Zoe Daniel (Goldstein, Independent) Share this | Hansard source

by leave—I move amendments (1) to (4), as circulated in my name, together:

(1) Clause 4, page 3 (line 13), at the end of the clause, add:

The Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Environment is established to monitor the CEO's performance of the CEO's functions, and for related matters.

(2) Clause 5, page 4 (after line 14), after the definition of EPA, insert:

joint committee means the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Environment established under Part 5A.

joint committee member means a member of the joint committee.

(3) Clause 44, page 23 (after line 25), after subclause (2), insert:

(2A) A person must not be appointed as the CEO unless:

(a) the Minister has referred the proposed appointment to the joint committee for approval; and

(b) the joint committee has approved the proposed appointment.

(4) Page 29 (after line 17), after Part 5, insert:

Part 5A — Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Environment

56A Simplified outline of this Part

This Part establishes the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Environment to monitor the CEO's performance of the CEO's functions, and for related matters.

56B Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Environment

(1) A Committee to be known as the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Environment is to be established as soon as practicable after the commencement of each Parliament.

(2) The joint committee is to consist of 12 members:

(a) 6 of whom must be members of the Senate appointed by the Senate, and 6 of whom must be members of the House of Representatives appointed by that House; and

(b) 5 of whom must be members of the Government; and

(c) 5 of whom must be members of the Opposition; and

(d) 2 of whom must be members of the Parliament other than members of the Government or Opposition.

(3) The co-Chairs of the joint committee are to be:

(a) the joint committee member nominated as co-Chair by the Prime Minister; and

(b) the joint committee member nominated as co-Chair by the leader of the Opposition.

(4) A member of the Parliament is not eligible for appointment as a joint committee member if the member is:

(a) a Minister; or

(b) the President of the Senate; or

(c) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; or

(d) the Deputy President and Chair of Committees of the Senate or the Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(5) A joint committee member ceases to hold office:

(a) when the House of Representatives expires by the passing of time or is dissolved; or

(b) if the joint committee member becomes the holder of an office specified in any of the paragraphs of subsection (4); or

(c) if the joint committee member ceases to be a member of the House of the Parliament by which the joint committee member was appointed; or

(d) if the joint committee member resigns the member's office as provided by subsection (6) or (7).

(6) A joint committee member appointed by the Senate may resign the member's office by giving a signed notice to that effect to the President of the Senate.

(7) A joint committee member appointed by the House of Representatives may resign the member's office by giving a signed notice to that effect to the Speaker of that House.

(8) Either House of the Parliament may appoint one of its members to fill a vacancy amongst the members of the joint committee appointed by that House.

56C Powers and proceedings of the joint committee

All matters relating to the powers and proceedings of the joint committee are to be determined by resolution of both Houses of the Parliament.

56D Functions of the joint committee

(1) The functions of the joint committee are as follows:

(a) to monitor the CEO's performance of the CEO's functions;

(b) to report to both Houses of the Parliament, with such comments as it thinks fit, on any matter connected with the performance of the CEO's functions that the joint committee considers should be directed to the attention of the Parliament;

(c) to examine each annual report prepared by the CEO under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 and report to both Houses of the Parliament on any matter appearing in, or arising out of, any such annual report;

(d) to inquire into any question in connection with the joint committee's functions that is referred to it by either House of the Parliament, and to report to that House on that question;

(e) to consider proposed appointments to the office of CEO (see subsection 44(2A));

(f) to make recommendations to both Houses of the Parliament, the Minister and the CEO on:

(i) draft estimates referred to in section 56E; and

(ii) what proportion of the EPA's budget should be spent on monitoring, compliance, enforcement and assurance;

(g) to conduct reviews and make recommendations under section 56F;

(h) to do anything incidental or conducive to the performance of the above functions.

(2) Subsection (1) does not authorise the joint committee to reconsider the CEO's decisions or recommendations in relation to a particular decision under a Commonwealth environmental law.

56E Estimates

(1) Without limiting section 56D, the joint committee may request the CEO to submit to the joint committee draft estimates for the EPA for a financial year before the Federal Budget for that financial year.

(2) The CEO must comply with the request in time to allow the joint committee to consider the draft estimates and make recommendations on them before the Budget.

56F Review of Commonwealth environmental laws

The joint committee must:

(a) regularly review Commonwealth environmental laws; and

(b) if the joint committee reasonably believes that the purposes of those laws would be better achieved if any functions under those laws were transferred to the CEO—recommend to both Houses of the Parliament and the Minister that the functions be transferred to the CEO.

I am concerned that what the government is asking the House to sign when it comes to the Nature Positive Plan is a blank cheque, and that is what this amendment is designed, in part, to address. I want to impress on the House and Australians taking note of this debate that the government has been made absolutely and explicitly aware of the deficiencies in this legislation. I often bring my concerns about policy directly to the government, and, in certain circumstances, they are responsive to amendments proposed by myself and other members of the crossbench. Indeed, this is what the crossbench has tried to do with amendments to this legislation. I want to be clear that I absolutely believe that we should have a federal EPA, a good one, and my proposed amendment is an incredibly simple measure to improve the integrity and oversight of this proposed law.

The crossbench has had multiple meetings with the minister and her staff on this legislation, and that is welcome and appreciated, but, in every case on nature positive, the government has refused to adapt commonsense changes from the crossbench in a series of amendments. As a result, this bill will likely end up in a quagmire of political disagreement in the Senate, and that will not be good for the social licence that must accompany this bill.

This amendment goes to the oversight and the independence of the EPA. In my view, the government has decided to establish an agency which will operate like any Commonwealth agency rather than an independent authority, and this includes the ability for any future minister to shape its overarching policy direction via a statement of expectations. The project decision-making process, which is currently delegated and processed by the department of the environment, one which the minister can interfere with at any time, will simply be shifted to a new agency—no board, no expert-led appointment process and minimal operational independence. Again, the government has been made aware of this by experts, interest groups, me and others on the crossbench.

To be very clear, I very much respect this minister. I'm not convinced, though, that any future minister will be equally competent. Therefore, the amendment I'm proposing would create a joint parliamentary committee on the environment which, critically, would oversee the ministerially appointed CEO. I believe this is an important step for accountability, but, alas, the government appears wary of the potential consequences of this extra democratic oversight when it comes to environmental protection. I would argue that a committee is a reasonable compromise given that the government will not implement a board to oversee what is not in reality an independent post.

The concept of this amendment has received multipartisan support in recent years and is endorsed by Australia's leading environmental experts. Beyond confirming the minister's appointment of a chief executive, the committee would be empowered to request the CEO to submit draft budget estimates for review in advance of each upcoming federal budget. The CEO's performance would be monitored and reviewed in the interests of best practice environmental public administration. Absent this, absent a joint committee and absent decision-making independence, my concern is that this EPA model is a potential lame duck lacking both autonomy and integrity.

This commonsense amendment would substantially improve the performance and the integrity of this bill, and it is consistent with the principles of the international nature-positive movement. Unfortunately, the government have decided not to adhere to these principles, which are at odds with the concerns that have been raised with them and the urgent threats faced by Australia's environment and, I believe, at odds with the need for a particularly robust EPA. I commend the amendments to the House.

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