Mr Tony Burke (Watson, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Finance) Share this | Hansard source

The opposition will be supporting the Water Legislation Amendment (Sustainable Diversion Limit Adjustment) Bill 2016. This issue is hard. For members on both sides of the chamber, no-one should pretend that anything is easy when dealing with the Murray-Darling Basin. People on both sides of the chamber—and I include the minister at the table—have stepped up and made compromises that were hard and, in making those compromises, have fought very hard for their communities to get the best possible deal. But they also made sure that, in fighting for their communities, they did not continue the deadlock that had plagued Australia for more than a century—that is, in representing their communities, people were willing to see that no deal would be struck at all.

Both the minister at the table and the Minister for Agriculture and Water Resources, who spoke earlier, are good examples, in fact, in that the plan in front of us and the legislation in front of us do not represent their ideal outcome. There is no-one who, from an environmental perspective, views the Murray-Darling Basin Plan that was enacted when I was minister for water as being the ideal outcome. In terms of my starting point when I was negotiating the plan up and down the basin, I would not view what we ended up with as the ideal, perfect outcome. But for more than a century we were a nation where there was no outcome. We needed to get to the point where, for the first time in the history of this country, we would treat the Murray-Darling river system as having a coordinated plan across the country.

The Murray-Darling river system is a very unusual system, in terms of the fundamentals of what we are dealing with. We are talking about one-seventh of our continent. We are talking about an extraordinarily large river system which reaches across Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and even the ACT. Where we are standing now, we are in fact within the basin. But it is much more than one-seventh of our agricultural output.

The debates that began in Australia, on whether the river system was being used effectively and whether the water that was being pulled out of the system in some states was having an impact on other states, were originally part of the Federation debates to determine whether or not we would, in fact, become a country. This issue was on the agenda then. It was viewed then not as an agricultural issue or an environmental issue but as a navigation issue. They were not able to get the barges far enough up the Murray River in South Australia when they went through periods of drought because of water that was being pulled out further up. So this issue has been live for a very long time.

It was always about the best political outcome. If you said: 'Okay. In terms of the politics, what's the best outcome for each state? What's the best outcome for each electorate?' the best outcome politically was always going to be for everybody to say, 'I'm not giving an inch,' defend the line for whatever was right for their community and leave Australia with this issue unresolved. The politics of that allowed people to be involved in a tough negotiation in which they did not give ground and did not get a national plan for more than a century. What then happened, though, in 1991 was a new negotiator came to the table. In 1991, the river decided to negotiate back, and it proved that it was less compromising than any politician. The blue-green algae outbreak went for 1,000 kilometres. At this point, the river effectively sent a message that unless you become serious about fixing this, it does not matter whether you care about the river for environmental purposes, for social purposes, for critical human use or for agricultural purposes; unless you fix this, the river is not going to allow any of it to work. That is the message that a blue-green algae outbreak sent out for 1,000 kilometres.

The Keating government responded in 1994 by brokering the first COAG agreement. That set the principles back in '94 on which all the reform that we are talking about today was subsequently based. That COAG agreement said that there would be pricing of water, there would be trading of water and to reserve some volumes of water for the environment. That fundamental concept of adopting a market approach to an environmental and agricultural irrigation problem was quite radical. Globally, now, that concept has been adopted in many parts of the world. Even China, with respect to the Yellow River, now have a form of water trading community by community, not landowner by landowner. This concept where you allow there to be market system to help inform some of these decisions is an example that Australia has set for the world. The Keating government, in getting to that point of the COAG agreement, formed the underpinnings of what would later become the Murray-Darling Basin Plan, but we still had a long way to go.

On this particular policy issue I do have to pay tribute to the work that was done under the Howard government; it would be dishonest not to. It was the big environmental reform in the final term of the Howard government—my first term in this place. It was also the first term of the now Prime Minister, who at that time was the Minister for the Environment and Water Resources. He introduced the Water Act and he introduced what then became the legislative framework for the plan. So the intergovernmental framework was established by the Keating government, the legislative framework was established by the Howard government, the Murray-Darling Basin Plan was advanced during the period of the Rudd government when Senator Wong was the Minister for Climate Change and Water, and concluded in the Murray-Darling Basin Plan under the Gillard government when I was the Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities.

That plan effectively dealt with the issue in this way. If we start with some of the problems that we are dealing with: the Murray-Darling Basin, while it is one of the biggest river systems in the world, has two characteristics that make it quite different to any other major river system in the world. The first is that it is particularly dry, and the second is that it is particularly flat. In other major river systems—if you look at the Amazon or something like that—you will see water surging. Whereas in parts of the Murray-Darling and in particular in parts of the Darling, you will find parts of that river system where the water flows, except in times of flood, can be extraordinarily modest. In terms of how flat it is think of this: go to the Macquarie Marshes, right in the north of the Murray-Darling system. This is a system that flows all the way out to sea. Right at the top end of this system, you are only 142 metres above sea level. Where the Darling meets the River Murray, you are only 35 metres above sea level. This is an extraordinarily flat system. In terms of any of the water management that is done, when you are dealing with areas where the topography is particularly flat, it means that any flooding event will be different. If you have a steep system, the topography will mean that floods and major water events, when they occur, are more likely to mimic what had happened previously. When you have a very flat system these events will behave differently on every occasion. The Minister for Health and Aged Care and Minister for Sport at the table, from her own electorate of Farrer, would know all too well—aside from environmental water use, when there is a natural flood—how different each flood can be.

So the nature of the reform and the fundamental thing that the reform tries to do is to say, 'We will never return the Murray-Darling to a completely 100 per cent natural system.' Some people might advocate for that, but it is never going to happen. But what we want to make sure of is that we have a healthy working basin. There are sites that are viewed as the particularly sensitive environmental sites—and the rivers themselves are part of that, but there is a series of wetlands around the system that have critical environmental purpose as well—and sometimes the health of those sites will need to be managed deliberately. The way it gets managed deliberately is with water that used to be all allocated for irrigation purposes and that over time has increasingly been designated to the Office of the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder. This is the key to the reforms: the Environmental Water Holder then becomes responsible for initiating particular flood events or water events that are required to keep the health of the basin going.

The environmental health of the basin has a different requirement to what irrigators want. This is why some of the flexibility of the plan was put there quite deliberately. If you are an irrigator, then by definition you want the guarantees of water to be as regular as possible, but the environment will have, and ecologically is required to have, a cycle of drought years and good years. The challenge that we have had is that because of overallocation that was occurring in particular irrigation districts the environmental sites were not getting the good years. When it was meant to be a normal sort of year the environmental impact was in fact mimicking a drought year, so that by the time the drought years came along you had the system in such a state that environmentally it was as though it had already experienced a number of drought years before the drought itself arrived.

The key question was: how much water is required to keep the basin in a state of good health? On this one some people will argue 'the science says' and quote a magic number. On this issue, the truth is that there has never been and can never be certainty as to what exactly the perfect number of gigalitres required for maintaining the health of the basin should be or must be. But what we can know is the environmental benchmarks that we need to keep to to monitor whether or not the health of the basin is being maintained and, in some cases, restored and, similarly, to make sure that the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder has enough water for those outcomes to be able to be met.

One of the things that came out of consultation when this plan was put together—and this is why this bill is before us now—came out of a cross-party inquiry with some unanimous recommendations that was led by the then member for New England, Tony Windsor. It was a great use of a House of Reps inquiry, and it brought people together across the chamber. That inquiry wanted to find ways—where we could—of maximising the same environmental outcome while minimising the buyback direct from irrigators. Be in no doubt that buyback, when it occurs, occurs on a purely voluntary basis. It has not occurred through any form of compulsory acquisition. That is from the perspective of the individual irrigator.

From the perspective of the communities that rely on the water, they will often say, 'It still impacts on us even if some individual irrigator who is the owner of the water has made that decision.' They wanted to find a way for that to be counted in the plan. So where we ended up was to say that the first 2,100 gigalitres would have to be obtained as real water that was held by the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder. You had to get to the environmental impact of 2,750 gigalitres, but, in relation to the 650 gigalitres in the middle, if the states could come forward with better ways of managing water that would deliver the same environmental outcome as the actual held water, that could be done in place of buyback.

A lot of people argued that we should not agree to this as a Commonwealth. It is a significantly more expensive way of doing things, with a significant impost on the taxpayer, but it delivers the same environmental outcome and a much better outcome for those irrigation communities. Often these things intersect, and to put people in different groups is not really right, because lots of people care about both. If your perspective is purely environmental, you get the same outcome; if your perspective is purely the communities, you get a better outcome. The test was always: would the states, who are in charge of bringing forward these projects, come up with projects that were good enough to meet the same environmental standards and mean that there were 650 gigalitres that did not need to be acquired through buyback methods? Whether the states will come forward with projects that are good enough is not yet known. This legislation sets a new deadline for the states to come forward with these projects and then sets a final deadline that was not previously there, which is a deadline on the authority, effectively, to say that certain projects are approved or not approved, and we then have the consequences.

As the states are putting together these projects, I want to make clear on behalf of the opposition that the opposition is absolutely willing to make sure that up to the 650 gigalitres can be delivered as an alternative path to buyback, but it must deliver the same environmental outcomes. If the states come back with projects that do not meet the environmental outcomes that are contained within the Murray-Darling Basin Plan, the Labor Party has no interest at all in lowering the environmental standards that are contained within the plan. The only option for the states is to come up with projects that meet the environmental benchmarks of the plan. If they do so, there is 650 gigalitres that does not need to be otherwise acquired.

For the states to do that, there will be compromises that they will need to make. Some of these projects will be hard; some of these projects will be expensive. But the only options, if the states do not come up with projects that are good enough, are either further buyback or the powers that revert to the Commonwealth under the Water Act if the plan is not met. I suspect the states do not want either of those two outcomes, but some states may be wondering whether, if their projects do not come up to scratch, they will get away with the parliament agreeing to lowering the environmental standards in the plan. I want to make clear on behalf of the opposition that the answer to that question is no. There will be no lowering of the standards contained within the plan. There is no need for further buyback beyond what is in the plan for this portion of the 650 gigalitres. There is no need for the Commonwealth to exert the powers over the states that are contained within the Murray-Darling Basin Plan. But those things remain the case only if the states put forward projects that meet the benchmarks. So I urge the states to do so.

I should flag, because I do not want anyone to think that I am misrepresenting the government's position, that I have had nothing from the government that would in any way imply that they want to lower the environmental standards of the plan. I just want the states to be absolutely, clearly on notice and I want state water ministers, when they are going to their treasurers asking for money to pay for these projects, to be fully armed with the knowledge that there is no interest in lowering the environmental standards that are contained within the plan.

In terms of the amount of buyback that that would then mean is required, on the latest information available, of the 2,100 gigalitres that has to be held water, 1,984 gigalitres are already held. There are only 115 gigalitres left to go. That is really close. There is an extraordinary opportunity for the states now, if they want to avoid further buyback and avoid the Commonwealth powers being activated, to put forward good-quality plans. We will then see the money that was put in place for the additional 450 gigalitres up, which was all to be added through improved on-farm infrastructure projects, where the Commonwealth government has been getting very good value for money and where improvements in technology continue to make this a very good outcome for irrigation communities. That money, which was voted by the parliament to be appropriated, all remains available to make sure that the full environmental impact of the 3,200 gigalitres is achieved and that the additional 450 gigalitres that comes towards the end of this entire process also occurs not with additional buyback but through the Commonwealth acquiring additional water, while irrigators have their on-farm infrastructure improved.

I want to pay tribute to a former Victorian state Minister for Water, from the other side of politics, Peter Walsh. There would not have been bipartisan agreement on this issue were it not for the concept of the 650 gigalitres that we are talking about now, with states finding ways to be able to better manage water and as a result being able to meet the environmental objectives without the Commonwealth having to hold that extra 650 gigalitres. It is a good outcome for communities, it is a sane outcome for the environment and it would not have been possible without the constructive and professional policy work that was done by Peter Walsh.

I should also pay tribute at this point to a giant of the river Murray, in particular, and of reform, who is no longer with us. Henry Jones was a great South Australian. One of the great events that many members of parliament attended during the entire negotiation of the Murray-Darling Basin Plan was when Henry as a professional fisherman brought a tinnie to Parliament House and, out there on the lawn, served us a barbecue of a series of different species that had been caught in the Murray. I asked Henry to be my guest at the National Press Club the day that I announced the plan had been signed into law. He was not well enough to be there at my table that day, and died quite shortly after. But I have no doubt we would still be facing the deadlock that plagued Australia for a century, were it not for the good work of Henry Jones. I send my best wishes to his family.

This all takes us to the situation where the government has brought forward legislation that shows that the bipartisan agreement which has characterised this issue for a long time now continues to hold. The only thing that could place the Commonwealth in any sort of a difficult situation would be if the states failed to come through on their part of the bargain. But I think I have made the position of the Labor Party crystal clear—that we are not for moving, and it is the states' obligation to come up with projects for 650 gigalitres or more that create better ways of managing the water.

I think Hattah Lakes is a good example to provide to the House of the things you can do to manage water and the simple sorts of things that have been done. Hattah Lakes is a beautiful environmental site. I have kayaked there, where you weave your way through the river red gums. But you need a massive amount of water to get an over-bank flow to reach Hattah Lakes. However, when water has been directly piped there, you have been able to get the same environmental outcome by using much less water. Similarly, there are a series of issues around what are called river rules, which go into a level of complexity which fascinates me alone probably, in this room—maybe also a couple of the departmental advisers. So I will not visit those upon the House! But, with the river rules, there are a series of things that can be done that make a fundamental difference to the efficiency with which water is managed.

At this point, for where we are, I want to pay tribute to everyone who has been involved so far. Difficult compromises were made, but we have ended up with something that does one thing that Australia had been incapable of for a century, and that says, 'We have a pathway to ensure that we have a healthy working basin in the Murray-Darling.' I pay tribute to the departmental officials of the Commonwealth and the states for the incredibly complex technical work that has been done for a very long time, and I have no doubt that the service they provided when I was minister is a service they continue to offer to the minister of the day.

We must not miss this opportunity. I am not naive, and I know that bipartisan support on any policy issue is a perilous thing. For those within this chamber who feel that, in their seats, they have made difficult compromises, please understand that there are many people in this chamber who may have a different interest in their electorate and who have a sense that they have made compromises too.

When I was first elected, one of the first things that happened following the election in 2004 was that I heard the first speech of the member for Adelaide, who is in the chamber now, which referred to growing up and sitting along the river Murray. Back then, none of us really expected we would get to the point that we have reached now. The health of the basin on a permanent ongoing basis is in front of us, it is possible and we can deliver it. I simply ask the government to continue to hold its nerve, and I ask the states to deliver on the agreement that had previously been reached so that the plan that was put into law in 2012 can continue to deliver, in Australia, with a healthy working basin.

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