Mark Dreyfus (Isaacs, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Attorney General) Share this | Hansard source

by leave—I move:

(1) Schedule 1, page 3 (after line 9), after item 1, insert:

1A At the end of Part 4

Add:

30A Certain reports and briefings

(1) If:

(a) a report by the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor referred to in subsection 29(1) or 30(1) relates to a review of the Counter-Terrorism (Temporary Exclusion Orders) Act 2019, or a report relating to that Act is otherwise prepared in the course of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor carrying out the functions in subsection 6(1); and

(b) the Committee on Intelligence and Security requests, in writing given to the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, a copy of the report;

the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor must give the Committee a copy of the report, or a copy of extracts from the report that deal with that Act.

(2) If the Committee on Intelligence and Security requests a briefing in relation to the report or extracts, the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor must give the Committee such a briefing.

As with the other recommendations made by the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security, recommendation 6 of the committee was a unanimous recommendation made by all six of the Liberal members of the committee and the five Labor members of the committee. Recommendation 16 is to the Counter-Terrorism (Temporary Exclusion Orders) (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2019 rather than to the substantive bill, because it relates to a particular aspect of the interaction between the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor and the new powers that have been conferred by this legislation. What recommendation 16 of the committee was directed at was enabling the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor to provide a copy of the reports made by the monitor at the same time as the reports are provided to the Prime Minister.

The committee also recommended that the monitor should be empowered to brief the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security on his or her findings. Honourable members will bear in mind that this very national security legislation monitor is the agency that this government was committed to abolishing when it came to office in 2013. It was only after a number of the crossbenchers in the Senate were persuaded of the worth of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, an agency created by the previous Labor government, that the then Abbott government was prevented from abolishing in Independent National Security Legislation Monitor.

We've seen over the course of successive years, since this government tried to abolish in Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, the worth of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. It's a very useful reviewing mechanism. It's a very useful safeguard. It's a very useful level of scrutiny that's provided. All three of the national security legislation monitors to date have been very senior barristers, the first being Bret Walker SC; the second being Roger Giles QC, a former judge of the Court of Appeal in New South Wales; and the third eminent barrister, occupying the position as we speak, being James Renwick SC.

This recommendation went directly to the oversight of the use of these new temporary exclusion orders, or the new powers, that would be created by this legislation. The oversight of these new powers would be via the parliament through the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. The government has not accepted this recommendation. That's an extraordinary non-acceptance. Again, as with a whole range of the recommendations that were made by the committee in respect of the substantive bill, the government—neither through the Prime Minister nor through this Minister for Home Affairs—has not sought to explain the failure of the government to accept the unanimous recommendations of the committee, which is chaired by the member for Canning, a Liberal member of parliament, and on which there is a majority of Liberal members—six out of 11.

It is particularly surprising in the case of recommendation 16 that the government has chosen not to accept it. Recommendation 16 is consistent with recommendation 23, paragraph 2 of the 2017 Independent intelligence review, which was conducted by Michael L'Estrange and Stephen Merchant. That's a regular review. They take place roughly five or seven years apart. The 2017 Independent intelligence reviewwas, as I said, conducted by very senior former public servants, Michael L'Estrange and Stephen Merchant. It recommended that the role of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security— (Time expired)

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