House debates

Tuesday, 19 November 2024

Committees

Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Joint Committee; Report

4:16 pm

Photo of Brendan O'ConnorBrendan O'Connor (Gorton, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

On behalf of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, I present the committee's report entitledInquiry into the Department of Defence annual report 2022-23.

Report made a parliamentary paper in accordance with standing order 39(e).

by leave—On behalf of the joint standing committee, and as the chair of the Defence Subcommittee, I present the committee 's report entitled Inquiry into the Department of Defence annual report 2022-23. This inquiry examined Australia's assistance to Ukraine, the Defence health system, Defence's capability assurance mechanism, artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons and armaments manufacture, procurement and inventory. Australia is facing an increasingly complex and rapidly evolving strategic environment with rising tensions and reduced warning time for conflict. Responding to these challenges, Australian statecraft and diplomacy is investing in Indo-Pacific partnerships while deepening engagement across South-East Asia and the Pacific and with our allies around the world.

A cornerstone of our approach remains our unwavering support for Ukraine, a commitment endorsed by our Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in fact, this government and, importantly, the federal opposition. This bipartisan support is critical not only to Ukraine's immediate needs but also to the need for a stable rules based international order. As the conflict in Ukraine endures, it is clear that Australia's support must be carefully coordinated and sustained for the long term. Our Department of Defence and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade are already doing vital work managing and coordinating this assistance. However, there is currently no central point of contact for communication and clarity of responsibilities for Ukraine, our partners and particularly the Australian public. To address this shortcoming, the subcommittee has recommended in this report the creation of a whole-of-government mechanism—a dedicated one-stop shop, if you like—to streamline Australia's support efforts. This will ensure that we are more efficient and effective in our assistance in the future.

We must also be strategic about the equipment we provide to Ukraine. The subcommittee believes it is crucial that a Ukraine lens be applied to the decision-making process around the retirement of equipment from military service. Identifying items of equipment well in advance of their retirement will allow more effective planning while providing more appropriate time to ensure Australia's ongoing compliance with international agreements and treaties.

Furthermore, transparency is essential. Public discussions about the potential gifting of military hardware like the Hawkei vehicles and Taipan helicopters have lacked some clarity. The subcommittee recommends the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade publish a summary of their decision-making processes, enabling the public to understand the rationale behind these decisions and increasing trust in our actions.

In addition to military support, Australia's training contributions to Ukraine through Operation KUDU have proven highly successful. We are committed to expanding this operation, continuing our support for the training of both Ukrainian forces and civilians to enhance their resilience.

On the diplomatic front, the subcommittee believes there is a strong case for reopening Australia's embassy in Kyiv. Given the long-term nature of the conflict, a physical diplomatic presence would not only strengthen our bilateral ties with Ukraine but also align us with 70 other nations that have already reopened their embassies. Alongside this, the subcommittee has recommended the posting of an Australian military attache in Kyiv to provide crucial support for logistics, for equipment and for training efforts on the ground.

Turning to domestic matters, we must also address the significant workload facing Defence and its health services contractor in providing healthcare services to over 60,000 personnel across various Defence units. The subcommittee heard evidence that while efforts are being made to address challenges in the healthcare system, staffing shortages and delays in medical appointments remain ongoing concerns. We urge both Defence and its contractor to investigate these issues urgently and take the necessary steps to ensure timely service delivery that meets the needs of our personnel.

The subcommittee is also concerned about Defence's oversight of its health services contract, particularly the workforce fill rates and performance targets. Despite ongoing efforts, these issues persist. The subcommittee believes continued attention and remediation are essential. Additionally, the shortfall in recruitment health assessments is affecting Defence's ability to meet its recruitment targets. We therefore call on Defence to work closely with its contractors to address these shortfalls.

Looking at the broader picture, the subcommittee reviewed Defence's capability assurance systems and is confident that they are well documented and effective. However, the subcommittee recognises that the cyber and space worthiness systems are still in development, and the subcommittee has recommended that these areas receive urgent attention. The shortage of skilled testing and evaluation personnel was identified as a key vulnerability. This gap could hinder the development of critical defence capabilities, and we have urged Defence and the defence industry to prioritise investment in training and retaining these highly skilled personnel.

The 2023 Defence Strategic Review and the 2024 National Defence Strategy provide a clear roadmap for addressing these challenges. And again, the subcommittee is confident that with a focus on minimum viable capabilities, timely delivery and allocated funding, Defence will be able to meet its objectives and build the integrated force of 2031.

Australia finds itself in a rapidly changing strategic environment, facing an elevated risk of state-on-state conflict. To meet these challenges head on, the Australian government, in collaboration with our AUKUS partners, is prioritising the development and acquisition of asymmetric capabilities, including autonomous weapons systems. These technologies will empower the Australian Defence Force to project influence effectively across a full spectrum of responses, ensuring our capacity for impactful and proportionate action in any scenario.

As we look to integrate these advanced capabilities, it is essential that we assess the full range of artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons systems to ensure they meet the unique requirements of our defence strategy. However, we must also remain committed to the principle that all new capabilities be fully compliant with international humanitarian law.

The subcommittee acknowledges that rapid advancements in AI and computing will continue to shape the future of weapon systems. To guarantee the reliability and functionality of these systems, Defence must establish robust test and evaluation frameworks, ensuring systems are thoroughly validated before deployment.

Additionally, we must address challenges such as automation bias and ensure our personnel are trained to understand the limitations of these new technologies.

The subcommittee heard evidence on the application of international humanitarian law, particularly article 36 of the additional protocol to the Geneva conventions, in regulating the use of AI and autonomous systems in modern warfare. The subcommittee is confident that existing legal frameworks remain sufficient to govern these advancements and that state responsibility will continue to apply in situations where individual accountability is unclear.

Australia remains committed to contributing to international discussions on AI policy, and we must stay informed of evolving international law and policy developments. As such, the subcommittee strongly urges Defence to continue adhering to the requirements of article 36 of the Geneva conventions and other relevant international obligations as we develop, acquire and deploy new defence technologies. Australia's future defence capabilities will be shaped by innovation. But we must always ensure they align with our legal and ethical obligations. This balance will safeguard our national security while upholding our commitment to international law.

Finally, as we strengthen Australia's sovereign defence capabilities we must address our reliance on international supply chains, particularly around munitions. The subcommittee has recommended sourcing more components domestically to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities in times of conflict or other disruptions. Additionally, a transparent reporting framework for guided weapons explosive ordnance stockholdings has been recommended, which will allow progress to be tracked and Australia's self-reliance in munitions production to be enhanced.

While challenges remain, the subcommittee is confident that Defence's ongoing efforts to improve its systems and capabilities will position Australia's defence for long-term success. By strengthening domestic industries, improving transparency and staying agile in response to emerging threats, we can ensure that Australia's defence remains robust and resilient, securing our national security both now and into the future.

In conclusion, I thank, firstly, the deputy chair, Andrew Wallace MP, and other members of the subcommittee for their final contributions to this inquiry. I also extend my thanks to Julian Hill for his critical contributions to the inquiry as the former chair of the subcommittee. I also thank the secretariat, Wing Commander Julian Baesjou and committee secretary Kate Portus for their advice and their support to the subcommittee in the past year, and all the witnesses and contributors to this inquiry—including the significant support from Defence in briefing the subcommittee and supporting its site visits in Queensland and Victoria.

I commend the report to the House, and I move:

That the House take note of the report.

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