Paul Fletcher (Bradfield, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Government Services and the Digital Economy) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Oversight Legislation Amendment (Robodebt Royal Commission Response and Other Measures) Bill 2024. This bill implements two recommendations of the royal commission. Recommendation 2.1 is about imposing a statutory duty on agency heads and departmental secretaries, requiring them to assist the Ombudsman with investigations. Our understanding is that, as a matter of general practice, departmental secretaries and agency heads already do this. This bill would, however, implement the royal commission's recommendation by entrenching the obligation in legislation.

Recommendation 21.2 is about giving the Ombudsman another power to obtain information in equivalent terms to that of subsection 33(3) of the Auditor-General Act. In practice, this would confer the power to enter premises of Commonwealth agencies and obtain documents and to be entitled to reasonable facilities while doing so. Again, the coalition understands that the Commonwealth Ombudsman is seen as a respected and senior figure in the Public Service and the kinds of information typically sought under this power are generally provided as a matter of practice.

As a rule, departments and agencies across the Public Service engage with the Ombudsman in good faith, recognising the importance of the role that he plays. Nevertheless, this bill entrenches the power in law and implements the recommendations of the royal commission.

There are three additional points to note. Firstly, the bill implements analogous changes in respect of the Inspector-General of Taxation and Taxation Ombudsman. The inspector-general exercises functions equivalent to those of the Commonwealth Ombudsman with respect to the taxation system. It is appropriate that their powers also be equivalent.

Secondly, the bill makes changes which go beyond the specific recommendations of the royal commission by conferring a power to obtain documents remotely. While this was not a recommendation of the royal commission, it appears, in principle, to be unproblematic. In many cases it would allow the Ombudsman to access information that he or she would be able to access anyway but without the need to attend the premises in person.

Thirdly, the bill also extends the duties and powers in the bill to all the statutory offices that are created under the Ombudsman Act. This means that the obligations imposed on public servants and the investigative powers conferred by this bill also apply in relation to the functions exercised by the Private Health Insurance Ombudsman, the Postal Industry Ombudsman and the other statutory offices established by the Ombudsman Act. Again, this does not appear, in principle, to be problematic.

Nevertheless, the coalition's position is that it is appropriate to scrutinise the legislation through a brief committee process. On too many recent occasions, the coalition has found that legislation which appears to be straightforward and uncontentious has, on closer examination, either contained errors or not operated as intended. A routine scrutiny process will provide stakeholders with the opportunity to identify issues and potential improvements to the relevant parliamentary committee. It is appropriate that stakeholders have that opportunity.

It is worth making one additional comment. This legislation continues a trend, which seems particularly prevalent in the Attorney-General's portfolio, of asking the parliament to pass contingent amendments. An example of this type of contingent legislation is found in division 2 of part 4 of schedule 1 to this bill. Those provisions make amendments that are contingent on the passage of the Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Bill 2023, or the ISLA Bill for short. The ISLA Bill has not yet passed the parliament. It has not even passed the House of Representatives. It is currently before the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security.

However, the ISLA Bill, if enacted, will introduce an error into the Ombudsman Act. This is because the ISLA Bill, as introduced, did not properly take account of changes to the Ombudsman Act that took effect when the National Anti-Corruption Commission legislation passed this parliament, even though the ISLA Bill was introduced some six months after the National Anti-Corruption Commission became law.

Rather than putting forward amendments to the ISLA Bill to fix the error directly, the Attorney-General wishes to fix the error through contingent amendments in this completely separate bill. This is not good practice. It is unnecessarily complex. It introduces uncertainty. It has the potential to leave dead letters in our statute book. What is the status of these contingent amendments if the ISLA Bill does not pass in this term of parliament? Presumably, they simply have no effect, and this will serve only to puzzle future generations of government lawyers.

More importantly, this approach speaks volumes about the mismanagement of legislation in the Attorney-General's portfolio. Why did legislation introduced in June 2023 in the same portfolio and by the same minister not take account of changes made in December 2022? Why does the Attorney-General not fix errors in a bill by making amendments to that same bill? Why rely on a second bill to fix the first one? Why does the Attorney-General take the passage of both pieces of legislation for granted? The substance of these contingent changes is inconsequential, but the approach is obtuse, high handed and, sadly, all too characteristic of this Attorney-General's approach to legislation. I conclude my remarks on that sobering point.

Debate adjourned.

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