Kelvin Thomson (Wills, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

by leave—The treaties committee has today handed down one of its most significant reports, and one which shows why the treaties committee is the parliament's most heavy-duty committee. We have recommended that uranium sales to India only commence when: (1) India has achieved the full separation of civil and military nuclear facilities as verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency; (2) India has established an independent nuclear regulatory authority under law; (3) the Indian nuclear regulator's existing policies and arrangements have been reviewed to ensure its independence; (4) the frequency, quality and comprehensiveness of on-site inspections at nuclear facilities have been verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency as being of best practice standard; and (5) the lack of sufficient planning for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities has been rectified.

In recommending to the government that there be no uranium sales to India until these crucial conditions are met, the treaties committee has listened to, and taken into account, the expert advice which was given to us by, for example, John Carlson, the former head of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office. The treaties committee heard evidence that it is essential that any nuclear agreement with India should be at least as rigorous as all the agreements Australia has concluded with other countries, and that there is no justification for Australia to require less of India than of all other agreement partners. So we have urged the government to push India to become a party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty. In doing so we acknowledge the views of civil society witnesses who felt Australia could have done more in the negotiation process to pursue global disarmament.

We have also listened to the nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, which undertook a mission to India in March this year to investigate India's regulatory framework. This mission found that the Indian nuclear regulatory agency was still not independent under law; the existing policies and arrangements at the nuclear regulator needed to be reviewed to ensure its independence; the frequency and quality of inspections at nuclear facilities was still not up to best practice standards; and there was still insufficient planning for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. So the committee has made recommendations to deal with exactly these findings. We respect the work of the IAEA and believe that all countries, India included, need to observe its requirements to the letter.

The committee has also picked up on two areas where there is dispute about the legal position. The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office is adamant that Australian consent is required to engage in uranium enrichment of 20 per cent and above. But nuclear treaty experts Ronald Walker and Ernst Willheim have a different view. Given the troubling difference of opinion, the committee has recommended that the Australian government outline the legal advice it has received regarding the consent to reprocessing provisions.

A similar conundrum arises in relation to whether this treaty breaches our obligations under the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga. The committee was given opposing interpretations presented by very reputable sources. Once again, we have recommended that the Australian government outline the legal advice it has received concerning whether this proposed agreement breaches Australia's obligations under the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

The committee has recommended that the Australia-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement be ratified, subject to the recommendations I have outlined. Let me re-emphasise that point. Our support is subject to our other recommendations. If they are not implemented, then do not expect me to be supporting this agreement.

As we say in our report, 'For the committee, the highest standard of safety in the use of Australian material is a central requirement for the export of that material. Should Australian nuclear material be sold to India, the Australian public will want to be assured that the nuclear material is being used safely.'

The government will ignore these powerful recommendations, which come not only from opposition members but from members of the government, at its peril and at the peril of Australia's reputation as a responsible global citizen, with a strong commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament.

This report should act as an orange light, warning the government not to ratify this treaty precipitously but to tread carefully, aware of the immense and long-lasting consequences of error in this fraught and long-contested area of energy policy.

Finally, I want to praise and acknowledge the chairmanship of this inquiry, by the member for Longman, Mr Roy. In this very adversarial place I am probably not doing him or his career any favours by speaking well of him, but I will all the same. The chair has worked very hard to achieve a consensus among members who come to this issue with widely differing views about whether nuclear power is part of the problem or part of the solution and whether India has been a good global citizen in relation to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues. As a result of the chair's maturity and understanding we have been able to put to the parliament a very significant report. I hope the government listens to this bipartisan call and implements all of its recommendations.

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