House debates

Thursday, 10 February 2022

Committees

Animal Health Australia and Plant Health Australia Funding Legislation Amendment Bill 2021; Second Reading

11:47 am

Photo of Julie CollinsJulie Collins (Franklin, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Agriculture) Share this | Hansard source

The explanatory memorandum for the Animal Health and Plant Health Australia Funding Legislation Amendment Bill 2021 says the purpose of the proposed amendments to the Australian Animal Health Council (Live-stock Industries) Funding Act 1996, the AHA Act, and the Plant Health Australia (Plant Industries) Funding Act 2002, the PHA Act, would be to streamline administrative processes by removing redundant provisions, to add provisions that create efficiencies and facilitate future levy arrangements, and to increase consistency between the acts regarding the spending of emergency response levies.

The AHA Act is the disbursement act under which the Commonwealth pays levies and charges that are collected from certain animal industries to the Australian Animal Health Council, otherwise known as Animal Health Australia. Animal Health Australia is a not-for-profit company created to coordinate the government-industry partnership for animal biosecurity in Australia. The AHA sets out priorities that must be applied to the spending of the Emergency Animal Disease Response levies. These priorities ensure that the Commonwealth's primary purposes for Emergency Animal Disease Response levies are met. These purposes include cost recovery for collection of these levies and funding industry contributions to relevant emergency responses under the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement—that is, when there is an incursion or when something comes through Australia's biosecurity system, there is a levy imposed on those industries that are impacted to try and deal with it.

The proposed amendments in the bill relating to the AHA Act include: amending the AHA Act to facilitate the funding of emergency responses under emergency biosecurity response deeds other than the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement, such as the proposed Emergency Response Deed for Aquatic Animal Diseases; adding a power in the AHA Act for the Governor-General to make regulations, which is consistent with the regulation making power in the PHA Act; and repealing redundant provisions in the AHA Act that relate to honey, as honey-related levies are no longer paid to the AHA.

The PHA Act is the disbursement act under which the Commonwealth pays levies and charges that are collected from certain plant industries to Plant Health Australia. Plant Health Australia is a not-for-profit company created to coordinate government-industry partnership for plant biosecurity in Australia. The PHA Act sets priorities that must be applied to the spending of the Emergency Plant Pest Response levies. These priorities ensure that the Commonwealth's primary purposes for the spending of the Emergency Plant Pest Response Levies are met. These purposes include the cost recovery for collection of these levies and funding industry contributions to relevant emergency responses under the Emergency Plant Pest Response deed.

The proposed amendments in the bill relating to the PHA Act include broadening the scope of permissible uses for the Emergency Plant Pest Response levies in the PHA Act to include the promotion or maintenance of the health of an EPPR plant, which will provide more flexibility to PHA industry members in meeting industry biosecurity needs. This is also consistent with the permissible uses for the equivalent emergency animal disease response levies in the AHA Act, adding a power in the PHA Act for the secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment or a delegate of the secretary to determine that a body is a relevant plant industry member by notifiable instrument. It also seeks to repeal redundant provisions in the PHA Act that provide for the redirection of excess levies to research and development purposes.

The explanatory memorandum also outlines that the bill would make minor consequential amendments to the Horticulture Marketing and Research and Development Services Act 2000 and the Primary Industries Research and Development Act 1989. It is understood that the proposed amendments would commence on 1 July 2022. The explanatory memorandum further states that consultation has been undertaken with PHA, all the industry members, and AHA. It also notes that the proposed changes would not impact AHA's existing industry members. I note that this bill has no financial impact on the Australian government budget, but I have sought assurances from the government that it will not be increasing massive levies across industry and the sector, and that has been part of the consultation.

As already stated, Labor has indicated that we will support the bill. We do take very seriously legislation of this nature around biosecurity to ensure that there are measures in place to keep out pests, weeds and disease, and we've been very supportive of these types of bills and legislation in the past. We have not wanted to hold these up in any way, shape or form. However, we do need to highlight the concerns that we have with the government's slow approach to strengthening Australia's biosecurity system. Firstly, the government doesn't have a good track record when it comes to delivering on biosecurity. We know the government did an almighty backflip on the biosecurity levy, and it failed to adopt the levy that was recommended in an industry review back in 2017. It did a lot of work on this levy. It even made provision for one in the budget a number of years back. The government even expended the money. But, like so many other announcements on that side, the levy didn't eventuate. I've spoken to many farmers and other stakeholders across the agriculture sector, and they continue to raise concerns about Australia's biosecurity system and the lack of a sustainable funding arrangement and how we are going to pay for it into the future.

It is clear that this has been a huge policy void over the past few years when it comes to the government doing anything of note around strengthening Australia's biosecurity system. Indeed, it's like many parts of that government, where they are responding slowly and on an ad hoc basis. It has been extremely disappointing given the significant risks that pests and disease could have on Australian produce and the impact across the agriculture sector. Indeed, in terms of agriculture it is estimated that Australia's biosecurity system underpins around $78 billion in production, with around $60 billion of that in exports. Around $42 billion is attributed to the country's inbound tourism industry and 1.6 million Australian jobs across the supply chain. The National Farmers Federation estimates that the cost of a single outbreak of disease or pests in Australia would exceed $50 billion. This is a very significant issue to the future of our sector.

With so much at risk, where has the government's urgency been to do something about the biosecurity system? They've had nine years in government to fix this—nine years! How long is it going to take? Indeed, prior to the 2021-22 budget, where they did put in a bit of money for biosecurity, it was actually going backwards over the forwards. That was the state of biosecurity funding in this country. The government really has done very little to assure farmers and primary producers or to give them any confidence that it is a good manager of Australia's biosecurity system.

I've spent a lot of time in this place talking about biosecurity and the government's failures. I've also spent a lot of time in this place quoting about the government's failure, including the Inspector-General of Biosecurity and the Auditor-General. As the Inspector-General of Biosecurity and the Auditor-General point out, there's a lot to be concerned about. I just want to spend a bit of time going through these concerns. As I've mentioned, we all know there is a lot at risk so we need to understand what these reports are saying about where the biosecurity system is.

Last year alone there were four damning reports and reviews outlining serious inadequacies that exist across Australia's biosecurity. Three reports were from the inspector-general and one from the Auditor-General. The first report was in February last year by the Inspector-General of Biosecurity. The report looked at the adequacy of the department's operational model to effectively mitigate biosecurity risks in evolving risk and business environments. The Inspector-General of Biosecurity's broad assessment was that the biosecurity system is not in a strong position to address the diverse and evolving biosecurity risks and business environment expected to prevail from 2021 through to 2025. The inspector-general made 19 recommendations to the department.

The second report was in April last year—again, the Inspector-General of Biosecurity—and this report of course centred on the Ruby Princess cruise ship incident and human biosecurity, and we all know what a debacle that was. The review found weaknesses in the department's management of human biosecurity functions and recommended a strengthening of arrangements for intercepting listed human diseases and biosecurity risk material to ensure that the efforts be directed across to areas of highest risk. Who would have thought, Deputy Speaker, in a global pandemic there might be a risk? The review also found that information systems that underpin human health activities need to be transformed. The inspector-general in that report made 42 recommendations that went to improvements around the management of human biosecurity and the vessel's pathway.

The third damming report was in June last year. This one was the Australian National Audit Office responding to noncompliance with biosecurity requirements. The Auditor-General made eight recommendations to the department, and the performance report concluded the department's arrangements to respond to noncompliance with biosecurity requirements are 'largely inappropriate'. The department's compliance framework is 'largely inappropriate.' Indeed, it says there is:

… no framework to assess risk across the entire biosecurity system and target regulatory actions accordingly.

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