Tony Pasin (Barker, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to speak in support of the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014, but, before I do, I must say that I sat listening intently to the contribution from the member for Melbourne. In effect, he is advocating a position of soft diplomacy with respect to the threat of terrorism across the globe.

With respect to the member for Melbourne's contribution, the do-nothing option is simply not an option. To sit here and listen to that undermines the very good and collaborative bipartisan work that has been undertaken in this place, on this legislation and other things, regarding the threat of terrorism across the world.

This bill will enhance the ability of Australia's law enforcement and intelligence agencies to take timely action in relation to Australian persons who are—or indeed are suspected of being—involved in terrorism related activity. These are persons who are enabling or supporting terrorist activity and persons who are suspected of fighting terrorist organisations in foreign conflicts. This bill will address urgent legislative limitations identified in the context of present or recent operational activities, including counter-terrorism investigations and the activities of the Australian Defence Force against Daish.

The first duty of any national government is the protection of its citizenry and its territorial integrity. The sad reality is that we live in an age where both are under threat, and it is appropriate that we take steps to ensure that those charged with providing our national security have all the tools necessary to do their tasks. It was interesting to listen to the contribution of the member for Melbourne. He is someone who purports to point to expert analysis on very many other topics but is rejecting the expert analysis being provided to this government by security agencies across the spectrum.

Nation-states face a multitude of threats that are unprecedented, both in number and form. At one end of the spectrum we face the rise of Daish—that heinous death cult that brings to mind the worst excesses of totalitarianism and seeks to expand its sick and twisted ideology as far as it can. It has the vast economic resources of a national government, the military capacity of an army and the mindset of a fanatic. This body poses an existential threat to our country and to our national interests in the region. It is a breeding ground for terrorism and seeks to recruit people not only by coercive force in territories they have seized but also in seducing people in our own country—either to strengthen their hand over there, or for those people to return to our shores and wreak havoc upon our own population.

This leads me to the other end of the spectrum of threat: individuals acting without specific command-and control-structures being able to execute acts of terror to generate fear and force us to change our way of life. Sadly, we have seen an example of this in Australia, with the recent attack in Victoria of two police officers. We have also seen the tragedy in Canada where their national parliament was subject to an attack.

These types of so-called 'lone-wolf' attacks are extremely dangerous, because they require many more resources and planning than, say, the 9/11 style terror operation. Describing these threats as lone-wolf attacks is misleading, because even if a terrorist does not enjoy direct operational assistance relating to a specific attack they often have assistance through financial support, advice, training, non-specific planning assistance, housing communications and various other means, which enable them to carry out their evil deeds.

In order to reduce the threat of Daish, our Defence Force is currently engaged in combat operations against it. I want to take the opportunity to say this to the Australian troops: you enjoy my wholehearted support for what you are doing and I will do everything in my capacity to give you the support you need. Accordingly, I support this legislation, which seeks to help dismantle the support structures for those who would perpetrate terror and who are engaged in attacks against ADF personnel.

The measures in the bill have been included as a result of instances of operational need, identified by relevant agencies, subsequent to the introduction of the previous two tranches of legislation. In the case of the proposed Intelligence Services Act amendments, the need for amendment is urgent. This is as a result of recent developments in the security environment—primarily due to the government's decision to authorise the ADF to undertake operations against the Daish terrorist organisation in Iraq.

There is urgent need to make amendments to the Intelligence Services Act to ensure that intelligence services can undertake relevant activities in support of the ADF operations in Iraq against the Daish organisation. These activities are anticipated to include the collection of intelligence in relation to Australian persons who are known or suspected participants in hostilities and particularly of those who are known or suspected of fighting with or alongside the Daish terrorist organisation.

Such intelligence is likely to prove instrumental to these operations. This includes the protection of ADF personnel, members of other defence forces and civilians from death or serious harm as a result of terrorist or other hostile acts committed in the course of this conflict. The proposed amendments are directed in two key areas. Firstly, the primary purpose of the amendments is to better facilitate ASIS in providing timely assistance to the Australian Defence Force in support of military operations in its cooperation with the ADF on intelligence matters.

The proposed amendments make explicit that such support and cooperation is a function of ASIS, consistent with explicit functions to this effect inferred upon the other two intelligence-service agencies: the Australian Signals Directorate, ASD, and the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation, AGO. These measures also make a small number of amendments to facilitate the timely performance by ASIS of this function. These concern the provision of ministerial authorisation by the minister responsible for ASIS, in relation to a class of Australian persons, and enabling the Attorney-General, as the minister responsible for ASIO, to provide agreement to an authorisation in respect of individuals falling within a specific class of Australian person.

All of the existing safeguards in the Intelligence Security Act will apply to the pool of performance of the new function. These include the statutory threshold for granting of authorisations, ministerial-reporting requirements and independent oversight of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, IGIS.

Secondly, the proposed amendments also remedy practical limitations identified in the arrangements for emergency ministerial authorisation, which apply to ACIS, ASD and AGO. The amendments make provision for the contingency that the relevant minister may be temporarily uncontactable when there is an urgent previously unforeseen need to collect vital intelligence.

Debate interrupted.

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