James Stevens (Sturt, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to support the second reading of the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (High Risk Terrorist Offenders) Bill 2020 and I thank those who have contributed so far. The shadow Attorney-General gave a selective history of the Labor Party's interaction with the national security services in this country, talking about the events of 1986 but forgetting the events of 1973 when the Whitlam government's Attorney-General Lionel Murphy undertook his famous oversight of ASIO by arriving unannounced and potentially inebriated at their headquarters in Melbourne. I add that to the record when we're talk about Labor and their respect—or, potentially, lack thereof—for the security services in this country.

This is a very important amendment, and it has been recommended by the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, to create a new category of dealing with high-risk terrorist offenders after they've completed the sentence for the crime that they've been convicted of in court. There is a comparable regime to the one that we're expanding here, which is, unfortunately, that we which we need to have in place for the most vile and disgusting people that walk the earth—that is, those who commit the sexual abuse of children. In the state and territory jurisdictions, even when someone has been convicted of a crime and has done their time for things such as sexual abuse, and particularly child sexual abuse, there is a very high expectation in many of those cases that that person is likely to offend again, and, if we simply release them into the community because they've finished their custodial sentence, we are not prepared to live in a society where someone might offend again because we didn't have a structure or a regime in place to protect against future abuse of children.

This, much like that regime, gives us another power—another tool in the toolkit—to deal with people who have been convicted of terrorism offences. They've served their time, but a court may nonetheless determine that they still pose a risk of committing a future terrorist act. Indeed, the previous speaker mentioned that a similar regime to this has operated quite successfully in the United Kingdom for two decades. We are learning some good lessons from what they've put in place there and we're seeking to do that here. We are creating an additional ability to deal with these people.

At the moment we can have a continuing detention order, where it is possible to keep people in a custodial environment if the burdens within that application to a state or territory Supreme Court can be met—that is, to say that a person should not be released back to the community. It may be they have completed a custodial sentence but they are such a risk and meet the burden required that they should continue to be kept incarcerated. A continuing detention order is something that is already in place. It is obviously significant to have to keep someone detained despite the fact that they've served their time for the crime that they have been convicted of. Some of the most ancient fundamentals of our system speak against that principle. That's why there needs to be a very high threshold and a very significant need to keep someone incarcerated beyond the service of the sentence that's been given to them through the appropriate processes of our criminal justice system.

Currently, after release, you can apply for a control order over someone who is a high-risk convicted terrorist offender who has finished their custodial sentence. It is interesting—and this is part of why we are undertaking this amendment—that it is through the supreme courts of the state and territories that you apply for the continuing detention order but that you have to go to the Federal Court to get a control order. That's the crux of what we're achieving by introducing these extended supervision orders in this legislation. It's to address that gap. Say someone in my home state of South Australia had been convicted of a terrorism offence. They might have been given a 10 or 15 year sentence. When they come to the end of that period, having served their sentence, they are eligible to be released. At the moment, the AFP can apply to the Supreme Court of South Australia for a continuing detention order and meet the burdens required to have that granted, or not, but it can only make a decision on that application and either grant it or not. Separate to that, you can go to the Federal Court and seek some form of control order to be put in place on that person. There's no interactivity when you're making an application for a continued detention order for anything other than that to be considered, and then, equally, the fallback position is the control order.

We're essentially putting something in between those two systems by creating this concept of an extended supervision order. That means that the Supreme Court, which will have jurisdiction over these extended supervision orders, will have the ability to determine applications. It might be that the application is for a continuing detention order but that the Supreme Court feels that, whilst the standard for that has not been met, the standard for an extended supervision order has been met. An extended supervision order is much more far-reaching than a control order. As some of the other amendments that are part of the bill set out, an extended supervision order will provide the ability to undertake surveillance and certain other measures to keep an eye on people who are potentially radicalised and who, where it has been demonstrated in the Supreme Court, pose a high risk of reoffending.

To briefly digress, I think it is poignant that we are debating this in the aftermath of the horrendous action in the United Kingdom on the weekend, which may well be proven in the courts to have been a terrorist attack, against a fellow member of parliament, Sir David Amess. It reinforces to us that terrorism is unfortunately still with us and that the risks are very significant and ongoing. As lawmakers, we must always be looking for opportunities to do all we can to protect innocent Australians from the horrors of terrorism. We've had terrorist acts in this country and we've seen awful terrorist attacks across the planet. Unfortunately we have this risk in this country. We have successfully prosecuted people in this country under the terrorist offences legislation in the Criminal Code. That's why we need to do this, unfortunately. There are people who are going to be entering this category of completing their custodial sentence for having been convicted of a terrorist offence, and those people may well still be radicalised and pose a significant threat of undertaking a future terrorist attack. Whether it's in this country or not is immaterial. We need a judicial system that is flexible enough to deal with that risk. No-one will thank anyone in this parliament if we don't make these necessary reforms, which have been recommended by the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, and then someone who could have been captured by this measure subsequently offends and, in the worst case, we see loss of life when Australian citizens become victims of a future terrorist attack that could have been prevented.

There is one other element—and it may well come up in other contributions—that I think is important to address. I know that some stakeholders have concerns about evidence for these applications being used in a confidential way and not given to the subject of a proposed extended supervision order or their legal counsel. It's really important that we think about why it would be necessary to keep that evidence confidential, with access given purely to the court officers who are making the determination and not to the convicted offender who is the subject of the application order. You can imagine that the Australian Federal Police are capable of collecting a whole range of information, the confidentiality of which is vital to their ongoing activities when it comes to counterterrorism. And you can imagine that the Australian Federal Police would be conflicted as to the value of using the evidence they have obtained in a way that is revealed to a convicted terrorist—that is, if the person were told that the AFP had obtained this information. It might be recorded telephone conversations, it might be emails or it might be information from some of the other technological platforms that people are using to interact, communicate and collaborate for the purpose of criminal activity. If the AFP obtains information relevant to an application for an extended supervision order, it is equally the case that if that information has to be provided to the person who is the subject of the application then it effectively gives that person the ability to warn their associates and other people that the AFP is in possession of the information. That could compromise a whole range of other things that the AFP is seeking to do with information, including ongoing criminal investigations and surveillance.

The last thing we want is to put the AFP in a position where potentially they have to decide to withhold something relevant to granting an extended supervision order because they don't want to jeopardise other operations they're in the middle of or put informants at risk. You can imagine that, when it comes to seeking these extended supervision orders, a lucrative source of information the AFP might use is informants who have been serving custodial sentences alongside the person who is the subject of the application order—and so on and so forth.

I think it's very important to rebut that point from some civil liberties and legal groups—and I'm not suggesting I've heard any contributions in this chamber to that effect. I understand why these groups always make sure they stand up for those rights, but in my contribution I want to make it clear that I reject that concern. I think it's vitally important that all the relevant information is known to those making the decision about whether or not to issue an extended supervision order. It's equally important that the AFP isn't compelled to reveal that information to others. Doing so might jeopardise other operations of the Federal Police and/or mean the AFP withhold that information for the very same reason—that is, they don't want to jeopardise other operations—and we see the wrong decision made on an extended supervision order because all the information to make the determination wasn't provided.

With that, I'd like to commend the Attorney-General and all those who have been involved in putting this bill together, and I thank the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. I think this is a really good example of the kinds of important and necessary reform propositions that are brought forward to government from that mechanism. I think it is going to put the Federal Police in a position to do an even better job than the already sensational and excellent job they do in fighting terrorism, protecting our community and keeping us safe. This is the sort of additional mechanism they need. We should give it to them, and we can do that by supporting this bill. I commend the bill to the House.

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