Anthony Byrne (Holt, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

() (): On behalf of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, I present the committee’s report entitled Report of the inquiry intopotential reforms of Australia’s national security

l egislation.

Ordered that the report be made a parliamentary paper.

by leave—I am pleased to present this report. It has been 12 months of intense labour by members of the committee and I have five minutes to speak about it. Recent events such as the Boston bombings and the murder of a British soldier in the streets of London remind us of the impact of terrorist attacks and the continued need for the government and its security and intelligence agencies to maintain vigilance, preparedness for and defence against terrorist attacks.

The committee recognises the need for our security and intelligence agencies to be appropriately resourced, and to be granted powers which are often intrusive, in order to undertake their role. However, these intrusive powers must always be balanced by appropriate safeguards for the privacy of individuals and of the community. This recognises that Australia is a democracy which values personal freedoms and imposes limits on the power of the state. The committee's report reflects these fundamental values.

In May 2012 the then Attorney-General, the Hon. Nicola Roxon, asked the committee to inquire into a package of potential reforms to Australia's national security legislation. The committee was provided with a discussion paper outlining the reforms the government wished to have the committee consider. The committee was tasked with examining potential reform, of which three objectives were: to modernise lawful access to communications and communications data; to mitigate the risk posed to Australia's communications network by foreign technology and service suppliers; and to enhance the operational capacity of intelligence community agencies. The terms of reference contained 18 reform proposals involving 44 specific items across three reform areas. Importantly, the context for the committee inquiry included the serious challenge presented by new and emerging technologies upon agencies' intelligence-gathering capabilities. The committee received 240 submissions. Three submissions were received in largely identical terms from 5,300 individual members of the public. These submitters expressed opposition to the reforms put by the then Attorney-General, particularly with regard to the proposal to introduce a mandatory data retention scheme. I thank all those who contributed to the inquiry.

I note that the committee was faced with several difficulties. These included that the terms of reference were wide ranging and canvassed some of the most complex and significant reforms to national security legislation ever to come before the parliament. The absence of detail in the discussion paper concerning mandatory data retention also significantly impaired both the public discussion and the committee's consideration of the issue. Against this backdrop the committee was deliberate in taking the time needed to examine carefully the issues before it. Despite these challenges, Speaker, I am pleased to advise that the committee has produced a comprehensive and, critically, unanimous report which carefully considers both the needs of our national security agencies and the right of the individual.

The committee made 43 recommendations. In the time available to me, I will note three of the committee's principal recommendations. First, the committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act should be comprehensively revised, with the objective of designing an interception regime which is underpinned by clear privacy provisions—provisions which are technologically neutral—by the maintenance of investigative capabilities clearly articulated in enforceable industry obligations and by robust oversight and accountability which supports administrative efficiency. Second, in recognition of the need to ensure the protection of privacy and security of data and critical infrastructure, the committee recommends the adoption of telecommunications sector security reforms. Third, the committee recommends targeted reforms to legislation which supports the AIC in discharging its duties and equips it appropriately to protect the Australian community.

One of the main proposals the committee examined was that of mandatory data retention—that is, a regime which would potentially require telecommunications companies to retain communications data, such as subscriber details, for a period of time. The committee felt that whether or not to introduce a mandatory data regime is ultimately a decision for government. However, the committee has taken note of the views of concerned members of the public, which are summarised in this report. In fact, the option of a committee being asked to recommend the establishment of an intrusive power, without draft legislation, provided an almost existential moment for the committee. With the events of America with PRISM, the public must have confidence in its parliamentary oversight agencies. Therefore, the committee was extremely careful in putting forward a model, if the government chooses to go down that track. It is the government's decision to include intrusive powers and then bring that back to the committee.

In the time available, this work could not have been done without the committee secretariat, particularly Jerome Brown, Robert Little, James Bunce, Cameron Gifford and Simon Lee. I thank the committee members. They are most responsible committee I have served with. They had civil liberties in mind. They had the protections of the community in mind. This committee is the best I have ever worked with; it discharged its duties absolutely admirably.

I commend the report to the House.

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