Ed Husic (Chifley, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

I don't buy for one minute any suggestion that this government has suddenly discovered its inner voice when it comes to consultation—that it in some way has suddenly had a revelation in the middle of the night that it's done the wrong thing and needs to listen to people about this bill, the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Assistance and Access Amendments Review) Bill 2019, and, in particular, at the heart of this bill, about the whole architecture that was spawned around encryption, and the access arrangements for that. There were 15,000 submissions made by people in Australia's tech sector about the flaws in this bill. This government refused to take those submissions on board, refused to make a lot of those submissions public and refused to listen to what was said. On top of that, they then tried to shut down the committee when it was considering this bill. They tried to shut down consultation on, and consideration and criticism of, this bill back at the tail end of last year—this time 12 months ago. That is what they did. And, in their inability to manage the legislative program, they failed to bring their own legislation to this place to have it properly discussed in a timely way and to ensure that, when it got to the other place, the amendments could be considered.

The finance minister gave his word to us as a Labor opposition. The finance minister made a commitment that, in return for allowing the bill to go through, he would consider the amendments that in good faith reflected what the PJCIS had said needed to be amended; there were 17 recommendations that triggered nearly 200 amendments to the bill. The finance minister made a commitment that those amendments would be considered in the new year. But the honour of the finance minister gave way to his fear of the home affairs minister, and those amendments never got considered. So the government ratted, the home affairs minister ratted and the finance minister yet again bowed to the home affairs minister—we saw how that worked countless times last year—in failing to put those amendments through. And now, all of a sudden, the government say they need extra time to consider the work of both the PJCIS and the INSLM. This is why I say I don't buy what's being put forward by the government, because they're not fair dinkum about making the necessary changes to this.

As the shadow assistant minister, the member for Gellibrand, just pointed out a few moments ago, their failure to do the right thing has caught up to the government. Their failure to address the flaws the way the PJCIS recommended that they be fixed, in the face of the criticisms that were raised at the time about our inability to get access to data because our arrangements wouldn't conform with the way the US expects these things to be managed, is now catching up to the government. And their failure to fix that has jeopardised national security. It has jeopardised our ability to access the data that is required and that can be accessed if it's done the right way, in line with the US CLOUD Act. Because the government rammed through the changes, wouldn't listen to advice and ratted on a deal about this, we are now in a position where our national security is not strengthened; it's weakened. It's been weakened fundamentally because we're not allowed to get access to this data.

The other reason I don't trust this government's new-found commitment to consultation and extending the period for consideration of this is that the home affairs minister is peddling the idea that he has created a backdoor that will allow a new backdoor to be created in terms of encryption by going around and saying that these legislative arrangements that would never see the light of day in the US will gain them access to information that other jurisdictions could not access on their own turf. They have put in place a weaker, diluted set of arrangements in relation to encryption here and they're now flogging that concept overseas to other jurisdictions. So, when the chair of the house judiciary committee writes to Australia, writes to the government, and says they've got serious doubts about what the Australian government has put in place, I say—through you, Deputy Speaker McVeigh—to that chair: you are spot on the money. Jerrold Nadler is spot on the money. The house judiciary committee is spot on the money, and I absolutely urge US lawmakers to recognise that this act is flawed and that, until this government fixes the flaws in this legislation, this government should get nowhere near, and should not be considered compliant to, the US CLOUD Act at all.

The message that should be taken by our friends across the Pacific is that what this government has done is tried to put a shoddy backdoor arrangement into the way that this data should be accessed, and it should not be gifted that access. In particular, the way this government put these so-called judicial oversight arrangements in place with a retired judge and then getting two ministers to agree with each other on getting access to it in terms of the arrangements under this act—this is a terrible arrangement. This is not judicial oversight at all. This is an absolute and utter facade.

Why do we need to extend the period of time for this to be considered when we know all these flaws exist right now and they should be fixed? They absolutely should be fixed. Frankly, as the Labor opposition we will not give up at all on pressing the case for these laws to be fixed. They need to be fixed to ensure, from a national security perspective, that we get access to the type of data that is needed to prevent harm to others in the community.

On another quite distinct plane, we should make sure that Australia's tech sector is not treated as a pariah on the world stage. There are doubts being expressed by those overseas to tech companies here. They say that they're genuinely concerned about the arrangements the Australian government has put in place and they're questioning whether or not they can work with Australian tech. They're wondering whether or not Australian tech is robust because of what's been unleashed as a result of this act. The Australian tech sector should not be put in that position whatsoever by this government—this government that claims it's pro-business but did everything it could to ignore the views of business on this.

Business said it wanted to work with the government to achieve what it wanted to but not in the way that the government was proposing. Australian and overseas businesses, particularly from the tech sector, wanted to work with the government in the way it had sought. As an opposition, many of us on this side of the chamber had said that if someone wants to do harm and there is a way to intercept that information and act on it to prevent that harm from occurring, those arrangements should be made. This government, in its clumsy attempt to try to politicise the debate and make itself look tougher than it was, set in place these measures that have caused this type of concern within the tech sector and which now raise a genuine concern about whether or not we would be in a position to get important advice, data, that could help national security agencies here. It is a complete and utter disgrace that we have reached this position.

The constant bravado and politicking of the home affairs minister, who wants to score the political point rather than reach the substantive one, is coming to undo him. But worse still, we're the victims of it as a community, because his politicking means we won't get access to the data that will allow for national security agencies to work efficiently. This is the problem when it comes to those opposite on national security, particularly the home affairs minister, who always wants to play politics when Labor try to work with him, when Labor try to do the bipartisan thing. Frankly, I have on countless occasions raised with him other issues—for example, the rise of far-right extremism that has grown 320 per cent in the last five years—and he won't do a thing about it. But if it's to score a political point, he will. He's an absolute disgrace. We on this side try to talk, try to work with the government quietly and try to get things done. Communities that have seen the rise of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism who are genuinely concerned about this stuff, can't get anywhere. But if it is to make a political point—bam—he's there, trying to score the points. He then brings through shoddy law that affects our ability to perform the roles of national security effectively.

The US Democrats are absolutely right to put the spotlight on this shoddy work and then demonstrate how bad this law is and how bad it's being viewed overseas. And they would absolutely be well within their rights to set an expectation about judicial oversight, certain steps to be followed before you get access. They say that you should not do things that weaken the system of encryption that is used by business and others for legitimate reasons to be able to securely ensure the passage of data between parties. People say that the system shouldn't be weakened and this government goes ahead and tries to do just that. And if they say that, no, you're not meeting the standard and therefore you should not be entitled to data in that way, well, guess what? You shouldn't get it. You should not get that free pass. Certainly the US house committee should put a very sharp focus on whether or not this law, this shoddy law that the government has put in place, meets the high standards that they put in place in the US jurisdiction. They should absolutely put that magnifying glass over that law that has been passed in this country, and the government should be held to account for weakening our national security as a result of putting these laws in place.

As I said, when I look at this bill and I look at this sudden desire for consultation by the government I finish as I started, by making the point that this government cannot be trusted in terms of national security. It rats on deals that have been designed. When it talks about bipartisanship it does not mean it, and it will not follow through on it. We will be required to do what we must to ensure that the law in relation to encryption is such that our national security is maintained and that we are able to get access to the data that is vital for the work of our agencies, but to do it in a way that's fundamentally better than what has been put forward by a government more interested in politicking than in a genuine pursuit of a much higher quality and a much stronger level of national security than what we'd have as a result of this bill.

See this speech in context