Mark Dreyfus (Isaacs, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Attorney General) Share this | Hansard source

Another issue that I raised with the Attorney-General during discussion about this bill relates to the funding of the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. In short, I do not think that the evidence of the Attorney-General's Department at last Wednesday's COVID-19 Senate select committee hearing that the commissioner requires no additional resources to fulfil her new oversight responsibilities is credible. In fact, it is incredible. You do not have to take my word for it. Just last October, the Information Commissioner told Senate estimates that her office is already underresourced. The Attorney-General has advised me that his department is engaging with the commissioner to ensure that she has the necessary resources to perform the important oversight functions provided for in this bill, the Privacy Amendment (Public Health Contact Information) Bill 2020. While I welcome that engagement and look forward to receiving an update over coming days or weeks, there is no question in my mind that additional funding is urgently required. The only question is how much.

It is also important to remember that for years the government has refused to appoint a standalone information commissioner, a standalone freedom of information commissioner or a standalone privacy commissioner. Instead, one person currently occupies all three of these important and demanding roles. As I've said repeatedly, this is unacceptable. In light of the new responsibilities that this bill would confer on the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, now more than ever the government needs to appoint a standalone, dedicated privacy commissioner. The appointment of a full-time and properly resourced privacy commissioner rather than a commissioner forced to split her time between three different and demanding roles would make a further valuable contribution to building public confidence in the COVIDSafe app. It should not take a public health crisis for the government to show that it takes seriously the privacy of Australians.

In conclusion, let me be as clear as I can. I have downloaded the government's contact-tracing app, and I want other Australians to download the app, too. But I understand, and my Labor colleagues understand, that many millions of Australians have legitimate concerns about downloading the app. Those legitimate concerns should not be derided or minimised. Those concerns must be taken seriously and, to the extent possible, addressed. I believe this bill goes a long way towards addressing a number of those concerns. But it does not address every concern, and there are many issues that cannot be addressed by legislation alone. Ultimately, those concerns can only be addressed by the government.

If we are to come anywhere near the Prime Minister's target of at least 10 million Australians downloading the app, perhaps the most important thing that the government can do now is to be open and transparent with the Australian people. To gain the trust of Australians, the Morrison government must trust Australians. Publishing the source code for the app was a good start, but it was only a start. The government must be as transparent as possible about everything to do with the COVIDSafe app, whether it be providing additional technical information in relation to the app or being upfront about how the app is working in practice.

The government should be transparent about other matters, too. For example, the government should explain why it awarded the COVIDSafe data storage to Amazon Web Services instead of an Australian cloud service provider. And it should provide concrete assurances to the Australian people that the inexplicable decision to award this contract to Amazon does not mean that the data collected by the COVIDSafe app could, or will, be accessed by anyone outside Australia.

The government should also provide the Australian people, including older and culturally and linguistically diverse Australians and Australians with disabilities, with clear, easy-to-understand and accurate information about the app.

Finally, and most obviously, Australians will have no reason to download or keep using the app if the technology does not work or if the technology is not secure. For that reason, the government must urgently address the technical and security concerns that have been raised about the app by technology experts and members of the public.

I'd like to once again thank the Attorney-General for the constructive way in which he has engaged with Labor when it comes to this bill. I commend the bill to the House, and I move:

That all words after "That" be omitted with a view to substituting the following words:

"whilst not declining to give the bill a second reading, the House:

(1) notes that:

(a) since the beginning of this public health crisis, the Opposition has sought to work constructively and in good faith with the Government to ensure that Australians are kept safe during this health emergency;

(b) the Opposition made a number of constructive suggestions to improve the bill prior to its introduction into the Parliament and the Attorney-General considered, in good faith, all of those suggestions;

(c) to be a valuable public health tool, the Prime Minister has said that at least 40 per cent of the Australian population – or 10 million Australians – would have to download the Government’s COVIDSafe contact tracing app;

(d) to date, approximately 5.5 million Australians have downloaded the COVIDSafe app; and

(e) the passage of this bill, which incorporates a number of suggestions made by the Opposition, is likely to encourage more Australians to download the COVIDSafe contact tracing app; and

(2) is of the view that, in order to reach the Prime Minister’s 40 per cent target, there are other things the Government can and should be doing to build public confidence in the COVIDSafe app, including:

(a) explain to the Australian people why the Government preferred to trust overseas multinational Amazon Web Services over a range of Australian certified cloud service providers when it came to awarding the COVIDSafe data storage contract;

(b) take concrete steps to reassure and guarantee to the Australian public that none of the COVIDSafe app data stored by an overseas multinational cloud service provider can be accessed by foreign nationals, including Amazon employees and contractors and overseas law enforcement and intelligence services;

(c) provide additional funding to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, and appoint a standalone Privacy Commissioner, to ensure that the Commissioner is able to properly perform the important oversight functions provided for in this bill;

(d) urgently address the security and technical concerns that have been raised about the COVIDSafe app by technology experts and members of the public; and

(e) provide the Australian people, including older and culturally and linguistically diverse Australians and Australians with disabilities, with clear, easy to understand and accurate information about the COVIDSafe app''.

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