Adam Bandt (Melbourne, Australian Greens) Share this | Hansard source

by leave—I move amendments (1) to (16) on sheet 1 circulated in my name together:

(1) Page 20 (after line 10), at the end of Division 1, add:

24A Act of grace payments

(1) The Minister may authorise one or more payments of an amount or amounts specified in the authorisation to a person (even though the payment or payments would not otherwise be authorised by law or required to meet a legal liability), if:

  (a) either:

     (i) the person has made a public interest disclosure; or

     (ii) the person has not made a public interest disclosure but the Minister is satisfied that the person has made a disclosure that the person genuinely believed at the time of making it to be a public interest disclosure within the meaning of this Act; and

  (b) either:

     (i) the Minister is satisfied that the disclosure resulted in the protection or the reclaiming of public money; or

     (ii) the Minister considers, in the Minister's absolute discretion, that there are reasons of public interest for making the payment or payments.

(2) Nothing in subsection (1) has the effect of appropriating the Consolidated Revenue Fund for the purposes of making a payment under that subsection.

(2) Clause 26, page 23 (table item 3), omit "and imminent".

(3) Clause 31, page 29 (lines 12 to 15), omit paragraph (b).

(4) Clause 36, page 33 (line 6), before "An", insert "(1)".

(5) Clause 36, page 33 (line 12), at the end of the definition of authorised officer, add:

  ; or (c) for an agency that is a House of the Parliament:

     (i) a Senator or Member who belongs to that House or a public official who belongs to the Finance Department; and

     (ii) is appointed, in writing, by the principal officer of that House (with the agreement of the principal officer of the Finance Department, if the public official belongs to the Finance Department), as an authorised officer for the purposes of this Act.

(6) Clause 36, page 33 (after line 12), at the end of the clause, add:

(2) For the purposes of paragraph (c) of the definition of authorised officer, the Finance Department means the Department administered by the Minister administering the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997.

(7) Clause 38, page 34 (line 2), omit "(1)".

(8) Clause 38, page 34 (lines 14 to 20), omit subclause (2).

(9) Clause 39, page 34 (line 22), omit "(1)".

(10) Clause 39, page 34 (lines 26 to 32), omit subclause (2).

(11) Clause 41, page 35 (line 28) to page 36 (line 4), omit paragraphs (1)(a) and (b), substitute:

  (a) information that has originated with, or has been received from, an intelligence agency that is about, or that might reveal:

     (i) a source of information; or

     (ii) the technologies or methods used, proposed to be used, or being developed for use, by an intelligence agency to collect, analyse, secure or otherwise deal with, information; or

     (iii) operations that have been, are being, or are proposed to be, undertaken by an intelligence agency;

(12) Clause 41, page 36 (line 20), omit "(b),".

(13) Clause 69, page 60 (after table item 12), insert:

(14) Clause 71, page 64 (after line 13), after paragraph (b), insert:

  (ba) a House of the Parliament; or

(15) Clause 71, page 66 (after table item 2), insert:

(16) Page 72 (after line 24), after clause 82, insert:

82A Review

(1) The Minister must, as soon as practicable after the second anniversary of the commencement of this section, cause a review to be undertaken of the operation of this Act.

(2) The persons undertaking the review must give the Minister a written report of the review within 6 months of that second anniversary.

(3) The Minister must cause a copy of the report of the review to be laid before each House of the Parliament within 15 sitting days of that House after its receipt by the Minister.

The purpose of these amendments is to clarify the way that an ombudsman can investigate a whistleblower and their claim and how it can be treated by the agency concerned. The position underpinning these amendments is, obviously: supporting the principle of whistleblowing and empowering people to take a stand to do what is right and make a positive and lasting contribution to society.

This is exactly what whistleblowers do and the Greens unequivocally support their protection under law. But we want a whistleblower scheme that assures people that they will not be the focus of investigation but rather that their allegations will be. However, the way that this bill is drafted shows greater preoccupation with protecting Public Service institutions than with public servants themselves. The government's amendments improve this imbalance, but we still have concerns because the bill sets up so many trip-wires for the whistleblower to navigate and, with one wrong step, they can lose their legal protection. In this respect, we wish that the bill was closer to the legislation that was passed in the ACT as part of the agreement between the Greens and the Labor Party, which we believe provides a template for simplicity and effectiveness.

The amendments address a number of issues and I will go through those briefly. First is the question of MPs and their staff. An obvious flaw in the bill is that it does not cover MPs and their staff. Our amendments include them in the operation of this legislation. Members of parliament are imposing standards and obligations on all those working for the Public Service, except themselves.

This legislation, as currently framed, will do nothing to challenge the public perception that politicians are more interested in arranging their affairs to suit themselves than in vigorously pursuing the public interest. These amendments will bring MPs, ministers, speakers, presidents and their staff into the scheme so that they may raise concerns about misconduct, maladministration and corruption before the consequences escalate.

Also addressed by these amendments is the question of intelligence agencies. The blanket exemption on externally disclosing all information created or obtained by an intelligence service is so broad it would cover the most remotely incidental and inane material and even covers disclosing material that has already been publicly released.

Our moderate amendment simply takes this blanket exemption out and leaves in place the long list of exempt material that would threaten investigations, operational matters and broader national security interests. Without this amendment, our intelligence agencies will be more vulnerable to maladministration and corruption than any other public agency because there are no protected avenues for intelligence officers to disclose information to a third party when internal investigations have been fruitless or thwarted by senior management.

These amendments also address the question of act-of-grace payments. Whistleblowers often undergo great personal and financial strain once they have decided to come forward, and this legislation, despite the objects of the act, does not provide enough incentives for someone thinking about doing the right thing and speaking out.

One way that the Greens want to provide incentives is for the minister to have an explicit and broad but non-compellable power to make payments to those whistleblowers who, through their disclosures, have saved the government money either through preventing revenue loss or enabling it to be reclaimed.

There is also a broad power to reward the discloser in the public interest. Many jurisdictions have improved their public service efficiency and reduced waste through offering payment to disclosers. We should do the same so that there is a chilling effect on those who might engage in wrongdoing but do not in knowledge that their colleague might be rewarded if they expose them. I commend the amendments to the House.

See this speech in context