Kate Chaney (Curtin, Independent) Share this | Hansard source

The need to reform the Public Service is pretty clear. The recent robodebt and PwC scandals have blown wide open the fact that the APS is not functioning as it should. Is it the bastion of frank and fearless advice it's meant to be? Does it have the intellectual capital required to be the main source of advice to government? The Thodey review, to which this bill responds, says that the answers to those questions is no.

But I also think that this legislation is an inadequate and untimely response to the problem. The Public Service Act already sets accountability as a Public Service value and says that the APS is open and accountable to the Australian community. The act sets out, as a main objective, to establish an apolitical Public Service that is efficient and effective in serving the government, the parliament and the Australian public. But after years of resourcing neglect, Australian departments do not have the capability or the permission to live up to this objective. For decades, governments have demanded more efficiencies within departments. This means reduced resources with increased expectations. The long-term effect of demanding more output with less budget has resulted in a hollowing out of the public service. The government has a huge task ahead of it in rebuilding the Public Service. It is going to take decades of concerted effort to get departments to where they should be. But this bill is not the right way to start, nor is it coming at the right time.

I want to make it clear that none of my comments are intended to reflect on the public servants within the APS who turn up to work every day and commit to performing their obligations with the greatest of care. Particularly in the last few years of COVID response and restrictions, departmental staff have been working above and beyond. My comments are about the fundamental structures, hierarchies and practices that have evolved within the Public Service that need reform. The Thodey review confirmed in 2019 the finding that had been made a number of times in recent years that APS capability is no longer fit for purpose. The Thodey review noted a weakened Public Service results in weakened service delivery for Australians, and that's the key issue. Yes, the Public Service needs to be delivering advice and support to government, but it is also the interface between government and the Australian people. The Thodey review report says a rundown public service results in 'direct and adverse impacts on the APS's ability to deliver for the community'. That report outlined two fundamental concerns: firstly, that there has been a trend of outsourcing core ongoing Public Service work to contractors; and, secondly, that the APS is suffering from creeping politicisation. This could not have been more accurately illustrated than through the PwC and robodebt sagas of the last few months.

We have all borne witness to the ongoing investigation and extensive media coverage of external contractor PwC's use of confidential information acquired in 2015 while assisting the government in drafting new multinational tax laws. So many questions have been raised about the interaction between sensitive government policy and the private sector. It has been revealed that PwC had more than half a billion dollars worth of contracts with the federal government in the last few years. The issue has highlighted how dependent the APS on the consulting industry, which is entirely inappropriate—and I say that as an ex-consultant myself. This is exactly what the Thodey recommendations identified, and these were generally ignored by the former government in 2019. The APS is bound by values and codes of conduct and has an obligation to serve the public and the government of the day. External contractors have none of these requirements. More importantly, the outsourcing of core work to contractors hollows out the ability of the APS to advise. It removes the core purpose of the APS. Outsourcing core work redesigns an APS into a briefing hub that relies on external advice rather than supporting a workforce that can provide quality, considered and situationally aware advice. A well-resourced, capacity-rich APS will always provide better advice than a contractor and won't leak secrets to clients.

The robodebt debacle goes to Thodey's second fundamental concern: the creeping politicisation of the APS. The horrors of the robodebt scheme and the effect of this scheme on the lives of so many Australians cannot be underestimated. But how did this happen? How did a theoretically apolitical APS that delivers frank and fearless advice manage to implement this unlawful and immoral scheme? Well, it didn't. The APS that implemented this scheme was following the instructions of government without challenging or questioning the principles. The APS that implemented this scheme was not serving the public. In 2017, a Senate committee found that a 'lack of procedural fairness is evident in every stage' of the program, which 'should be put on hold until all procedural fairness flaws are addressed', but nothing happened. Robodebt was implemented as directed by government without frank and fearless advice from the APS. This is the problem that we should be addressing. So what does this bill actually do? We've just heard from the member for Bruce about these problems but not much about how this bill will actually change anything.

At the outset I do applaud the Albanese government in its announced commitment to rebuild the APS. It requires a long-term commitment to the task. I acknowledge the narrative that this bill is the first step, but it's not a step. This amounts to platitudes which will do nothing to operationalise a rebuilding. If rebuilding the APS was akin to rebuilding a house, this bill is choosing the colour of the roof tiles. I worry that this bill will detract from significant reform as we all pat ourselves on the back because we've started.

So what does this bill actually do? Firstly, the bill legislates a few of the rhetorical elements of the Thodey review but does not include the substantive recommendations. Secondly, it adds in an APS value of stewardship, which is not a Thodey recommendation, given that stewardship is a function, not a value. It requires an APS purpose statement to be prepared by the Secretaries Board. This seems like labour-intensive and arduous lip service when the APS is already bound by the Public Service Act and APS Values. The third thing this bill does is require agency heads to create a work environment that enables decisions to be made by APS employees at the lowest possible classification level. I'm assuming that this is to attempt to dilute some of the top-heavy decision-making in the APS hierarchy, but it makes no sense to me that this, which is not a Thodey recommendation, is a priority. It's not clear that it even belongs in legislation. I worry that the government is touting this bill as part of long-term thinking when actually it's a piecemeal, knee-jerk reaction for the need to action.

So what actually does need to happen? Before we can even begin to have conversations about how to rebuild the APS, we need to hear the response from the robodebt royal commission. Understanding the failures of the past is essential to equipping us for the future. If we really want to improve and fix the organisations in front of us, we need to know what went wrong, which is why I'm introducing a second reading amendment, which has been circulated in my name, to suspend any further work on this bill until the robodebt royal commission has reported. There is no point undertaking royal commissions if we don't hear from them before deciding how to respond. The royal commission report is expected in a few weeks. Surely, it's worth listening to it before deciding on the highest priority reforms.

Secondly, we need to respond to the Thodey review—and not just the rhetorical elements. We need legislation or regulations that strengthen the power of the APS Commissioner, clarify the distinct roles of the Secretary of PM&C and the APS Commissioner and strengthen the merit based processes for appointments and termination of secretaries.

Thirdly, we need to undertake a comprehensive review of the APS Values, preferably after receiving the robodebt royal commission report. A comprehensive review should focus on each group of employees and their relationship with government and the parliament, their relationship with the public, their workplace relationships and ethical behaviour.

Fourthly, the government needs to commit to long-term, substantial resourcing of the APS. This means enough money for the APS to hire well and when it needs to, enough money that the APS can develop or redevelop in-house expertise and won't have to farm out to contractors for advice and enough money that public servants are not skewing their programs, advice or delivery in favour of political goodwill and therefore budget.

Fifthly, we need to re-establish the correct relationship between government, the APS and the public. The APS must be regarded as a significant institution in its own right as part of responsible government under the Constitution. I refer to Andrew Podger AO's comments in this regard and defer to his experience. He said:

The partnership between Secretaries and Agency Ministers is therefore critical: it requires trust and mutual respect, and confidence in the confidentiality of communications between the two. Equally, the degree of independence of the APS, and hence of Secretaries, must be recognised. The relationship should be along the lines of trustees, each respecting the other's role and responsibilities; not quite equals (as the APS does 'serve the Government') but not the 'principal-agent' relationship which has emerged since the 1980s let alone the 'master-servant' relationship which I have detected in more recent times.

Finally, we need to make ensure that APS leaders are fully equipped to lead. Concerns about leadership and leadership responsibilities within the APS have been raised regularly over the last two decades. It seems ludicrous that we've been talking about leadership concerns in the APS for two decades. I'm told these conversations have resulted in some strengthening of requirements and expectations and improvements in training and development for APS leaders. Thodey recommended that 'performance management of secretaries should be robust and comprehensive', and 'robust processes should govern the termination of secretaries appointments'. I urge the government to prioritise the reform of APS leadership and to ensure departmental secretaries are appointed on merit, with a full understanding of purpose and responsibilities and a commitment to the rebuilding of expertise and capability in their departments.

In conclusion, and to quote the Thodey review again:

APS capability has arguably deteriorated and is not fit for the future. The approach to all aspects of workforce management lacks strategic direction and is below best practice in many areas.

But I ask the government to consider these three points: (1) reform of the APS is essential for our government and our democracy to function, so it should be done comprehensively and strategically; (2) the timing of reform is critical and we must wait for the report of the robodebt royal commission in order to learn from past mistakes to prioritise our reform for the future; and (3) reform must be substantive, not rhetorical and it needs to be backed by appropriate resourcing and budget. We need government to act decisively. I move:

That all words after "That" be omitted with a view to substituting the following words:

"The House declines to give the bill a second reading until such time as the report on the Robodebt Royal Commission is handed down".

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