Rowan Ramsey (Grey, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

Tonight I would like to take this opportunity to put forward a case for four-year parliamentary terms at the federal level. The Australian national parliamentary term has become an oddity in our nation. Over the last 25 years all states and territories have adopted four-year terms, with all but Tasmania also moving to fixed terms. Clearly this sky has not fallen in and it raises the question as to, if they can all do it why can't the national parliament? The answer is quite simple. While the states and territories have been able to alter their electoral periods by legislation, part III section 28 of the Australian Constitution declares:

Every House of Representatives shall continue for three years from the first meeting of the House, and no longer, but may be sooner dissolved …

The simplest way to amend the Constitution is to change the word three to four.

The history of efforts of constitutional change in this country is marked more often by failure than success, and so if we were to push for change we would need to make a clear case for change, and then select the path which will negate populist calls of self-interest that may be levelled against politicians who promote the change.

The essence of good government is stability—the ability for governments to focus on a plan, to make commitments to the plan and then to be in government long enough to either reap the benefits or wear the blame for folly. The current three-year time frame is simply too short for these outcomes and, it can be argued, pushes the government to adopt policies which give short-term benefit rather than focusing on the longer term effects. Three-year terms are particularly challenging for newly-elected governments, which, it's generally conceded, spend the first year settling in, the second year trying to implement their electoral agenda and the last year in an ever-increasing frenzy of self-promotion in an effort to ensure they get another term. In the case of a four-year term, they would hope to benefit from policy implemented in their first term.

It's well known that business confidence falls away as an election approaches. Businesses prefer to make decisions when as many factors as possible are predictable. The chance of a change of government introduces extra risk. A longer term of government reduces the periods when business is hit by this uncertainty. While it can be argued that in general Australia has been governed well—witness our place in the world—generally this election cycle diminishes governance. Comparable democracies—in most cases our major trading partners, such as Germany, Japan, Canada and the US, in the case of presidential tenure—all have four-year terms. The UK and France have five. If it is recognised as good governance for them and for all of our member states and territories, it would surely also be a good outcome for the national parliament.

In fact, even though Australia has had three-year terms since Federation, largely because our terms are not fixed the average length of government over 45 parliaments through to 2019 has been less than 32 months. The public cost of elections has been increasing at a rate far in excess of inflation. The general election in 1980 cost $12.4 million, in 1990 it was $55.4 million, by 2001 it was $105.8 million, in 2010 it was $161.3 million, and in 2016, the latest election we have figures for, it was $286.6 million—albeit that was a double dissolution. While we don't yet know the cost of the 2019 election, we can probably assume it was in the vicinity of $300 million, and $300 million equates to $100 million a year on average for the length of the parliament. A move to four-year terms would reduce the frequency of elections by 25 per cent, averaging out to $75 million a year, a saving of $100 million per parliament. That's a very simple saving and a simple message for the public: four-year terms save taxpayers money. These figures do not include the amounts raised and spent on campaigns by the parties, although it is unclear as to whether four-year terms would reduce this amount or simply mean there is more spent on each election.

Since the adoption of our Constitution in 1901, 44 nationwide referenda have been staged. Just six have had even partial success. It is clear that Australians have great faith in the document that has served us well for 118 years and need a strong, united argument to change it. The most successful referendum was in 1967, recognising Aboriginals as full citizens of our country. It was supported by the major parties and received 90.77 per cent support from the population.

To provide the best chance of achieving change, it is essential that bipartisan support is forthcoming. Ideally, other parties and independents would provide support as well. If a bipartisan position cannot be achieved, the question of four-year parliamentary terms should not be put. The call for four-year terms have not been the sole domain of any one party, and, with goodwill, it is difficult to see why most would not support this reform. If we are to convince the public that one of the benefits of four-year terms is a reduced demand on taxpayers' dollars, it will be important that we put the referendum question at a general election, preferably the next one, which is likely to occur in the first half of 2022. If this were the case, costs could be minimised—probably in the vicinity of a million dollars for the printing of the ballots, perhaps $10 million to $20 million to fund the yes and no cases, and an amount for public education on how to participate in the ballot.

Probably the most challenging part of the reform is what to do with the Senate. Part 2, section 7, paragraph 4 of the Constitution stipulates:

The senators shall be chosen for a term of six years, and the names of the senators chosen for each State shall be certified by the Governor to the Governor-General.

Consequently, if senate elections were to continue in unison with the House of Representatives, this too would need alteration. The Australian public would likely, and quite rightly, reject an alteration to the Constitution which led to separate Senate elections, and, in that case, more elections—as would be the case if the House of Representatives served a four-year term and the senators were elected for six.

If we are to shift to four-year terms in the House of Representatives, the question arises as to whether we elect a full Senate every four years or elect senators for eight years. Amongst the Australian states, three—New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania—have eight-year terms for their upper houses. While it can well be argued that eight years is a long time, it does not seem to be an issue causing any great concern in any of those jurisdictions. In Victoria and Western Australia, the upper houses operate at a variance and feature multimember electorates. All of their seats are declared vacant at each election. Queensland, the Northern Territory and the ACT have unicameral systems.

On balance, and for simplicity of the case, the best chance of achieving success in a referendum would likely be minimal change. This would be achieved by moving to an eight-year Senate term. I think the case for a fixed term is less convincing, with only the USA and Canada of the countries listed at the beginning of this synopsis specifying election dates. In Australia, while most states and territories are fixed it is not universal. Including fixed terms is likely to make reform more complex than simply putting the case for four-year terms. I would not recommend it unless it were a prerequisite to achieving bipartisan support.

It is difficult to see how a no case would find much traction if the proposal could not be attacked on the basis of being a waste of money. But it may well attract criticism to members or governments with accusations of self-interest in wanting to elongate their terms. Another concern may be possible legal difficulties arising from the transition from a parliament elected under the current Constitution, specifying three-year terms, somehow transferring to a four-year term, should a referendum be successful.

The quite simple way to deal with both these issues is to propose that the new rules take effect at the election after the one in which the referendum is proposed and passed—hopefully, the next one. At this stage, it would mean the first four-year parliament would be for the one elected in 2025. In that way, candidates and their parties would go to the electorate seeking a four-year term at that time. This would significantly dilute the arguments of self-interest, as any changed term would not apply to members for almost six years from today, by which time many participating in the process will have left the parliament. Additionally, it would assure the public that this was a long-term and well-considered change. This path also provides a good case for change and, providing bipartisan support can be achieved, it has a very high chance of success.

It is in the national interest; it's difficult to see how it would advantage one group of Australians in front of any other. In that case, it should be to the advantage of all Australians and, in turn, makes sense that all sides of politics should work together for what is simply changing just a few words in the Constitution, all being within part II. The first are in section 7, about the Senate, and in the fourth paragraph. It refers to the elected term of senators, and we would replace the word 'six' with 'eight'.

The paragraph in section 13 refers to the election of senators in instances of dissolution. The word 'three' should be replaced with 'four' where it occurs in conjunction with the House of Representatives, and for the Senate 'eight' should be replaced where 'six' occurs now. And in section 28, about the duration of the House of Representatives, the word 'three' should be replaced with the word 'four'. I think this would be a great reform for the nation.

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