Jane Prentice (Ryan, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (Submarine Cable Protection) Bill 2013. The coalition went to the election with a strong communication plan to bring Australia up to speed with the digital economy by investing in communications infrastructure. Today's bill is one step of many the coalition are taking to deliver on our election promises.

Submarine cables have been used for telephonic and telegraphic purposes for more than 150 years, with submarine telegraph cables first laid across the English Channel in 1851 and across the Atlantic Ocean in 1866. Now modern fibre-optic submarine cable technologies connect the globe in the digital age, transferring multiple terabits of data every second. They are the backbone of the world's communications infrastructure.

Submarine cables are an important factor in connecting Australia to the rest of the world. A connection to the internet enables Australian businesses, families and individuals to engage in commercial, educational and entertainment opportunities. The fast transfer of vast amounts of data enabled by modern submarine cables is vital to our communications infrastructure. To meet future internet traffic growth in Australia there are several proposals for new submarine cables.

When you think of modern day communications and digital terrorism, themes from James Bond and Die Hard4.0 come to mind, where stereotypical nerdy kids in glasses are furiously tapping away at keyboards in the dark, bringing down Western civilisation from behind a computer screen. However, behind the abstract virtual cloud of cyberspace is a very real physical infrastructure with some surprising vulnerabilities. For example, if you want to throw Manhattan into virtual chaos, all you need do is disrupt the New York data centre on John Street. But if you really want to disrupt the internet globally then you need simply interfere with the biggest choke point of all: the undersea fibre-optic cables that move vast volumes of data from continent to continent.

While these intercontinental deep-sea cables seem untraceable in the hundreds of millions—indeed, trillions—of cubic metres of seawater on the planet, these cables have to pass through shallow water at either end where they come ashore. This last kilometre is where the cables are most vulnerable. To add to the vulnerability, the shore nodes are surprisingly concentrated. For example, on the US east coast, virtually all of the transatlantic undersea cables come ashore at three locations between Long Island and southern New Jersey. On the US west coast, the vast bulk of cable traffic is concentrated in two locations—one in central California and the other in Oregon.

Disrupting a cable is not rocket science. There are easier ways of sabotaging the world's internet than those worthy of a James Bond movie. Each year there are approximately 150 unintended cable disruptions by the accidental snagging of a cable with a dragging anchor or fishing net. While most of these disruptions are genuinely accidental, there are occasions when submarine cables become terror targets. Earlier this year there were multiple disruptions on a number of undersea communications cables terminating in Egypt and nearby destinations. The sheer number of breaks struck some observers as an odd coincidence but was chalked up to the chronic problem of dragging ship anchors or tangled bottom nets snagging the communications links. Then the Egyptian coastguard caught three divers trying to cut the SEA-ME-WE-4 cable on the seabed a few hundred yards offshore near Alexandria. While on this occasion the acts of terrorism only amounted to a series of annoying repair headaches and not global cyberspace chaos, it was a troubling reminder of how vulnerable the global cable infrastructure is and presents a precedent for increasing attacks in the future.

While there is considerable redundancy built into the system—as you would hope, when there can be over 150 disruptions a year—if enough capacity is lost through enough cables being disrupted then the effect can be devastating. If too many submarine cables are located in the same pathway and go to the same access points, a single point of failure can arise.

In early 2008, three cables, including SEA-ME-WE-4, were cut between Egypt and Italy. These three cables carry over 90 per cent of all internet traffic between Europe and the Middle East. The amount of bandwidth that crosses Egypt is breathtaking. The SEA-ME-WE-4 cable has a total capacity of 1.28 terabits per second. Multiply that by three and you have lost a lot of capacity for data transfer. Despite aggressive re-routeing, over 14 countries ended up losing web connectivity. The Maldives were completely cut off, while over eight per cent of traffic from India was affected, along with slightly lower outages among the Gulf states, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

As an island nation, Australia is particularly dependent on submarine cables. Sub-sea cables carry the bulk of voice and data traffic in and out of Australia. Australia has seven submarine cables and three declared protection zones. As the majority of damage to submarine cables comes from man-made causes, in Australia's protected zones certain activities—trawling, mining, some types of fishing, anchoring of vessels and dredging—are prohibited or restricted. Within protection zones it is an offence to damage a submarine cable, engage in prohibited activities or contravene a restriction. Penalties include fines of up to $66,000 and/or 10 years imprisonment for an individual and up to $330,000 for a corporation.

Several new cables off the east coast of Australia have been announced, as has a Perth-to-Singapore route. SubPartners and Hawaiki Pty Ltd have announced proposals to construct cables connecting Australia and the United States. Telstra, Vodafone NZ and Telecom NZ have recently announced a joint venture to build an additional cable between Australia and New Zealand.

This bill increases Australia's connectedness, which is a cornerstone of the coalition government's broader communications policy. This bill is a reflection of our commitment to provide $100 million for mobile black spots to ensure more people can connect to mobile phone services, particularly in rural and regional areas, and is of course at the centre of our plan for a better NBN. The coalition is committed to completing the National Broadband Network sooner, more affordably for consumers and at less expense to taxpayers.

Our plan for a better NBN will ensure that areas that do not have adequate broadband service will be prioritised and that broadband services will ultimately be more affordable. This approach ensures that more Australians can prepare for the future of the global digital economy. The coalition government is committed to telling Australians the truth about Labor's NBN. The coalition's plan for a better NBN will see more people have access to fast, affordable broadband sooner. This bill will help ensure Australia's connectedness by improving the submarine cable protection regime set out in schedule 3A of the Telecommunications Act 1997.

This bill aims to ensure consistency between Australia's cable protection regime and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, which sets out the rights and obligations of coastal nations in relation to the seas and oceans, including Australia's right to regulate foreign ships and persons beyond its territorial waters. Although this issue has not arisen in practice, because the ACMA is required to consider UNCLOS when it exercises its powers, some concerns have been expressed that the regime may seek to regulate foreign nationals for certain actions in waters of the exclusive economic zone or continental shelf in a manner inconsistent with international law, including UNCLOS. This bill provides a structured process for the consideration of matters within the Attorney-General's portfolio in relation to submarine cable installation permit applications.

This bill enables significant cables that connect two places in Australia to be brought under the regime's protection. The Governor-General will have the power to specify in regulations that a domestic cable or route be given protection. ACMA would then have discretion to decide whether a protection zone should be declared around that cable or route. Examples of significant domestic submarine cables are those owned by Telstra and Basslink, which cross Bass Strait to Tasmania. This bill will enable domestic submarine cables to be brought into the regime and be suitably protected under the regime if appropriate. The bill will also streamline the permit process so carriers need to obtain only one type of permit to land a cable in Australia. The permit-processing time frames are tightened and duplicative processes are eliminated. Australia's regime has been praised as a global best practice example for the protection of submarine cables. (Time expired)

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