Allegra Spender (Wentworth, Independent) Share this | Hansard source

by leave—I move amendments (1) to (8) as circulated in my name together:

(1) Schedule 4, item 2, page 97 (after line 21), after the definition of Federal cap in section 302ALA, insert:

Independent House candidate means a candidate for election to the House of Representatives, for a Division, at any time while the candidate is not endorsed by a registered political party.

Independent House candidate Divisional cap means 150% of the Divisional cap.

(2) Schedule 4, item 2, page 97 (lines 23 to 25), omit "a candidate for election to the House of Representatives, for a Division, at any time while the candidate is not endorsed by a registered political party", substitute "an Independent House candidate".

(3) Schedule 4, item 2, page 98 (lines 1 to 3), omit the definition of Independent House of Representatives by-election cap in section 302ALA, substitute:

Independent House of Representatives by-election cap, for a by-election, means:

(a) for an Independent House candidate—120% of the Independent House candidate Divisional cap that applies on the 2 day the writ for the by-election is issued; or

(b) otherwise—120% of the Divisional cap that applies on the 2 day the writ for the by-election is issued.

(4) Schedule 4, item 2, page 98 (lines 4 and 5), omit the definition of Independent House of Representatives cap in section 302ALA, substitute:

Independent House of Representatives cap means:

(a) for an Independent House candidate—the Independent House candidate Divisional cap; or

(b) otherwise—the Divisional cap.

(5) Schedule 4, item 2, page 98 (before line 6), before the definition of Independent Senate candidate or Senator in section 302ALA, insert:

Independent Senate candidate means a candidate for election to the Senate, for a State or Territory, at any time while the candidate is not endorsed by a registered political party.

(6) Schedule 4, item 2, page 98 (lines 7 to 9), omit "a candidate for election to the Senate, for a State or Territory, at any time while the candidate is not endorsed by a registered political party", substitute "an Independent Senate candidate".

(7) Schedule 4, item 2, page 98 (after line 16), after the definition of Independent Senate candidate or Senator in section 302ALA, insert:

Independent Senate candidate Senate base amount means 150% of the Senate base amount.

(8) Schedule 4, item 2, page 98 (lines 19 and 20), omit paragraph (a) of the definition of Independent Senate cap in section 302ALA, substitute:

(a) multiplying whichever of the following applies by the number of Divisions in the State or Territory:

(i) for an Independent Senate candidate—the Independent Senate candidate Senate base amount;

(ii) otherwise—the Senate base amount; and

This is a deeply problematic bill and a deeply problematic process that has been followed to push it through the House with almost no scrutiny. Despite the complexity of the legislation, despite it running to more than 200 pages and despite it being described by the minister as the largest reform to Australia's electoral laws for over 40 years, the government and the opposition voted against the bill even being considered by a committee inquiry. This is clearly a stitch-up, trying to entrench incumbency and reduce competition in our democracy. It is very telling that, aside from the minister and shadow minister, not a single member of either the Labor Party, the Liberal Party or the National Party got up to defend this bill. That says it all.

One of the biggest issues in this bill is the structural spending caps. I support spending caps in principle. As we all agree, Clive Palmer should not be able to spend more than $100 million on an election. So, on paper, the $800,000 spending cap for individual candidates seems reasonable. But, when you unpack how these caps are applied, it's clear they create a structural bias towards the major parties. Whilst an Independent is limited to spending $800,000, the major party can not only spend $800,000 promoting themselves personally with their name; they also benefit from their party's advertising for the Senate, up to $9.2 million in New South Wales, as well as their party's national spending, which can be up to $90 million overall. The structure of these caps has many loopholes, that the Labor Party could line every single street in my electorate with banners saying, 'Vote (1) Labor,' and it would not count towards a candidate's $800,000 divisional cap.

I have heard the minister describe how he didn't need to spend $800,000 on his electorate and this should be allowed for competition. But the point is that this bill entrenches unfairness in competition. And this is why the loopholes are being called by the Centre for Public Integrity, Transparency International and the Australian Democracy Network—I mean, these are hardly bodies that are sitting there not interested in electoral reform. These guys have been pushing it from long before the Labor Party agreed to do this. They all said yesterday that 'the bill will entrench major party and incumbency advantage', and they said passing it without an inquiry was 'not in the interest of the Australian public'.

While Independent MPs like me are disadvantaged by the structure of these caps, the impact on challengers is much worse. New independent candidates, selected by communities who are frustrated by major parties' failures to tackle long-term problems, face huge barriers. Most of these candidates, including most of the people on the crossbench right now, do not have a political past. They come from business. They are doctors. They are from not-for-profits or, perhaps, the public service. That is exactly the sort of diversity we want in this parliament, but it means that challengers usually don't have a big profile and will have to spend heavily to build name recognition, establish credibility and educate the electorate about their policies. In contrast, the major party can rely on the reputation of the party. They can rely on the fact that the major parties are on television practically every single day and that the major parties have consistently used public spending on advertising to promote what they do in their parties and to really build on the back of these in the national media, even if incumbent MPs, like me, have an advantage over them. So applying the same cap to Independent challengers and to incumbents is clearly not a level playing field.

This amendment seeks to address that imbalance. It raises the spending cap for non-incumbent Independent candidates in the House and allows them to spend 150 per cent of the divisional cap. An equivalent provision is made for in the Senate. This change is modelled on spending caps in New South Wales, where Independents are able to spend 1.5 times that of major parties. This amendment does not benefit a single member of this House nor a single member of this crossbench, and I think that should be noted, because I think there has been a lot of imputation, saying I'm trying to protect—this is not about me trying to protect my seat. This is about trying to make sure that we have contestability in our parliament and in our democracy, and that means competition. It does not benefit a single senator. It only benefits those who seek to challenge us, and it is about purely creating competition in our democracy.

The government could argue that this cap unfairly disadvantages major party candidates at the expense of their challengers, and I would refer them to my earlier example. This bill bakes in structural spending advantages for the major parties, which this amendment would only partly—and I hesitate to bring it forward because I know it will only partly address so many problems in this bill, but it would still make it better for challengers. (Time expired)

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