Andrew Wallace (Fisher, Liberal National Party) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to speak in relation to the National Security Legislation Amendment (Comprehensive Review and Other Measures No. 2) Bill 2023. As the Deputy Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, it's been my privilege to be intimately involved in the examination of this bill.

I'd like to commence by firstly saying that, of course, an Australian government has no greater responsibility than to ensure the protection of its citizens and the homeland. It brings me no joy to have been the deputy chair sitting on the committee when we had to provide a dissenting report—the first time in 17 years. There has only ever been one other dissenting report of this committee, and that was in relation to the listing of the Kurdistan Workers Party. This committee was formed in August 1988. Prior to this inquiry, on only one other occasion has the committee not spoken with one voice. So it was with great reticence that the opposition felt that it had to stand opposed to the recommendations of the majority and, therefore, also this bill. The opposition cannot support this bill in its current form.

The bill itself is relatively uncontroversial. We don't quibble with the 10 items that arose out of the Richardson comprehensive review. That comprehensive review done by Dennis Richardson was the most significant piece of work done on our national intelligence architecture since the Hope royal commissions of the seventies and eighties. The implementation of the 203 recommendations of that comprehensive review has been ongoing for a number of years. There was no rush by the previous government and there has been no rush by this government to deal with it. It has been going through those 203 recommendations in a calm, methodical manner. The inquiry which was undertaken, which was the precursor to the bill—or of the bill, I should say—examined just 10 of the recommendations, and there are more to come. We don't quibble with those 10 recommendations; the opposition in fact supports them.

The 11th recommendation, as the previous speaker, the member for Solomon, referred to, was to clarify the foreign minister's role in directing ASIS. There has been some contention about whether those directions were clear enough under section 6(1)(e) of the Intelligence Services Act. We don't quibble with that. But what we do quibble with is this government's decision to sneak—because that's what it has done—changes into section 28(2) of the Intelligence Services Act.

The sole basis of dissent between the opposition and government members is in relation to the composition of the PJCIS. The PJCIS, the intelligence and security committee, is regarded as the most important committee in this place. Members of this and the other place scramble to get on this committee. It is a committee of some note. It's a high-profile committee. It is a committee where our intelligence agencies share information with members and senators on that committee to top-secret level. It is the only committee in this place that has that exposure. No other committee does. So membership of this committee is highly sought after.

What the opposition is very concerned about is lifting the composition of the committee from 11 to 13 members. That might sound like a fairly innocuous type of thing. Attorney-General's in their submissions to the inquiry said, 'You guys are overworked,' and we are. 'You guys are overworked; we'll give you another two members.' But that is a total, utter ruse. The government seeks to add members to this committee, I fear, because it has done a grubby deal with some, perhaps all—I don't know—members of the crossbench. For what purpose, once again, I don't know. Whether it's because of support for legislation that has gone through the parliament or support for legislation that will go through the parliament, time will tell. Time will tell when this bill ultimately passes, because it will pass, sadly. The laws of arithmetic are against us.

The government provided no consultation whatsoever—no meaningful consultation, at least—on this bill. Ordinarily, the government in relation to intelligence bills would provide a six-week period in which to conduct an inquiry. Often there's a consultation period of a month to six weeks. Do you know how long the government provided for consultation with stakeholders on this bill? I will tell you. Five business days. The committee received complaints from stakeholders saying: 'What? Five business days? We can't respond in five business days.'

The government did not consult with the opposition on this bill. This is a bill on national security, which is very, very important. The government should have consulted with the opposition on this, but it didn't. It has tried to ram through this change to the PJCIS under the cover of darkness, under the cover of all of these other recommendations which we support. Members of the government will stand up here in this place when they are talking about this and they will talk about all the other 11 changes and they will maybe just refer a little bit to the composition of the PJCIS.

In the inquiry I asked the Director-General of Security a very simple question: if there are more people who know a secret, is there a greater risk of that secret coming out? The answer to that was yes. He talked about the need-to-know principle. That's why we have the need-to-know principle. The fewer people who know a secret, the less chance there is of it coming out, either inadvertently or otherwise. So by changing the composition of this committee we are running the risk of having a greater chance of secrets being leaked, either inadvertently or advertently.

I also have great concerns that this could have a chilling effect on the information that is shared with this committee. Since 1988, there has only ever been one nonmember of a party of government that has sat on this committee. By convention, the only members who sit on this committee are from parties of government. Why is that important? Because ultimately we are talking about matters of national security. When those opposite are in government—they are a party of government, just as we are a party of government—their obligation as a party of government is to protect Australian citizens. It's their obligation to ensure when they are in government that those laws are sounds, that they are workable, just as it is when it's our turn and we are in government.

I am very concerned that by bringing a nonmember of a party of government onto this committee we will see a chilling effect on what is shared between our intelligence agencies and the committee. Madam Deputy Speaker Sharkie, you may have a very different view to me on this, being a member of a party that is not in government, and you are entitled to your view. But the reality is that since 1988 this has been a convention—that only members of parties of government sit on this committee—and that is for a very good reason. I'm not impugning you or any of your colleagues, but there is a very good reason that we have had this convention in place. But this government is changing that convention, and I'm very concerned about it.

This committee is under immense stress and pressure all the time because of the number of inquiries it deals with, but it provides a degree of corporate knowledge—I'm a little hesitant to use the word 'expertise', because in this place you have to be a bit of a jack of all trades. But, by virtue of the fact of the workload of this committee, you do become a bit of a quasi-expert in intelligence and security. Increasing the number of members from 11 to 13 could promote a situation whereby fewer people decide to turn up to meetings, to hearings. The nature of the changes that are suggested in this bill is that it changes the composition to two government members from the House, two government members from the Senate, two non-government members from the House and two non-government members from the Senate, and the other five can come from either house. That means that if a government of the day wanted to be underhanded it could appoint, in the four places that are restricted to non-government members, purely crossbench members, cutting out the opposition entirely. That is a fact. That is an unmitigated, unmistakable fact. It could do that.

It is incredibly important that on this committee, more so than on any other committee, there is a bank of members and senators who have an understanding—a good corporate-knowledge understanding—of issues of national security, because the tide always turns. The Labor Party might think they're in there forever, but the tide always turns. Politics is cyclical. And it is in the country's best interests to ensure that there are members of both sides who are competent, who are experienced and who are knowledgeable in matters of national security. We will continue to fight these changes, because we believe they are bad for this country's national security.

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