Bob Katter (Kennedy, Katter's Australian Party) Share this | Hansard source

In rising on this, the Corporations Amendment (Strengthening Protections for Employee Entitlements) Bill 2018, it is with deep regret. When I moved from the state parliament to the federal parliament, I realised that in this place the minister is not sitting at the dispatch box when legislation comes forward and the head of the department is not here. So, we talk, but we talk into an empty brass cylinder. The people that we want to get through to, the minister and, probably more importantly, the head of the department, should have to sit in this place and cop it for their incompetence, or be praised for their excellent work. In this place, they hide out in their ivory towers, both the minister and the head of the department, so we can't get at them.

If ever there was a trail of destruction in this country—and I don't wish to have a go at Clive Palmer, because I have no idea of the rights and wrongs of this case or how he was involved. All I know is that the company that owned the nickel plant did not pay workers and they did not pay suppliers. Hundreds of millions of dollars was not paid. That was a big case.

The Kagara zinc case—we were having lunch discussing it with an investigative journalist from The Sydney Morning Herald in a cafe in Sydney. The lady waiting on our table was a schoolteacher, but she had to work at a cafe as well to meet the debts she had because she was told that 'these were good investments'. One of those investments was Kagara Zinc. She was just a little schoolteacher in Sydney and she lost $25,000, which to her was a king's ransom. She picked up the word 'Kagara' from our conversation and she said, 'Is there any chance of us getting our money back?' In that case, four members of the board said: 'This company is in deep trouble. We had better put it in the hands of a liquidator.' They chose the liquidator. The liquidator sold the assets back to the four of them—I am exaggerating but only slightly—so half the board owned these assets afterwards but with no debt. They had written off $1,000 million worth of debt! These people they owed money too were ordinary little contractors—electrical contractors and engineering companies; there were hundreds of these little people—and also the employees. If it doesn't raise a red flag when the people on the board sell the assets themselves, shorn of the debt, then I don't know when you would raise a red flag.

I can go into case after case. I remember one case in Mount Isa 20 years ago which was worth $3½ million dollars. It was the third time the company had gone broke. When I say the company had gone broke, the principal of the company hadn't gone broke at all—he was as rich as Croesus—but, of course, he never paid anyone in Mount Isa. In this case, most of those jobs were government jobs. The government, before they pay the contractor, surely has a responsibility to ensure that the subbies have been paid. This is hardly an onerous obligation to say: 'Before I write you a cheque for a million bucks, mate, I want the names of all of your subbies—it's a criminal act not to give them to me—and I want a statement from them that they have been fully paid.' It is a very simple device. Four governments in a row came in in Queensland and said, 'We're going to address this problem.' But it is still not addressed.

We are talking here about protecting superannuation, and I support the member for Mayo's amendment here and will vote for it. I do wish that people, when they are moving amendments, would know what they are moving and why. It is hard for us to make decisions without knowing what the hell is going on. The thousands of workers in the Kennedy electorate that have not got paid—those standards remind them of the incompetence of several successive state and federal governments. The unions, in some cases, have been very lax—they have never fought the fight as it needed to be fought—and some unions have been very good insofar as they have fought those battles.

Going specifically to superannuation, I had an agency and, mostly, I sold superannuation through that agency. I could, with great pleasure, sell that agency in the knowledge that 60 per cent of that money that went into superannuation went into government securities by law. There was a 60-40 rule. Sixty per cent of all superannuation went into government securities—as safe as a house. They can be nothing safer than government securities.

Now, 51 per cent of all superannuation is going on the stock market. Go down to the TAB! The stock market—this is a secure investment? The Australian stock market has collapsed three times in the last 30 years, and I mean serious collapse. Too bad for you if you retired during that period of time. Twenty-six per cent is going on the Australian stock market and 25 per cent is going on the American stock market. If you're telling me that a fund manager, who is pretty typically under 30 years of age, is going to be able to tell you what is a good investment on the American stock market, well, I'm not going to believe you. My wife and I own a couple of old superannuation policies. I'm trying to get out of the superannuation arrangements because I consider 51 per cent very, very insecure indeed. Another 25 per cent's going on the property market. The property market in Australia—that's a solid investment? Heavens! The average price of a house in Newcastle, Sydney and Wollongong is $800,000. Everyone knows that that can't be sustained. So, when you say you've invested in property in Australia, let's get really scared here. Let's get really scared.

Our superannuation is simply not secure. The wise people that ran Australia for 120 years in this place said 60 per cent of that money goes into securities. So you can't play games with it—your stock market games and your property games. You can't play games with it, like Goldman Sachs and Enron and these people did in the United States. We're going to see that it's rock-solid—it's in government securities. And I, as a humble little bloke selling superannuation, could say to these people, 'Mate, this is a really solid investment.' The irony is it's an AMP agency. They were rock-solid. I was very proud to be associated with that company—a very, very conservative, very prudential company. They joined the Johnny-come-latelies: 'Make the big bucks real quick and don't worry too much about tomorrow, because I won't be the CEO tomorrow.'

Before I conclude my remarks today, I will say that I remember reading an article by a very famous Australian—probably one of the most powerful people in the nation's history—a bloke called Bob Santamaria. He had a column in The Australian newspaper. He wrote in that column that the superannuation funds of Australia were being invested by fund managers who were in their 30s. They were investing hundreds of millions of dollars and they were being paid millions of dollars a year. I read that and I thought, 'This bloke Santamaria's lost his marbles! I mean, this is ridiculous—outlandish, extremist rubbish,' and I stopped reading his column. Two years later, Nick—I'm trying to remember his second name—brought down Barings Bank, the oldest bank in the world. He brought it down, and Santamaria was wrong: he wasn't in his 30s; he was in his 20s. He was not being paid a million dollars—Santamaria was wrong; he was being paid tens of millions of dollars a year. He wasn't investing hundreds of millions of dollars, as Santamaria said; he was investing thousands of millions of dollars. This rogue brought down Barings Bank.

Barings Bank was brought down, and two of the biggest banks in the world were bought down during the GFC, in a market that everyone knew was collapsing—the American housing market. Many made billions of dollars short-selling because they could see what was coming. We did not get caught in Australia, and the banks went around congratulating themselves. The only reason we didn't get caught is that Australia is one of the few countries on earth where the banks have recourse lending.

If, in America, you can't make the payments on your house, you jingle-mail—send the keys to the bank—and you walk away with no debt. In Australia, you don't; you walk away with debt that the bank can pursue you for till the day that you die. That debt stays in place till the day that you die. So you become a debt slave to the bank, with all their charges and the murderous, punitive interest rates that they apply in these situations, and you carry the debt for the rest of your life. In America, the debt terminates. You lose your house and all the money you put into it, but the bank loses because they have to sell the house and it's not worth what it was originally worth. So the bank shares the loss, and so they should.

When I was at an agency and I was selling investments, if we sold to people that did not keep up that contract, we lost the agency. There was prudential oversight by what were called insurance companies—AMP, CML and MLC in those days. If there were rogue traders, if someone like me went rogue, once people were found not to be keeping up their payments—you had made bad contracts—then you lost the agency, and so you should. Now we have rogue traders everywhere in superannuation and banking. As for prudential oversight, what a joke.

Look at ASIC. There was a sugar mill sold by liquidators for $2 million. A sugar mill is $100 per tonne. If it's a 200-tonne mill, it's $200 million—it must be a million dollars a tonne. A two million tonne mill at $100 a tonne is $200 million. So a $200 million sugar mill was sold out from under the farmers for $2 million. I think we met with ASIC officials 17 times before we went to the then Treasurer, Wayne Swan. He had his people check up on the case, and he was horrified that ASIC, a government body, had done absolutely nothing about this appalling piece of thievery that had taken place. And I use that word 'thievery' because those people got huge benefits for doing the dirty on the poor farmers. The Treasurer ordered ASIC to meet with his people. There was no satisfaction, so Wayne Swan ordered them to meet again, because he was absolutely disgusted with their behaviour. Then the government changed. Mr Hockey came in as Treasurer. He had a look at this case and he was shocked. He ordered ASIC to meet with his people. Nothing happened, so he was very enraged and he ordered ASIC to meet again. That's two treasurers, and ASIC treated them both with contempt. ASIC knew the mill had been sold out from under us for $200 million. They knew the 30 pieces of silver that the decision-makers had got out of the dirty, filthy deal.

So we went and did it ourselves. We could only get 39 of the 230 farmers to put up the money. So there were only 39 farmers, and we got a settlement out of court for $23 million. Those incompetents will burn in hell—because I do believe there is a hell, and they're going to be punished somewhere. They sure ain't going to be punished by this place, but they will be punished later on. They got away with their thievery and roguery. They got away with tens of millions of dollars at the expense of the farmers. Were we right? Of course we were right. (Time expired)

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