Zoe Daniel (Goldstein, Independent) Share this | Hansard source

by leave—I move amendments (2) and (3) as circulated in my name together:

(2) Clause 224, page 240 (after line 23), after subclause (1), insert:

(1A) Despite subsection (1), the Secretary must not delegate any of the Secretary's functions or powers under Part 6 (purchase of biodiversity certificates by the Commonwealth) to a person who is an official of the Regulator.

(3) Clause 236, page 243 (after line 24), after paragraph (2)(a), insert:

(aa) the extent to which the Regulator has contributed to the achievement of the objects of this Act by performing the Regulator's functions, and exercising the Regulator's powers, under this Act; and

These amendments serve to address integrity concerns with regulation of the Nature Repair Market. The Nature Repair Market is slated to unlock $137 billion in financial flows for biodiversity by 2050 and will no doubt reach across and impact a wide range of habitats and species. Therefore, it's crucial that we have public confidence that the regulator which will design and administer the methods through which biodiversity certificates are traded and purchased on the market is performing in a way that generates the best outcomes for biodiversity and nature.

The Clean Energy Regulator is the designated regulator of the market. I have expressed my concerns with this, especially given the findings of the Chubb review into the carbon market, which found that reforms are needed before the Clean Energy Regulator is fit for purpose. While I would not go so far as to refer to this as a perk of copying and pasting the model of the carbon market onto the Nature Repair Market, there is the benefit of foresight to learn from the mistakes of the carbon market.

One of the recommendations of the Chubb review was that it's a conflict of interest in the carbon market that the regulator can be delegated to purchase carbon credits on behalf of the government. Amendment (2) serves to remove this similar power from the Nature Repair Market Bill. The provision in the bill that allows the government's power to purchase biodiversity certificates to be delegated to the regulator—the same body in charge of ensuring the integrity of these certificates while simultaneously tasked with finding the best deal on behalf of the government to buy such certificates—is a conflict of interest if ever there was one.

Acknowledging the Chubb review's recommendations, and to ensure that the Nature Repair Market does not repeat the mistakes of the carbon market, this amendment removes the provision that allows the government to delegate the purchasing of biodiversity certificates to the regulator. This is a crucial change. Given that this legislation is to pass pending the implementation of the Chubb review's recommendations relating to the regulator, it's important, too, that the legislation includes an assessment of whether the regulator is performing as intended. Rather than it being left on trust that the regulator is doing its job, amendment (3) specifically requires that regular reviews of the Nature Repair Market assess the performance of the regulator in achieving the objects of the act, performing its functions and exercising its powers.

These amendments will go some way to improving the integrity and accountability of the regulation of the Nature Repair Market.

See this speech in context