Mark Dreyfus (Isaacs, Australian Labor Party, Cabinet Secretary) Share this | Hansard source

Very briefly, the examples that were given just then by the member for Clark—with the greatest of respect to him—simply prove that there is a discretion currently, that there has been a discretion, and that late raised material is capable of being accepted without the tribunal choosing to draw an unfavourable inference to the credibility of the claim in those matters. I'm indebted in a way to the member for Clark for bringing forward those examples, because what we have here with the proposed new clause 367A from the Migration Act would replicate the effect of the existing section 423A of the Migration Act, that being the provision under which all of the examples that the member for Clark referred to were made.

No-one doubts the degree of difficulty or the degree of pain and suffering that has been experienced by very many applicants for protection status in Australia or the cultural barriers that exist that might indeed provide a reason why certain evidence wasn't brought forward at the earliest possible stage. No-one doubts the difficulty of obtaining appropriate legal advice, which sometimes means that unrepresented applicants at an earlier stage don't put their cases as well as they might, and that with the assistance of a lawyer they were enabled to put their cases better. The current tribunal, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, applying the current section 423A of the Migration Act, has proved itself able in the past to see those difficulties, to make appropriate decisions, to recognise that there were reasons why late raised material hadn't been raised earlier. I certainly haven't seen here in the examples put forward by the member for Clark, with respect, a reason for not continuing with the new proposed section 367A of the Migration Act, which, as I said, preserves appropriate discretion in the tribunal to receive late raised evidence.

See this speech in context