Warren Truss (Wide Bay, National Party, Leader of the Nationals) Share this | Hansard source

Yes, I did, and I notice that all of us are still alive. To our knowledge, it certainly did not have any adverse effect on those who were involved. The health impacts are one of the issues that are being raised quite extensively in the community. I have certainly been made aware—and I am sure other members will have been as well—of people in the public who have concerns about the health impact of these scanners. Employees at airports who may have to use the scanners many times a day, international business and leisure travellers, and airline employees as well as the operators of the machines need to be assured that they are safe.

There are two primary methods of body scanning technology: millimetre wave and backscatter technology. They operate differently. The millimetre waves are a part of the radiofrequency spectrum which is used by a number of different devices such as mobile phones and wireless devices. Backscatter technology is an advanced form of X-ray imaging technology. The government has determined to implement millimetre wave technology. I am advised that the power density exposure for a person undertaking a scan is thousands of times lower than that of a single mobile phone call and is comparable to the passive exposure from a mobile phone used several metres away. The US Transport Security Administration has stated that the technology emits 10,000 times less radiofrequency energy than an average mobile phone call. The exposure is also much lower than that which passengers routinely experience during a flight. I think this is a particularly important point. Anyone worried about these body scanners should not be flying as they will be exposed to more waves on board the aircraft than they will experience passing through these scanners.

The millimetre wave scans are within the limits set by the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency. The waves emitted by the scan are directed inwards so the exposure of security staff who operate the machines is considered insignificant. The coalition has been assured by the government and the Office of Transport Security that the machines are safe. It should also be noted that active implanted medical devices such as pacemakers and defibrillators are designed to meet a series of standards which require the devices to be protected from interference by mobile phones and other similar devices. The power levels for the scanners are lower than many of these other sources, including mobile phones, and as such there are no known safety concerns in relation to people with these devices undergoing the scan. Additionally, unlike walk-through metal detectors, people with internal metal implants, such as false hips and pacemakers, will be undetected by the machines and this will address the inconvenience these passengers regularly experience when travelling.

The Office of Transport Security has advised that a person with any illness, injury or disability that would prevent them raising their hands above their heads and standing still will be screened using alternative methods, as will infants and small children.

Perhaps the most prevalent concern in the community about the new scanners relates to personal privacy. It is important in this respect to note that section 44(3)(3B) of the bill states that any image produced by a body scanner:

... must be a gender-neutral, generic image such that the person is not identifiable and no anatomical or physical attribute of that person are revealed.

As I mentioned by way of response to the interjection from the minister at the table, early this year I undertook a scan in one of the machines that this bill will allow to be introduced at international airports. I can vouch for the fact that the image it produces is indeed a generic outline with a yellow box highlighting the area of your body which the machine detects as potentially having something concealed. Of course, there are examples of these kinds of screens available to members. Without wanting to offend the standing orders, Deputy Speaker Georganas, I think this picture gives a clear example that in fact there is nothing offensive about the image and that it is done in a way which should avoid public concern.

This is unlike some technology that has been used overseas, which saw graphic images of passengers produced, stored and transmitted. Not only must these machines produce a generic image but the machines are also unable to transmit or store images. I understand that as a result of the committee inquiry the government intends to propose an amendment to the bill to ensure that any technology that may be implemented in the future also cannot store or transmit images. This will further protect the privacy of Australians.

In introducing body scanners at our international airports, the bill repeals section 95A of the Aviation Transport Security Act, which currently allows a person to choose an alternative screening method over a selected screening procedure. This means that, where a person is randomly selected to undertake a body scanner, they may not choose an alternative method of screening such as a frisk search. If a person refuses a scan they will be unable to pass through the screening point and will not be able to fly. This is a pretty drastic action and the fact that there is no alternative available means that people are going to have to make up their minds whether they are prepared to be scanned and if they are not prepared to be scanned then they simply will not be able to travel on that flight. I understand that this is the same approach that is adopted in the United Kingdom, though not in the US and some other countries.

The department has advised that this decision has been made primarily because the scanner is designed to detect items that are by their nature difficult or impossible to detect by other means. The only alternative to the body scanner which may achieve the same security outcome would be an extensive and invasive frisk search. It is the Commonwealth's belief that this would not meet Australian security standards. But I think also that it is reasonable to comment that those undergoing the frisk search may well find it more offensive, more intrusive than going through the scanner.

Additionally, the department has advised that the significant investment they have made in the new technology will only be justified by having a compulsory scheme. I have to say that I think that is something of a weak argument. It simply raises the question: why make the investment at all if it cannot stand on its merits? Finally, the department believes that the type of technology to be implemented in Australia mitigates the privacy and health concerns to such an extent that the optional system is not required.

As I have mentioned earlier, there is no evidence—and it is almost difficult to conceive that there could be any evidence—that going through this scanner is damaging. The concerns about privacy it seems to me have been strongly addressed through the use of the type of technology that is proposed in Australia. So the department's observation that this technology is such that it mitigates the privacy and health concerns to such an extent that an optional system is not required is a reasonable argument.

The fact that children and those who cannot raise their arms above their head will not be required to go through the scanners creates, however, some significant holes in the security net. The scanners will only add incrementally to aviation safety. Only a handful of countries are actually using this technology. Indeed, it is perhaps interesting to note that one of the few countries that does use scanners is the Netherlands, yet the Northwest Airlines flight which carried the passenger that has been the reason for this legislation coming into the parliament actually went through the security in Amsterdam. That demonstrates that this system, like all the other systems of security, at least to some extent, is not entirely foolproof.

The only total solution is to stamp out terrorism and suppress any ideology which compels people to carry out attacks on civilian travellers. That involves a determination to win the war on terror and strike at the heart of those of ill will towards our country. Evidence of a lack of commitment to stamping out terrorism or exhaustion in the fight will encourage more evil behaviour. We must work to encourage better understanding in our community and a universal commitment to renounce terrorism and attacks on innocent travellers. Scanners can help identify those of ill intent, but only a complete global end to terrorism can make us completely safe.

Finally, I would like to make some comments on the efficacy of the machines. The trial at the Sydney and Melbourne international airports last year saw 23,577 scans undertaken over approximately three weeks. An analysis of the trial indicated that 57 per cent of passengers were able to proceed immediately through the screening point. This represents a much higher alarm rate than walk-through metal detectors. The Office of Transport Security has advised that this higher than usual alarm rate was caused by passengers not being clear on what items they had to divest themselves of prior to scanning. According to the analysis conducted after the trial, alarms were commonly caused by high boots with buckles, currency, hair clips, watches, jewellery, pockets on cargo pants, and additional zips and studs on jeans and pants. As awareness increases as to what items are required to be removed prior to a scan, the proportion of alarms from these sorts of items should decline.

It will take some time for people to realise that the kinds of things that are likely to be picked up in a scanner are different from those picked up through conventional metal detectors. Bear in mind, this scanner does not work on detecting metal or some other kind of material; it works on comparing images with standard profiles within the computer technology. So it is a different kind of system, and different kinds of things will trigger it. That is what makes it obviously worthwhile—it is able to detect some things that cannot be detected by current technology. It should also be noted, however, that the alarm resolution is much quicker than with a walk-through metal detector, as the general location of the article that caused the alarm is identified by the scanners.

These new machines are costly and, like all the additions we have had to security in this country, will add to the cost of boarding aircraft in this country. The government is providing up to $28.5 million to help with the capital cost, but airports will be responsible for the ongoing operational costs, which will add further to the cost of air travel around Australia.

We have just been listening in the Senate estimates to some of the impacts on passengers of the costs of the recent round of security measures in regional airports which are coming online and expected to be operational by 1 July. These measures, which will have absolutely minimal effect on improving the security at our airports, are going to add very substantially to the cost of passengers boarding, particularly in small regional airports with relatively small throughput.

The machinery in itself is expensive, but operating the machinery will be an ongoing permanent cost. The department has admitted in estimates today that costs of up to $50 per passenger will result from these new government regulations, which are effectively imposing a new level of security in regional airports that is difficult to justify. Indeed, I think the $50 figure is conservative, and—when you have the situation where you are going to have to put teams of staff on to check luggage and passengers, sometimes with only one flight every day or two, and with the minimum wages that will have to be paid—the costs will be very substantial. Unless concessions are made or sensible ways found to deliver this level of security, the cost will amount to hundreds of dollars per passenger and not just $20, $30 or $50.

It is also worth noting that the recent federal budget has provided further cost impositions on Australian aviation, and they are just making it so much harder for our tourist industries to be competitive. There is the budget increase in the passenger movement charge, taking it to $55 per passenger from 1 July 2012. The budget has also announced that that charge is going to be indexed annually thereafter. The increase is going to see the government raise an extra $610 million over four years—at the expense of our struggling tourism industry. And by 2015-16 the passenger movement charge alone will collect over $1 billion. This departure tax was originally designed as a cost recovery measure for border services, but now it is just a new tax—a new tax that the government is imposing on our tourism industry and at a time when it is struggling to be competitive internationally.

In addition, the government is now going to charge airports for the cost of AFP officers being present on their site. This is a part of the security regime that people just take for granted: we do not expect to pay our local policeman when he patrols our street. But now when the Australian Federal Police do their job at the airport a bill is going to be sent to the airport operator. The impact of that is clearly going to be, again, higher airport user charges because the airports have got to recover these costs, and inevitably, therefore, yet another cost is going to be imposed on our airport users. It will be a $40-million-a-year charge on airports to partly recover airport policing costs.

At the same time as the government has cut funding to customs and the budget for passenger processing at airports, it has put up the charges. Indeed, one of the distressing things about this legislation is that it demonstrates the government's double standards: more machinery, more scanning equipment et cetera, but, at the same time, in almost every budget it has cut expenditure for customs and quarantine, reduced the numbers of inspections of cargo and reduced the numbers of passengers whose luggage is being inspected at the airports. This is adopting a very slack approach towards security at our airports. Instead, the government is going to impose new charges—a much higher passenger movement charge, and now these extra scanners which will add to the cost of the system—while, at the same time, turning its back on customs and quarantine inspections. If all of this is not bad enough, we have got the carbon tax also adding to the cost of travel in our country. These measures are on top of the carbon tax, which will cost Qantas at least $110 million in 2012-13 and will add $45 million to Virgin Australia's costs. Australia is becoming an unattractive place to visit because of the cost being imposed upon it by the taxes that this government invents. The carbon tax is clearly going to be the worst of them all.

These machines, for which this legislation will provide authorisation, are a further intrusion into our lifestyle. They will slow down passenger movements at international airports and they will test our patience. They are not perfect and trigger many false alarms. I wish they were not necessary. But the coalition notes the advice of the Office of Transport Security and the government that these machines are necessary to improve our national security framework. No responsible government or opposition can fail to heed such professional advice on a matter of security. The coalition is assured that the Commonwealth has taken all possible steps to ensure that the machines are safe and that the privacy of Australians will be upheld. For these reasons the coalition will not be opposing the bill and, in doing so, will not oppose the introduction of body scanners at Australian international airports.

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