Julian Hill (Bruce, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

I want to make a few comments on the Intelligence Services Amendment Bill 2018 and, in doing so, I say at the outset that I'm not a member of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security and, therefore, I have not been part of the detailed consideration. There are two reasons why I want to make some remarks. I have an interest in national security matters and, of course, there are relatively few bills that come before the House and, therefore, opportunities to consider these things. I do believe it's important to strive for bipartisanship to the greatest extent possible in relation to national security bills. I also have a very longstanding and broad interest in good legislative process. Wearing our hat as legislators is part of our role here. It's nerdy, if you like, but it's true. I think it's really important that good process and proper process is observed in making laws.

For both of those reasons, I want to compliment the government on presenting this bill or, to be more accurate, to compliment the member for Curtin, who had stewardship of this bill in her tenure as foreign minister. It is a good example of how the legislative process should work on security matters. There should be a deliberative process, as there has been, and there should be extensive and early consultation, as I understand and as I'm advised there has been, both with the shadow ministers in the opposition and also via the PJCIS. So I think it's fair to say that there has been extremely sensible handling of the bill on the government's part; therefore, Labor could do our job as a responsible opposition, striving for bipartisanship, because the government behaved like adults when Minister Bishop occupied the portfolio in relation to this legislation.

As the shadow Attorney-General just did, that can be, should be and must be contrasted with the mess of the encryption laws, which are still playing out this week. On one hand, we had the member for Curtin, when she was Foreign Minister Julie Bishop—as she was known—with a sensible, grown-up process, consulting with parliament and introducing legislation to achieve the objectives, with the appropriate checks and balances on new powers. Of course, for that, the Liberal Party party room rejected her bid for leadership. On the other hand, we have had the Prime Minister's handling of the encryption laws, abandoning proper committee and legislative process, heavying the government members of the committee via press conferences in the last week and picking a deliberate fight with the opposition, or so it looks from the outside. Again I say that I'm not party to the discussions and I have no particular knowledge of where they're at, but to go on TV this week, as one of the government ministers did, and say that Labor are 'friends of paedophiles' and 'friends of terrorists' in relation to a serious national security matter, as if that's somehow going to get the opposition on board, is disgraceful. Of course, in return for the Prime Minister's behaviour, they voted to install him in the leadership over the member for Curtin and her more measured, sensible approach. For any government members who are listening, you do see the difference in approach. When you take a sensible approach, you get a sensible outcome. When you use a sensible legislative process and the committee process, as it is set up to do on serious matters, you get a sensible outcome. We're here and we're supporting the bill; it's agreed. On the other hand, when you deliberately provoke and use a flawed legislative process and abandon the committee process, you end up in a mess.

I want to praise the shadow Attorney-General and the Labor members of the PJCIS for their work. We know from the outside that it is one of the hardest committee gigs in the parliament. The committee meets for hours and it meets late at night. There is no higher priority than national security and community safety. Senators McAllister and Wong were involved as well. They are enormous, serious efforts in fixing the government's messes. We heard comment with the previous bill. Actually, we've just had two national security bills go through the chamber with the support of the opposition. The other bill was the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Legislation Amendment Bill 2018. I had the misfortune of sitting in the chamber in December after the marriage equality vote. While everyone else was out drinking and celebrating, I had to wait to table a committee report, which for some obscure reason had to be done. I watched the Prime Minister introduce the bill, with grand hyperbole and comments about Chinese influence and 'Shanghai Sam' and all sorts of sledging of the opposition, when this was supposed to be a serious bill. As it turned out, the foreign influence bill was completely flawed because the government hadn't followed proper process. It was rushed. For such a serious, once-in-a-generation change, as we were told, they should have used an exposure draft. They should have consulted with the opposition. They should have consulted with the committee before sending the Prime Minister into the House, desperate on Christmas Eve for a bit of political momentum.

It's fair to say that the shadow minister is measured in his tone, as is appropriate, given his role. But what I see from the backbench is the government, when they're desperate, when they're in political strife, pressing what is a breaking glass—press national security. It's their favourite and lowest road wedge. It's a political plaything when it suits them, when they're desperate.

I'll keep my remarks on the substance of the bill very brief, because I think it's been well covered. It is a measured amendment. We do have a changing security and operational environment for our ASIS officers and it has been a fast-growing agency over the last decade. We ask them to operate in difficult environments that are different from that which had been contemplated perhaps 10 or 20 years ago: hostage situations, difficult negotiations, supporting publicly-known and non-publicly-known military operations. The current laws from 2004 are overly restrictive on governing the use of reasonable force. So it's entirely appropriate that the parliament take seriously their requests to update the legislative framework, to modernise it and to make sure they're protected in their work, in all legal aspects, and able to do their important work. Both elements of the bill are appropriate: firstly, enabling the minister to specify additional persons to be protected by an ASIS staff member or agent and, secondly, clarifying the use of reasonable force—in effect, extending the self-defence provisions to match the common law.

The final thing I'll remark upon are the strong and appropriate approval and oversight checks and balances in this bill, which are clearly absent from the encryption bill which has been presented to the House: ministerial approval being required; constraints on the minister's ability to approve without consulting with other key ministers, and senior ministers at that; a requirement for approvals to the Director-General of ASIS to be in writing—no verbal approvals; a requirement that the Director-General of ASIS give a report to the IGIS—again, entirely appropriate; and an entirely new oversight mechanism, with a mandatory report from the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security to the PJCIS. They're sensible and strong measures, they're appropriate checks and balances and they're the kinds of things which, to her credit, the member for Curtin introduced as a sensible piece of national security legislation.

I'll close my comments by contrasting that—again, I have no knowledge of where the committee is at with this; it's their business—with one of the most disturbing aspects in Minister Dutton's encryption bill, which is a complete lack of oversight and accountability. If you were serious about getting bipartisanship on national security rather than just picking a fight with the opposition so you can get some headlines through the week so it looks like you're doing something or standing for something, it would be unacceptable—and, at the very least, there would be serious concerns raised—to present a bill seeking enormous new powers to decrypt the phones and apps of everyone in Australia with no judicial oversight. The only comparison which you could reasonably draw is the restrictions and checks and balances that apply to telephone interceptions, which require warrants. That's not a very grown-up approach if you're serious about national security. I commend the former foreign minister on her approach and contrast it with the mess that's still playing out this week via the committee, which I do hope will be resolved by the end of the week so we can all go home.

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