Andrew Hastie (Canning, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to speak in support of Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Bill 2018. This is a very important bill and it was triggered by the Lindt Cafe siege of December 2014 and of course the coroner's report, which was released in May of last year. It's timely and important for a number of reasons. The first is that it implements recommendations from the Review of Defence Support to National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements, but, secondly, it optimises the legislative arrangements for calling out the ADF in the event of a terrorist incident. It gives decision-makers in government, authorised ministers—the Prime Minister, the Attorney-General, the defence minister and the Minister for Home Affairs—in extraordinary circumstances, the flexibility they need to keep the Australian people safe. That's the bottom line.

Most importantly, in my view, it unlocks the high-end counterterrorism capabilities that reside in the ADF, specifically within Special Operations Command—and I'm speaking of Tactical Assault Group-West, the Special Air Service Regiment in Perth; and Tactical Assault Group-East, the 2nd Commando Regiment in Sydney. Both of those units are our premier counterterrorism force elements, and I'm very pleased to see this legislation pave the way for their use in the event of a significant terrorist event that affects Commonwealth interests.

Of course, both these force elements serve at a reduced notice to move. They're always prepared for a terrorist event. They're constantly training for a number of contingencies. They benchmark against Five Eyes special operations and law enforcement units, so they have world's best practice at their fingertips. They also have significant combat experience acquired through ADF operations in Afghanistan over the past decade or so. They remain ready to resolve the most dangerous, complex and violent scenarios on behalf of the Australian people. Their training facilities are world-class. They use live ammunition almost every day—in fact, some have regular blood tests for lead, given the amount of time they spend shooting with live ammunition. My point is: nowhere else in government is anyone so equipped to deal with a terrorist scenario or incident involving hostages and people who are seeking to kill and do harm to Australian people in our Commonwealth.

The question at the heart of this bill is: why the amendment? Since 2000, terrorist incidents and attacks have been increasing worldwide. Deaths caused by terrorism since 2000 have increased ninefold. In fact, in 2016, 29,000 people had their lives taken worldwide by acts of terrorism. If we look historically over the past two decades, we think of 9/11, Bali, 7/7 and now Paris and London. Sadly, the names of those cities are synonymous with terror attacks over the last five years.

In December 2014, as I discussed, we had the Lindt Cafe siege in Sydney, which took place over two days, 14 and 15 December. The terrorist Man Haron Monis held 18 hostages in the heart of Sydney's CBD, and this was broadcast live across the world. I recall being overseas at the time and it being run regularly on international channels, which goes to a point I'll make later about the nature of international terrorism. This incident was eventually resolved by New South Wales Police, and tragically Tori Johnson and Katrina Dawson lost their lives in the final moments of the siege. Man Monis—it's up for debate, but I judge people by their actions—claimed to be acting on behalf of ISIS. He requested a flag, and that's good enough for me. My view is that he was acting on behalf of a transnational terrorist organisation committed to undermining Western democracy, the rule of law and our way of life for the persecution of minorities and the disgraceful treatment of women.

I don't want to go into the intimate details of the police siege here; that is covered in the coroner's report released in May last year. Many people—constituents and people in the media—across the country have asked the question: why weren't ADF counterterrorism elements used to resolve the Lindt Cafe siege incident? In short, this legislation will make it easier in the future for states and territories to request ADF support for those sorts of incidents and also for the Commonwealth to set in motion the use of those force elements if authorised ministers are convinced that the Commonwealth of Australia is indeed under threat. It's my personal view, in the event of the Lindt Cafe siege, that the threshold was met and the ADF would have been far better equipped, trained and more experienced to resolve that situation.

The bill makes it easier—among many things, but this is probably the most important point—for states and territories to request ADF support by removing the threshold requirement that the states and territories 'are not, or are unlikely to be, able to protect themselves or Commonwealth interests against the domestic violence'. The EM goes on to say:

However, authorising Ministers will need to take into account the nature of the violence and whether the ADF would be likely to enhance the state and territory response when deciding whether the ADF should be called out.

This goes to subsection 33 of the bill, which details the conditions for making the order. I'll go through it very briefly:

(1) The Governor-General may make an order under subsection (3) if the authorising Ministers—

that is, the PM, the Minister for Defence or the Attorney-General—

are satisfied that:

(a) any of the following applies:

(i) domestic violence that would, or would be likely to, affect Commonwealth interests is occurring or is likely to occur in Australia;

(ii) there is a threat in the Australian offshore area to Commonwealth interests …

(iii) domestic violence that would, or would be likely to, affect Commonwealth interests is occurring or is likely to occur in Australia …

This is a really, really important point. We've seen the impact of global terrorism and the fear and the chaos that it manages to produce when coupled with social media and media. We've seen it in Paris, and we saw it in London just last year. The Lindt Cafe siege was a good example at home of how terrorists can use propaganda to their advantage. The Lindt Cafe siege was broadcast live across the world to people in many countries. It was very clear that the Commonwealth of Australia was under attack from someone claiming to be a representative of ISIS. In my view, the threshold was met. That's why it's very important that we send a strong message to these people who would attack our citizens and seek to undermine our way of life.

We need to have a robust response in the event of a terrorist incident. Last year the Australian Federal Police Commissioner said that most terrorist incidents are over within 10 to 15 minutes. This was true of the London attacks last year. Our state and our Federal Police will always be the first responders. They need the right training, equipment and legal authorities, including provisions for the use of lethal force, to deal with the evolving threat posed by radical Islamist terrorists specifically. The Lindt Cafe siege coroner's report released last year did raise some troubling points about the readiness of New South Wales Police to deal with a terrorist incident that involved multiple hostages held captive in a stronghold that, to be frank, wasn't overly complex. There were two entry points, I think, and we had the blueprints. A mock-up, I understand, was built at Holsworthy in preparation for an assault. I want to say that the New South Wales Police acted bravely on that night, and it's easy to make judgements in hindsight, but we shouldn't shrink from seeking to learn from this. I think the stakes are very high in these sorts of incidents.

So I'm very glad that the coalition government has reviewed ADF call-out arrangements in the event of a future terrorist incident. I've argued for some time that we should consider using the ADF counterterrorism elements drawn from those two units—the 2nd Commando Regiment and the SASR—if we have a prolonged terrorist incident involving a listed terrorist organisation, a proscribed terrorist organisation, holding Australians hostage. There are a number of reasons for that. First, an attack on the Australian people by a listed terrorist organisation is not a state criminal matter; it's a Commonwealth matter. It's an attack on the Commonwealth of Australia, so it's in our national interest—and I would argue that our reputation is at stake as well—to deal with these threats. The majority of these people who commit these terrorist attacks on behalf of Islamic State clearly don't want to negotiate. In my view, nor should we. The most lethal means of statecraft reside with the Commonwealth, specifically the counterterrorism units within the ADF. Terrorists who attack and kill Australian people need to be killed quickly to protect our citizens and to deny them a propaganda victory. We saw how quickly social media and the worldwide media broadcast the Lindt cafe siege, particularly when the New South Wales police made entry and resolved the situation.

Finally on this point, our ADF counterterrorism elements are world class. They train especially for these sorts of situations over and again, not just for strongholds like the Lindt cafe siege but also for aeroplanes, offshore environments, ships. There's nowhere else in the Australian government where people are equipped and trained and experienced enough to handle these sorts of complex situations. They are surgical in the application of lethal force. Culturally—this is a key point between our police and military—they're ruthlessly mission focused, particularly when it comes to resolving these sorts of situations. I mentioned the combat experience that is resident in both of those units.

The legislation also makes a number of amendments which will improve the operational and tactical effectiveness of ADF units. I'll go through them very briefly. It enhances the ability of the ADF to respond to cross-jurisdictional incidents by allowing a Commonwealth-interest order to authorise action in multiple jurisdictions so we can have multiple ADF elements deployed across the country, including offshore areas. It expands the contingent call-out to allow the ADF to be pre-authorised to respond to land and maritime threats in addition to aviation threats. That means our decision cycles are just that little bit quicker. We can get people out, stage them and be more prepared for contingencies, which is really important.

The legislation increases the requirements for the ADF to consult with state and territory police where it is operating in their jurisdictions. We know that state and federal police will always be first responders, so we need to have those linkages at the lowest tactical levels with the ADF. Having them train together and liaise regularly together will mean that, when a moment of crisis comes, we'll have a more seamless operation launched against terrorists who seek to undermine the Commonwealth of Australia.

The legislation simplifies, expands and clarifies the powers of the ADF to search, seize and control movement during an incident. I won't go into the details here, but that's very important, obviously. It removes the distinctions between general security areas and designated areas to reduce complexity and uncertainty. Again, amendments that have tactical effect are very important for a seamless operation, especially in the midst of chaos.

I want to make it very clear, because I know some of the colleagues opposite made this point, that at no point does this legislation undermine the principle of civilian control of the ADF. That remains unchanged, and it's upheld at all points through this amendment. That's a really important thing. Civilian control of the military is what marks us out as a Western democracy. I want to make that very clear. Moreover, ADF units, when deployed in response or called out to a terrorist incident, are still operating under the Australian rule of law. No obligations are lifted for them to accord with what is expected of them in the ADF and within our judicial system.

I commend this legislation. I think it really does make our options for resolving these situations in the future much greater. It gives flexibility to our decision-makers, and, of course, at the end of the day, when we have a terrorist attack we want our best people on the ground resolving the situation. This legislation makes that possible. I commend it to the House.

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