Andrew Nikolic (Bass, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I move:

That this House congratulates the Government for its continuation of Defence reform, specifically in respect of strategic force modernisation, enhanced national security, and regional stability, including:

(1) the acquisition of:

(a) an additional 58 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft; and

(b) the eight P-8 Maritime Surveillance aircraft and commitment to the Triton Unmanned Aerial Vehicle; and

(2) a commitment to:

(a) enhancing Australia's overall Defence capability, close cooperation, and interoperability with regional partners; and

(b) provide certainty for Defence planning, capability and doctrine development.

I have great pleasure in bringing this motion before the House to highlight the government's defence reform agenda, which responds to evolving strategic circumstances in our region and beyond.

Our agenda spans three diverse areas, including: a comprehensive first-principles review of all aspects of the department and in particular the Defence Materiel Organisation; a commitment to return the Defence budget to two per cent of gross domestic product within 10 years; and the development of a new Defence white paper—a document that will articulate a clear Australian national security strategy, including the all-important funding and planning dimensions. In turn, this will give Defence industry in particular the certainty it requires.

Regrettably, far-sighted commitment to reform of this type has not always been the hallmark of federal policy. Too often, Defence has been seen as a convenient means of achieving short-term savings, at the overall cost and risk of long-term defence preparedness. Labor's embracement of the Defence of Australia doctrine during the 1980s and 1990s is a case in point. Under it, Australia's strategic outlook and commitment apparently stopped at the sea-air gap. Yet much of my 31-year career in the Defence Force was spent working in areas and thinking about military challenges well beyond the sea-air gap. The Defence of Australia policy had the effect of landlocking our Army inside continental Australia—replete with the inherent withering of land force capability. This situation set back Australian strategic interests and influence a decade or more. I know it, because I professionally lived through it. Not until after East Timor did Defence make sizeable steps to recover from this short-sighted introspection.

Perhaps just as bad, this period represents a graveyard of lost opportunities to prepare well and realistically for the future; even if only to use elements of our professional military to engage constructively and practically—as is their proven strength—within our immediate region. Labor's 2009 white paper falsely promised an economic grand bargain with Defence. The bargain went something like this: Defence had to find some $20 billion of savings in a 10-year period; the Labor government promised real growth of three per cent in the Defence budget to 2017-18, 2.2 per cent from 2017-18 to 2030, and a bit of a deal with indexation; and the combined effect of those two inputs would fund the capability requirements for Force 2030. I notice the member for Hunter is in the chamber: his media release of 12 May 2009 also promised $43 billion of much-needed new initiatives from 2009 to 2019.

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