Kevin Andrews (Menzies, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

Australia faces a series of strategic challenges over the next couple of decades. These include the interactions of the great powers—namely the United States, Russia and China in particular. These also include the diffusion of Islamic terrorism in our region, the continuing conflict in the Middle East—including in Afghanistan—the unpredictability of North Korea and, indeed, the risk of a failed nation state in our more immediate region.

While an attack on Australian territory is unlikely in the foreseeable future, it is a fact also that the military forces of many countries in the Indo-Pacific are being significantly modernised and expanded. Historically, as nations prosper they upgrade and improve their defence forces. For example, it is estimated that in 20 years time half of the world's submarines will operate in the Indo-Pacific. Cyber, surveillance and ballistic missile systems are being developed rapidly. In addition to modernising our standard military resources, such as ships and planes, Australia must keep pace of these developments if we are to retain our military edge in the future.

In this contribution, I wish to mention just one of these challenges, and that is the ongoing threat of Islamic terrorism. The threat or spread of Islamic terrorism to the Indo-Pacific remains the most significant immediate threat to our regional security. The attacks in Jakarta, following previous assaults in Bali and ongoing incidents in Australia, point to a challenging future. The confluence of the release, from Indonesian jails, of many JI adherents over the coming year and the return of foreign fighters from the Middle East to the region—indeed with the declaration of an offshoot of the caliphate by forces in the southern Philippines and elsewhere in South-East Asia—points to what Prime Minister Lee of Singapore identified as an 'emerging hazard'. It is a view shared by defence ministers throughout the region and heightened by more recent events.

While security and intelligence services, including in Australia, have been proficient, the task of detecting and preventing every planned attack is impossible. Good luck as well as good intelligence gathering have been important in the task to date. But we are also witnessing the increase in smaller, previously unknown groups and self-radicalised individuals, making the task of security agencies even more difficult. These developments have led to greater regional cooperation in our area. They also reinforce the imperative of defeating the terror at its source, especially in the Middle East. Australia has understood historically that the spread of Islamic terrorism is a global threat. That is why we committed to the US-led coalition in Iraq with the second-largest military presence after the US, operating air strikes, refuelling, and command and patrol activities in the air, as well as training Iraqi forces, mainly at Taji.

However, it is effectiveness, not numbers, that ultimately counts in this war. The notion that ISIL is weak and contained and that the assault upon it is proceeding very well is misplaced. Yes, territory has been regained, but the tentacles of ISIL and related groups continue to spread elsewhere. That is why America's acceptance of the advice of its military commanders that more had to be done to win the war and to expand the coalition involvement is significant. US Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter, told the congress in December 2015 that special forces would be utilised in direct action against ISIL in both Iraq and Syria. During testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary Carter said:

This is an important capability because it takes advantage of what we're good at.

Its goals would include freeing hostages and capturing leaders of ISIL. Military chiefs urging the expanded response also knew that elite agile special forces would assist in better identifying targets for air strikes, whether by crude or drone aircraft.

While the coalition pursued its then approach, Ramadi fell to ISIL—proof that the enemy was stronger than had generally been considered before that. Yes, Ramadi was reclaimed by the Iraqis, but it should never have fallen in the first place. While it remained under the black ISIL flag, it was a daily reminder of the ineffectiveness of the then strategy. For a long time the only real success in Iraq was by the Kurds in the north, who, rather than flee, stood and effectively fought their enemy, Other success was largely by the Iranian backed militia forces, which have little sway in the Sunni regions to the west of the country. Taking back Ramadi pales into insignificance to the task of defeating ISIL in their strongholds of Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq. In both cities, ISIL is embedded into the local population, making air strikes more problematic.

The new strategy that Secretary Carter announced in December 2015 recognises the limitations of the earlier approach. It also reflects the successful strategy that General Stanley McChrystal executed in Iraq over a decade ago. Under his Joint Special Operations Command, the identification of high-value targets was pivotal in the success of that campaign. The US has now recognised that advise and assist and building partner capacity activities to train the Iraqis are insufficient to defeat ISIL. It is conceded that special forces and related personnel can play a much more important role fighting ISIL, not just in training the Iraqi army.

As part of the coalition against ISIL we should welcome this new strategy and continue to assist as we do in its execution. The measures announced by the Prime Minister should enable better targeting of ISIL by our forces, which in turn will assist in the fight. But let us not be sanguine. We are engaged in a years- if not decades-long conflict from which we cannot withdraw. World security and peace depend on our continuing efforts. I commend the motion.

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