstruction task force commenced. The mission has changed substantially, with mentoring the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police while continuing reconstruction and population protection now becoming the order of the day. From February 2010, the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force changed to the Mentoring Task Force, focusing solely on mentoring the Afghan National Army. The next change, from August 2010 to today, was post the Dutch withdrawal. ISAF changed the operational disposition within our area of operations towards the Combined Team Uruzgan, or CTU, approach, which has had the Mentoring Task Force and a civilian led Provincial Reconstruction Team focus on reconstruction. MTF1, under 6RAR, was replaced by MTF2, based on 5RAR. MTF3 is currently in place, based on 2RAR, and will be followed by MTF4, based on 8/9RAR, and MTF5, based on 3RAR.

Australia's mission has therefore undergone a range of changes since 9-11 ushered in a new phase in the war against terrorism. The reality is that the strategy in Afghanistan is much bigger than destroying al-Qaeda. As President Bush outlined in his 20 September speech to the joint sitting of congress, it is the destruction of the terrorist apparatus and organisations within the country. The insurgency across Afghanistan is now made up of multiple organisations, including the Haqqani network, the Quetta Shura network, Tajikistan rebels coming down from the north and a range of independence-seeking, anti-West and pro-hardline Islamic organisations. The strategy is to ensure that this insurgency body does not once again wrest control of Afghanistan and allow that country to be used for training, resourcing, financing and assisting terrorism. Let us not forget that, as the Leader of the Opposition outlined, 108 Australian lives have been lost in a number of terrorist attacks, all of which can be linked back to the training, indoctrination, resourcing and basing of terrorist elements within Afghanistan.

Whilst discussions within the Karzai government continue about forming later governments that would include elements of the insurgency, including the Taliban, the fact remains that many of these insurgency groups need to lay down their weapons or they will be destroyed. In war, as we know, perceptions always lag behind reality. Whilst our TV screens are sometimes filled with the horror of suicide bombings as desperate insurgency forces reach out to the only weapon they have left in their arsenal—the destruction of young lives as they force people to strap weapons to their bodies, detonate themselves and enact mass violence—the perception indeed lags behind the reality. The reality is that considerable progress is being made.

The counterinsurgency strategy is working. As I have said a number of times this year in response to the Minister for Defence's statements, I remain cautiously optimistic. The strategy is more than just hearts and minds in terms of what our soldiers, sailors and airmen are doing in theatre. Not only are we reaching out, closing with and destroying the Taliban leadership, supply chains, information and communications and intelligence and surveillance networks; we are also seeking to build infrastructure. The Prime Minister made note of the road from Tarin Kowt through to Chora Valley. Within a week of that bitumen road going in, the price of palm oil, which in Chora had been seven times the price it was in Tarin Kowt, dropped to two times the price. It is that degree of economic activity that starts to reach out to the local people. When Australian troops reinforce roads, build aqueducts, bridges, mosques and schools and engage with and listen to the population, it makes a difference.

I have noted before in the House that six months ago—my last time in Afghanistan—the Commander CTU and I flew out to the first of the patrol bases in the Mirabad Valley, where, for an hour and a half, we sat down with the local leaders, many of them former mujaheddin fighters. As we sat in shura and talked, not once was the issue of security raised. That was how effectively our forces on the ground had achieved security within the upper parts of the Mirabad Valley close to Oruzgan. I had been to that place before, six months prior to that visit, standing in Tarin Kowt with the Leader of the Opposition whilst a massive battle was taking place on the very ridge line. As I walked, six months ago, stepping over the expended rounds and munitions, so indicative of modern battle, I paused to think about what the future would have been if the coalition of the willing had not been there. We talked with the locals for 90 minutes and all they talked about was their need for economic independence. 'When's the school coming?' 'When's the clinic coming?' 'What are we doing about this?' 'How's the road into the Mirabad Valley up to the greater reaches going?' Those are the questions they asked, not questions such as 'When's security coming to the region.' It is telling.

It is one thing for the Prime Minister to stand in parliament and say, 'All is well'; it is another thing for the wise and old mujaheddin warlords, who have spent their entire life fighting in the area, to sit down and say: 'For the upper parts of the Mirabad Valley, security is not our problem. Economic activity is our issue, the livelihoods of our children is our issue, education is our issue, medical clinics is our issue, roads are our issue, sanitation is our issue and replacing the poppy crop with a self-sustaining agricultural lifestyle is our issue.' That is the most telling aspect of what our combat operations and our Provincial Reconstruction Team are doing.

Indeed, what is even more telling is that, when I sat down with the Commander CTU, with the shurah there in the upper reaches of the Mirabad Valley, I looked around for the head of the Provincial Reconstruction Team—an Australian—and he was not there. He had legged it off to look at a bridge with some of the locals to work out what the PRT could do in terms of building greater access across streams and into roads. The fact that a civilian head of the PRT can spend an hour and a half, out there with the community, looking at how to build and engage while we talked about economic prosperity, says a lot more than any words can indeed say in parliament.

We have had some setbacks in terms of the Afghan National Army. There is an investigation into what drove the issues recently where three Australians were tragically killed by one of the soldiers whom they were mentoring. But if you ask our men and women out there in the dast right now about the motives behind the attack upon our soldiers, they would say that conjecture and discussion are counterproductive. It is imperative we continue to have a close working relationship with the Afghan National Army. They are starting to take over responsibility. Of our 30-odd patrol bases and forward operating bases, we literally only have troops in 11, using mobile mentoring patrols within the rest of them. Seven provinces have now been handed over, with a wide range of provinces being handed over to the Karzai government. The ANA is on track to reach its goal of 171,000 personnel trained this year and 260,000 by 2014. The security situation is improving. Progress is being made. Only nine per cent of Afghans had access to basic medical care. Today it is 85 per cent. And the statistics go on and on. Now is the time for our nation to stand behind what is being done in Afghanistan and join the parliament in expressing cautious optimism, as we seek to move towards the end.

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